

17

THE
ART OF RHETORIC:
OR, THE
ELEMENTS OF ORATORY,
ADAPTED TO THE PRACTICE
OF THE STUDENTS OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.

METHODICALLY ARRANGED FROM THE
ANCIENT AND MODERN RHETORICAL WRITERS, VIZ:

ARISTOTLE,	PETRUS RAMUS,	FARNABY,
CICERO,	CYP. SOARIUS,	LOWE,
DIONYSIUS <i>of Hal.</i> ,	DUGARD,	ROLLIN,
ISOCRATES,	BLACKWALL,	SMITH,
PLATO,	BLAIR,	WALKER,
QUINTILIAN,	BURTON,	<i>Archbishop of CAMBRAY,</i>
VOSSIUS,	BUTLER,	<i>Messrs. de PORT-ROYAL,</i>
	&c. &c.	

BY JOHN HOLMES,

LATE MASTER OF THE PUBLIC GRAMMAR SCHOOL IN HOLT, NORFOLK, (ENGLAND.)

TO WHICH IS ADDED
QUINTILIAN'S COURSE

OF AN
ANCIENT ROMAN EDUCATION;
FROM THE PUPIL'S FIRST ELEMENTS,
TO HIS ENTRANCE INTO THE SCHOOL OF ORATORY.

A NEW AND CAREFULLY CORRECTED EDITION,
IN TWO BOOKS.

ENTIRELY REMODELED:

FOR THE USE OF SCHOOLS, ACADEMIES, AND COLLEGES.

BY JOHN A. GETTY, A. M.

Song charms the sense, but eloquence the soul.—MILTON.

—Res antiquæ Laudis et Artis
Ingredior, sanctos ausus recludere Fontes.—VIRGIL.

PHILADELPHIA:
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1849.

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THIS TREATISE OF RHETORIC,

OR,

THE ELEMENTS OF ORATORY,

FOR THE INSTRUCTION OF YOUTH IN THE ART OF SPEAKING WELL AND WRITING
ELEGANTLY,

IS HUMBLY INSCRIBED BY

YOUR FAITHFUL, OBLIGED, AND

MOST OBEDIENT SERVANT,

JOHN HOLMES.

AMPLISSIMIS ERUDITISSIMISQUE

VIRIS,

REVERENDO ADMODUM IN CHRISTO PATRI AC DOMINO

D. THOMÆ HAYTER,

EPISCOPO NORVICENSI,

NEC NON

PRÆCLARO HUMANISSIMOQUE

D. JOSEPHO ATWELL, D.D.

EJUSDEM DIOCESEOS CANCELLARIO,

S. P. D.

JOHANNES HOLMES.

QUONIAM naturâ tenacissimi sumus omnes eorum, quæ rudibus annis percipimus; et quia, ad parandam bonam juventuti mentem, plurimum habet momenti, gustum optimarum rerum protinus insevisse teneris animis; hoc opus, DIGNISSIMI ORNATISSIMIQUE VIRI, in scholarum usum jamdudum institui: nempe TRACTATUM ORATORIUM ex diversorum *rhetorum*, illorumque neque unius Ætatis nec regionis, officinis depromptum.

In quo formando expoliendoque non nihil operæ oleique consumpsi; et (quod olim vestris antecessoribus, εὐλογημένοις τῷ Θεῷ τῷ Πατρὶ, Matt. xxv. 34, humiliter obtuli) nunc *de novo* vobis VENERANDI DOMINI, summâ cum reverentiâ humillimè do, DICO, DEDICO.

Liber enim, si me non fallit augurium, qui *artificium dicendi* à veteribus traditum, *legitimâ, jucundâ, facillimâ*, ac quasi *compendiariâ* METHODO breviter explicabit, atque inde fortasse ad *eloquentiæ studium* ornate loquendi cupidos inflammabit, ad vos, domini, qui tot *ecclesiis* et *ludis literariis* præsidetis, ingratus venire nequaquam poterit.

Ne verò cuilibet importuno et rerum malo æstimatori auctor, ut qui

libellum scholasticum talibus dedicat, temerarius videatur; sciatis, obsecro, AMPLISSIMI DOMINI, quod non modò *liber* hoc *ipse* postulabat, sed *personæ meæ* nihil convenientius esse ducebam: imò officio meo desuisse censi possem, si alibi illius mihi quæsissem patronos. Quid enim decentius, aut quid æquius, quàm ut vobis, qui juventutis HOLTENSI in GYMNASIO liberalibus studiis operam dantis institutionem mihi, per *licentiam* vestram, committitis, non solùm negotii, verum etiam otii mei, quantumvis licet exigui, aliquam redderem rationem? Porro autem illud nunc eo libentiùs facio, quod hoc meæ erga vos *observantiæ testimonium* haud illaudabile aut ἀποδοσίον, ut aiunt, fore arbitror; nihil metuens ne, dum eam in rem hâc occasione, non arreptâ, sed ultro oblatâ, utor, in arrogantiae ut temeritatis suspicionem apud vos incidam: quasi levia, nec titulis neque gravitati vestræ convenientia, sint, quæ in hoc opere continentur.

Quatenus enim ad *subjectum* nostrum, PRÆSUL ORNATISSIME, si nihil à Deo *oratione* melius accepimus, quid tam dignum cultu ac labore ducamus, aut in quo malimus præstare hominibus, quàm quo ipsi homines cæteris animalibus præstant?—Quòd si *orationis* tanta præstantia est, DIGNISSIME CANCELLARIE, non potest non maxima esse dignitas RHETORICÆ, quâ *ornandæ orationis doctrina* continetur.

Ad juventutis studiosæ, quæ in spem patriæ adolescit, *orationem* formandam jamdudum *utriusque linguæ doctorum* GRAMMATICAS erudito orbi exposui; qui, supremo numine favente, benigniter eas acceperunt, magnoperè comprobârunt, et undique coëmendo remuneraverunt: quàmobrem planè ita confido, ut volente itidem Deo cujus nutu omnia reguntur, aliquo etiam nunc loco finant apud eos esse lucubrationes elaboratas has nostras, quæ ad *ornatè* DICENDI ARTEM pertinent, et quas sub vestris potissimùm amplis et auspiciatissimis nominibus in eorum manus pervenire volui. Nec minus quoque spero quòd hilari illas vultu PRÆSTANTISSIMI MÆCENATES, etiam vos ipsi admittetis. Quod profectò facietis, nisi me fallunt omnia.

DEUM ter optimum maximum suppliciter veneror, ut omnia vestra, DIGNISSIMI VIRI, consilia fortunet, et hic, aucto indies nominum vestrorum splendore, vos, diu *patriæ ecclesiæ, Norfolciensi comitatui, scholæque* nostræ, salvos et superstites esse velit.

Dabam HOLTH nunc denuò *Calendis ipsis Januarii, Anno Salutis*
Humanæ, 1775.

P R E F A C E .

THE unanimous voice of every civilized nation has awarded unfading laurels to the ancient orators of Greece and Rome. The thunder of DEMOSTHENES shook the throne of the Macedonian Philip to its foundation, and the weight of CICERO'S unrivalled eloquence balanced, for some time, the tottering Republic of Rome. In the composition of these Elements, the chief design of the author has been to facilitate the acquisition of those high and sublime ideas of oratory which are interspersed throughout the ancient classics. For this purpose he has consulted the writings of ARISTOTLE, LONGINUS, CICERO, QUINTILIAN, and other distinguished "heroes of antiquity." He has also adopted, in many instances, the sentiments of modern rhetorical writers: and, in Elocution, many of the most appropriate examples have been selected from the Sacred Scriptures. In order, however, to a successful comprehension of the subject, the author has prepared, for this edition, a Translation of the first book of Quintilian's Institutes of the Orator. This invaluable production of antiquity, comprises a full course of an ancient Roman education, *preparatory to the study of Oratory.*

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* * * To find any Trope or Figure in the Latin part of Elocution: find, by the Index, the Trope or Figure in the English part, and the number of the one in the English will be found to correspond to the same in Latin.

BOOK I.



THE
ART OF RHETORIC:
OR, THE
ELEMENTS OF ORATORY.

WHAT is Rhetoric?

“Rhetoric is the art of speaking in such a manner as to attain the end for which we speak.”*

Into how many questions may it be resolved?

Two: the first, regarding the quality, the second, the import of the words by which it is defined.

INTRODUCTION.

DEFINITIONS OF RHETORIC, FROM QUINTILIAN'S
INSTITUTES OF THE ORATOR.

I.

Let us first examine what rhetoric is, of which there are different definitions. Considered in itself, it may be resolved into two questions; the first, regarding *the*

* Blair, Lecture XXV.—Lord Bacon defines rhetoric, or oratory, to be the art of applying and addressing the dictates of reason to the fancy, and of so recommending them as to affect the will and desires.

Vossius defines rhetoric, the faculty of discovering what every subject affords of use for persuasion.

What is the principal difference of opinions in this respect?

Some think that bad men may be called orators; whereas, others wish this name, and the art of which we speak, to be attributed entirely to the good.

In what do they, who separate eloquence from the greatest merit in life, make the duty of an orator to consist?

In persuading, or in speaking pertinently to persuade.

quality of the thing,* whether good or bad; the second, *the import of the words*,† by which it is defined. The principal difference of opinion in this respect is, that some think bad men may be called orators; whereas, others, whose sentiments we choose to adopt, desire this name, and the art of which we speak, to be attributed entirely to the good.‡

They who separate eloquence from the greatest and most desirable merit in life, make the duty of an orator to consist in *persuading*, or in *speaking pertinently to persuade*,§ which a bad man may equally effect. Rhetoric has, therefore, been commonly defined, “The

* *De qualitate ipsius rei.*

† *De comprehensione verborum.*

‡ But our opponents may say, that a bad man will make an exordium and narration, and use proofs and arguments, all equally good and cogent in their kind. And so also a robber will fight bravely, yet fortitude will be a virtue. A vicious slave will patiently endure tortures, yet constancy will not be deprived of its praise.”—*Quint.*, lib. ii. cap. xxi.

§ In persuadendo, aut in dicendo apposite ad persuadendum.

How, therefore, has rhetoric been commonly defined?

The power of persuading.

From whom did this opinion originate?

Socrates.

By what name does he designate it?

The workmanship of persuasion.

What does Cicero say that the duty of an orator is?

To speak in a manner proper to persuade.

In what does he make the end of eloquence to consist?

Persuasion.

power of persuading.”* This opinion originated from Socrates: not that he intended to dishonor his profession, though he gives us a dangerous idea of rhetoric, by calling it the workmanship (πειθεὶς δημιουργόν) of persuasion.† We find almost the same thing in the *Gorgias* of Plato; but this was the opinion of that rhetorician, and not of Plato. Cicero has written, in many places, that the duty of an orator is to speak in “a manner proper to persuade.”‡ And in his books of rhetoric,§ which undoubtedly he does not approve, he makes the end of eloquence to consist in persuasion.

But does not money persuade? Is not credit the authority of the speaker, and the dignity of an honorable person attended with the same effect? Even, without speaking a word, the remembrance of past

* Rhetorice esse vim persuadendi.

† Dicens esse rhetoricam persuadendi opificem.

‡ Oratoris officium esse, dicere apposite ad persuadendum. See *Cic. de Orat.*, lib. i.

§ Finem facit persuadere. See *Cic. de Inv.*, lib. i. 6.

Enumerate from the text those examples where, without speaking a word, the remembrance of past services, the appearance of distress, and beauty of form, resulted in persuasion.

How does Gorgias define rhetoric?

The power of persuading by speaking.

services, the appearance of distress; and beauty of form, are decisive in their favor. Did Antonius, pleading the cause of M. Aquilius,* trust to the force of his reasons, when he abruptly tore open his garment and exposed to view the wounds he received in fighting for his country? This act forced streams of tears from the eyes of the Roman people, who, not able to resist such a moving spectacle, acquitted the criminal. Servius Galba† escaped the severity of the laws by ap-

* "When I was to save M. Aquilius from banishment, while I touched upon the pathetic part, did I not feel all the passion I expressed? When I saw the man whom I recollected to have been consul, to have been a general distinguished by the senate, to have mounted the steps of the capitol in an oration, depressed, dejected, sorrowful, in imminent danger, is it to be imagined that I attempted to awaken sentiments of pity in the breasts of others before I felt them in my own? Yes, I perceived that it greatly affected the judges when I appealed to the old man's sorrow and dejection; and when I did, what you, Crassus, have commended, when, not from any art of which I know not how to treat, but from a strong convulsion of grief and concern, I tore open his vest to show his scars."—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. ii. cap. 47.

† The same person used to blame Servius Galba because, upon an action brought against him by L. Scribonius, he had worked the people to compassion. The circumstance, however, for which Rutilius blamed Galba, was, because he had reared almost upon his shoulders the young son of Caius Sulpicius Gallus, who was his relation; and thereby drew tears from the people, who remembered how dear his father had been

In what does Theodectes make the end of rhetoric to consist?

In leading men wherever one pleases by the faculty of speaking.

Is this definition sufficiently comprehensive?

No: flatterers and others, besides the orator, per-

pearing in court with his own little children, and the son of Gallus Sulpicius in his arms; by which the sight of so many wretched objects melted the judges into compassion. This we find equally attested by some of our historians, and by a speech of Cato. What shall I say of Phryne, whose beauty was of more service in her cause than all the eloquence of Hyperides.

Now, if all these examples persuade, consequently persuasion cannot be the end of rhetoric.

Some, therefore, have appeared to themselves rather more exact, who, although of a similar opinion, define rhetoric "the power of persuading by speaking."* Gorgias, in the book above cited, is at last reduced to this by Socrates. Theodectes concurs with these, if the work inscribed with his name be genuine. In this book, the end of rhetoric is, "to lead men wherever one pleases by the faculty of speaking."† But this definition is not sufficiently comprehensive. Many others, besides the orator, persuade by their words,

to them; and who had recommended himself and his two infant sons to the guardianship of the Roman people. Rutilius said, that by those touching circumstances, though Galba was both hated and detested by the people at that time, he was acquitted."—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. i. cap. 53.

* Existimaverunt eam vim dicendo persuadendi.

† Ducere homines dicendo in id, quod actor velit.

suade by their words, and influence minds to what they please.

Does an orator always persuade?

No: sometimes it is not properly his end, and sometimes this end is common to him with others.

How does Aristotle define rhetoric?

The power of inventing whatever is persuasive in a discourse.

In Plato's *Gorgias* how is it represented?

Inseparable from virtue.

and influence minds to what they please. Flatterers and infamous persons frequently accomplish this end. On the contrary, an orator does not always persuade; sometimes it is not properly his end, and sometimes this end is common to him with other different characters.

Some, therefore, setting aside the consideration of the end, as Aristotle, have defined rhetoric to be, "the power of inventing whatever is persuasive in a discourse."* This definition is equally as exceptionable as the one above mentioned; and is, likewise, defective in another respect, as it includes only invention, which, when separated from elocution, cannot constitute a speech.

It appears from Plato's *Gorgias* that he was far from reputed rhetoric to be an art of a pernicious tendency; but that it is, or ought to be, if we were to conceive an adequate idea of it, inseparable from virtue.

* Ἐξω δ' ἡ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις, περὶ ἑκάστων, τῷ διακρίσσει τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν.
—*Arist. Rhet.*, lib. i.

What is said in Plato's Phœdrus with regard to rhetoric?

That this art can never be perfect without an exact knowledge and strict observance of justice.

Had these not been his real sentiments would he have written an apology for Socrates, and the eulogium of those brave citizens who lost their lives in the defence of their country?

No.

How was Socrates influenced when he refused to pronounce the speech which Lysias had composed for his defence?

With the same spirit.

What was the custom of the orators of those times?

To write speeches for arraigned criminals, which they pronounced in their own defence.

This he explains more clearly in his Phœdrus, where he says, that "this art can never be perfect without an exact knowledge and strict observance of justice."* I unite with him in opinion; for had these not been his real sentiments, would he have written an apology for Socrates, and the eulogium of those brave citizens who lost their lives in the defence of their country? This is certainly acting the part of an orator, and if he, in any respect, attacks the profession, it is on their account who make a pernicious use of eloquence. Socrates, influenced with the same spirit, refused to pronounce the speech which Lysias had composed for his defence. For it was the custom of the orators of those times to

* Hanc artem consummari citra justitiæ quoque scientiam non posse.

What was the object?

To elude the law which prohibited pleading for another.

What masters does Plato in his *Phædrus* condemn?

Those who separate rhetoric from justice, and preferred probabilities to truth.

How does Quintilian define rhetoric?

The science of speaking well.

write speeches for arraigned criminals, which they pronounced in their own defence; and, therefore, the law which prohibited pleading for another was eluded. Plato, likewise, in his *Phædrus*, condemns those masters who separated rhetoric from justice, and preferred probabilities to truth.

Such are the definitions of rhetoric which have been principally agitated. For, to go through with all of them, is neither my design, nor do I think it possible; as most writers on arts have exhibited a perverse desire for defining nothing the same way, or in the terms of others who wrote before them. I am far from being influenced by the same ambition, and far from flattering myself with the glory of invention, shall rest satisfied with saying, that rhetoric is properly defined "The science of speaking well."*—*Lib. ii. cap. 6.*

* *Rhetoriken esse bene dicendi scientiam.*

II.

To what question does Quintilian here proceed?

Whether rhetoric be an art.

What title did those who wrote precepts of eloquence prefix to their books?

The art of speaking.

What does Cicero call rhetoric?

An artificial eloquence.

FROM QUINTILIAN'S INSTITUTES OF THE ORATOR.

Is rhetoric an art?

II.

There would be no end, were I to expatiate on this matter, and indulge my pleasure. I shall therefore proceed to the following question:—"Is rhetoric an art?"* Those who wrote precepts of eloquence doubted so little of this, that they prefixed no other title to their books, than the "Art of speaking." Cicero says, that what we call rhetoric, is only an *artificial eloquence*.† Who, therefore, can be so devoid of sense and knowledge, as to imagine an art in architecture, in weaving, and in pottery; and that rhetoric, the excellency of which we have already shown, could have arrived

* "For almost all other arts exist independently of one another, but that of eloquence, which is the art of speaking sensibly, skillfully, and beautifully, has no determined limits within which it can be bounded."
—Cic. de Orat., lib. ii. cap. 2.

† See Cic. de Invent., lib. i. cap. 6.

How were those of a contrary opinion influenced ?

More for the sake of exercising their ingenuity on the singularity of the subject than from any real conviction.

What example is given ?

Polycrates, when he wrote panegyrics on Busiris and Clytemnestra, and composed an oration against Socrates.

What do some maintain that rhetoric is ?

A gift of nature, which may be assisted by exercise.

What does Antonius, in Cicero's books of the orator, call it ?

A sort of observation, and not an art.

Was this Cicero's view of the subject ?

at its present state of grandeur and perfection without the direction of art ? I am persuaded, that those of a contrary opinion were influenced more for the sake of exercising their ingenuity on the singularity of the subject, than from any real conviction. Such was Polycrates, when he wrote panegyrics on Busiris and Clytemnestra, and composed an oration which he pronounced against Socrates.

Some maintain that rhetoric is a gift of nature, which may be assisted by exercise. Antonius, in Cicero's books of the orator, calls it a sort of *observation*, and *not an art*.* But this is not there asserted as truth, but only to support the character of Antonius, who was a *dissembler*† of art. Lysias seems to be of

* *Observationem quandem esse, non artem.*

† *Dissimulator*, "one who makes as though that were not which is."

No: his object was only to support the character of Antonius, who was a dissembler of art.

Who coincided in opinion with Antonius?

Lysias.

How does Lysias show that the most simple and illiterate possess a kind of rhetoric when they speak for themselves?

They find something like an exordium, they make a narration, they prove, refute, and their prayers and entreaties have the force of a peroration.

Recite from the text the cavils of Lysias.

the same opinion, which he defends by saying, that the most simple and illiterate possess a kind of rhetoric when they speak for themselves. They find something *like an exordium; they make a narration; they prove, refute, and their prayers and entreaties* have the force of a peroration. Lysias and his adherents proceed afterwards to these cavils:—"That what is the effect of an art could not have existed before the art: but in all times men knew how to speak for themselves and against others: masters of rhetoric having been only of a late date, and first known about the time of Corax and Tisias: therefore an oratorical speech was prior to art; and consequently, rhetoric is not an art." We shall not endeavor to inquire into the time when rhetoric began to be taught; although Homer mentions not only Phoenix,* who was a master skilled both in speaking and fighting, but also many other orators.

* "Thus Phoenix, in Homer, says (*Il.* lib. ix. v. 438) he was ordered to attend Achilles in the war by his father, Peleus, that he might teach him both how to *speak* and how to *act*."—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. ii. cap. 15.

What writer is quoted to prove its antiquity?

Homer.

Enumerate from the text the examples from Homer.

What answer will be sufficient to the cavils of Lysias?

That everything perfected by art has its source in nature.

Were this not so what should we exclude from the catalogue of arts?

Medicine.

To what was the discovery of this art owing?

To observations on things conducive or hurtful to health.

On what, in the opinion of some, is it altogether founded.

On experiments.

We may also observe from Homer, that all the parts of an oration are found in the speech of the three* chiefs deputed to Achilles; that several young men dispute for the prize of eloquence; and that among other ornaments of sculpture on the buckler of Achilles, Vulcan did not forget law-causes and their pleaders.†

It will, however, be sufficient to answer, "*that everything perfected by art has its source in nature.*‡ Were it not so, we should exclude medicine from the catalogue of arts, the discovery of which was owing to observations made on things conducive or hurtful to health; and, in the opinion of some, founded altogether

* Phœnix, Ajax, and Ulysses.

† Il., lib. xviii. v. 469.

‡ Omnia, quæ ars consummaverit, a natura initia auxisse.

Explain from the text the course pursued before it was reduced to an art.

Would architecture, according to the reasoning of our opponents, be an art?

No: because the first men built their cottages without its direction.

What other art would undergo a similar fate?

Music; as every nation has its peculiarities in dancing and singing.

What inference, therefore, must be drawn?

That the orator must have been made by art, and, therefore, could not exist before it.

What other objection is urged?

That everything effected by one's self without learning, does not depend on art; but men know how to speak, though they never learned to speak: therefore," &c.

on experiments. Before it was reduced to an art, tents and bandages were applied to wounds; rest and abstinence cured a fever: not that the reason was then known, but the nature of the disease obliged men to this regimen. In like manner architecture cannot be an art; for the first men built their cottages without its direction. Music would undergo a similar fate; as every nation has its peculiarities in dancing and singing. Now, if rhetoric be taken for any kind of speech, I shall admit that it was prior to art; but if every one who speaks is not an orator, and if, in the primitive ages men did not speak like orators, consequently the orator must have been made by art, and therefore could not exist before it.

How is this objection refuted ?

By what has been already said.

What example is adduced to confirm their argument ?

Demades and Æschines.

Can any person be an orator unless he has learned to be so ?

No.

To what, then, will the example of Demades and Æschines amount ?

To nothing more than that they applied themselves rather too late to eloquence.

What I have said refutes this other objection: "That everything effected by one's self, without learning, does not depend on art; but men know how to speak, though they never learned to speak: therefore, &c." They adduce the example of Demades, a waterman, and Æschines, a comedian, to confirm this argument. I assert, however, that no person can be an orator unless he has learned to be so; and all that can be alleged concerning Demades and Æschines, will amount to nothing more than that they applied themselves rather too late to eloquence. Æschines, it is certain, was in his younger years instructed in the letters which his father taught. Of the learning of Demades nothing is positively asserted; though, by the continual exercise of speaking he might have become, as he was afterwards reputed, a great orator. There cannot be a more effectual way to learn this; and, it may be said, he would have been a more accomplished speaker had he been assisted by the precepts of art; but, as he never attempted to publish any of his speeches, we cannot form a competent judgment of his eloquence.

What is the next objection?

When rhetoric asserts false things instead of true, does it follow that it assents to what is false?

No.

When Hannibal adopted the expedient of extricating his army, whom did he deceive?

Fabius.

When Theopompus, the Spartan, by changing clothes with his wife, was about to escape from prison, did he practise the deception upon himself or the guards?

Upon the guards.

The next objection is not so much one in reality as a mere cavil. "That art never assents to false opinions, because it cannot be constituted as such without precepts, which are always true: but rhetoric assents to what is false: therefore it is not an art." I admit that rhetoric sometimes asserts false things instead of true; but it does not follow that it assents to what is false. There is a wide difference between assenting to a falsehood, and inducing others to assent. A general of an army has often recourse to stratagems: thus, when Hannibal perceived himself to be surrounded by Fabius, he ordered fagots to be fastened about the horns of some oxen, and fire being set to them, had the cattle driven up the mountains in the night, in order to let the enemy see he was decamping; but he deceived him; for he was very well aware of the contrivance. When Theopompus, the Spartan, by changing clothes with his wife, was about to escape from prison, he did not practise the deception upon himself, but upon the guards. Thus, when an orator speaks

When an orator speaks falsehood, what is his intention?

To deceive others.

When Cicero boasted that he threw darkness on the intellects of the judges in the cause of Cluentius, was he unacquainted with all the intricacies that embarrassed the fact?

No.

What is said in the text with regard to the painter?

What is the fourth objection?

Whom can this objection affect?

Those who make persuasion the end of rhetoric.

Can an orator, who loses his cause, be said to fulfil the injunctions of his art?

falsehood instead of truth, he knows it to be false; he does not assent to it himself, his intention being to deceive others. When Cicero boasted that he threw darkness on the intellects of the judges, in the cause of Cluentius, could it be said that he was unacquainted with all the intricacies which embarrassed the fact? Or shall a painter, who so disposes his objects that some appear to project from the canvas, others to recede, be supposed not to know that they are all drawn upon a plane surface?

It is again objected, that "every art proposes to itself an end: but rhetoric has no end: therefore it is not an art." This objection can only affect those who make persuasion the end of rhetoric; but our orator, and our definition of art, are not restricted to events. An orator, indeed, strives to gain his cause; but should he lose it, provided he has pleaded well, he fulfils the

Yes, provided he has pleaded well.

Recite from the text the examples of the pilot and physician.

injunctions of his art. A pilot is desirous of coming safe into port; but should a storm sweep away his ship, is he, therefore, a less experienced pilot? His keeping constantly to the helm* sufficiently attests that he was not wanting to his duty. A physician strives to cure a sick person; but if his remedies are obstructed in their operation, by either the violence of the disease, the intemperance of the patient, or some unforeseen accident, he is not to be blamed, because he has satisfied all the directions of his art. So it is with the orator, whose end is to speak well; for it is *in the act*, and *not in the effect*, that art consists. The declaration is, therefore, false, "that arts know when they have obtained their end; but that rhetoric knows nothing of the matter;" for every orator knows when he acquits himself well.

These are the principal objections which have been urged against rhetoric. There are others of less moment, but derived from the same source. That rhetoric is an art is thus briefly demonstrated. If "art," as Cleanthes asserts, "is a power which prepares a way and establishes an order,"† it cannot be doubted but that we must keep to a certain way, and a certain

* The hemistich, in the Latin text, "Dum clavum rectum teneam," is probably taken from Ennius:

Dum clavum rectum teneam, navimque gubernem,
Non sum culpandus.

† *Ars est potestas via, id est ordine, efficiens.*

How is rhetoric proved to be an art ?

If art, as Cleanthes asserts, is a power which prepares a way and establishes an order, so in speaking well, we must keep to a certain way, and a certain order.

What ought we to call art, according to the most generally received opinion ?

Everything which, by a combination of concurring and co-exercised precepts, conducts to a useful end.

Is rhetoric deficient in any of these things ?

No.

What two constituent parts has it in common with other arts ?

Theory and practice.

order in speaking well. And if, according to the most generally received opinion, we ought to call art, everything which, by a combination of concurring and co-exercised precepts conducts to a useful end; have we not shown that nothing of all this is wanting to rhetoric ? Has it not likewise the two constituent parts of other arts, theory and practice ? And if logic be an art, as it is admitted to be by the same reason, so is rhetoric, the chief difference consisting not so much in the genus as species.* But we must not forget this

* Logic has for its object all things upon which it undertakes to dispute ; ought, then, rhetoric to suffer a limitation, which only differs from it in a more diffuse style and manner ?—*Cap. 22.*

There are two kinds of discourse ; the one continued, which is called rhetoric ; the other interrupted, called logic, which Zeno so slightly distinguished that he compared the latter to a fist, and the former to an open hand.—*Cap. 21.*

If logic be an art, why must rhetoric be also an art?
Because they both participate of the same nature.

Where must art necessarily exist?

Where a thing is done according to rule, and not at random.

How is this exemplified in matters of eloquence?

An illiterate person will not only be vanquished by a learned, but also the learned by the more learned.

III.

Enumerate from the text those invectives which have been urged against eloquence.

observation, that there art must be where a thing is done according to rule,* and not at random;† and there art must be where he who has learned succeeds better than he who has not learned. But in matters of eloquence an illiterate person will not only be vanquished by a learned, but also the learned by the more learned; otherwise, we should not have had so many precepts, and so many excellent masters.—*Lib. ii. cap. 18.*

FROM QUINTILIAN'S INSTITUTES OF THE ORATOR.

The Utility of Rhetoric.

III.

A question arises, *is rhetoric† useful?* Some urge the bitterest invectives against it, and, what is most disreputable, exert the force of eloquence against elo-

* *Artificialiter.*

† *Inartificialiter.*

‡ *Sequitur quæstio, an utilis rhetorice?*

With what do comic poets reproach Socrates ?

With teaching how to make a bad cause good.

How are Plato and Lysias represented ?

Promising the same thing.

Why was rhetoric banished from Sparta, and so restricted at Athens that the orator was not at liberty to move the passions ?

Because eloquence had been not only the ruin of private persons, but the destruction of whole cities and republics.

quence. "*That by it the wicked are rescued from punishment, and the innocent oppressed by its artifices ; that it perverts good counsel, and enforces bad ; that it fomented popular commotions and seditions in states ; that it arms nations against each other, and makes them irreconcilable enemies ; and that its power is never more manifested than when error and falsehood triumph over truth.*"

Comic poets* reproach Socrates with teaching how to make a bad cause good;† and Plato represents Lysias and Gorgias promising the same thing. To these are added several examples of Greeks and Romans, and a long enumeration of orators, whose eloquence was not only the ruin of private persons, but the destruction of whole cities and republics; and for this reason rhetoric was banished from Sparta, and so restricted at Athens, that the orator was not at liberty to move the passions.

* *Aristoph. in Nub.*

† *Nam et Socrati objiciunt comici, docere eum quomodo pejorem causam meliorem faciat.*

By granting all this as sound argument, what inference must we necessarily draw?

That neither generals of armies, nor magistrates, nor medicine, nor philosophy, will be useful.

Why?

Because Flaminius, an imprudent general, lost one of our armies. The Gracchi, Saturninus, and Glaucia, to raise themselves to dignities, put Rome in an uproar. Physicians sometimes administer poison; and among philosophers, some have been guilty of the most enormous crimes.

What other instances are mentioned in the text?

By granting all this as sound argument, we must necessarily draw this inference; that neither generals of armies, nor magistrates, nor medicine, nor philosophy, will be useful. Flaminius, an imprudent general, lost one of our armies. The Gracchi, Saturninus, and Glaucia, to raise themselves to dignities, put Rome in an uproar. Physicians sometimes administer poisons; and among philosophers, some have been guilty of the most enormous crimes. Let us not eat of the meats which are spread upon our tables; they have frequently caused disease. Let us never go into houses; they may fall and crush us to death. Let not our soldiers be armed with swords; a robber may use the same weapons against us. Who is ignorant but that the most necessary things in life, as air, fire, water, and even the *celestial bodies*,* are sometimes prejudicial to us?

* *Solem Lunamque præcipua siderum.*

Enumerate those examples which can be alleged in favor of eloquence.

But how many examples can be alleged in our favor? Did not Appius, the Blind, by the force of his eloquence, dissuade the senate from making a dishonorable peace with Pyrrhus? Did not Cicero's divine eloquence appear more popular than the Agrarian law, which he attacked? Did it not disconcert the audacious measures of Catiline? And did he not, even in his civil capacity, obtain honors by it which were conferred only on the most illustrious conquerors? Is it not the orator who arouses the drooping courage of the soldier, who animates him amidst the greatest dangers, and persuades him to prefer a glorious death to a life of infamy?—*Lib. ii, cap. 17.*

PART I.

INTO how many parts is rhetoric divided?

Four: INVENTION, DISPOSITION, ELOCUTION, and PRONUNCIATION.*

INVENTION.

Invention, in rhetoric, signifies the finding out, and selection of certain arguments which the orator is to use for proving or illustrating the subject, conciliating the minds, and moving the passions of the hearers.

* "The whole art of oratory, as we find it delivered by the generality of the greatest masters, consists of these five parts:—*Invention, Disposition, Elocution, Memory, Pronunciation, or Action.*"—*Quint.*, lib. iii. cap. 3.

"They next constitute, as it were, five members of eloquence, viz: inventing what you are to say; the arrangement of what you have invented; the embellishment of expression; next, the getting it by heart; and, last of all, come the action and the delivery."—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. ii. cap. 19.

In another place, Cicero has properly excluded memory from his division. Hence, says Ramus:—"Dicis oratori tria esse videnda, quid dicat, quo quidque loco, et quomodo; primo membro *Inventionem*, secundo *Collocationem*, tertio *Elocutionem* et *Actionem* comprehendis: memoriam igitur in hac trium membrorum partitione prætermittis."—*Rhet.*, lib. iii.

Cicero,* who wrote four books "*De Inventione*," considers this the principal part of oratory. This invention of the orators cannot, according to Lord Bacon, be properly called invention: because, to invent, is to discover things not known before, not to recollect those which are; whereas, the use and office of this rhetorical invention are only, out of the stock of knowledge, laid up in the mind, to select such materials as are advantageous for the purpose.

The same author divides this faculty of invention into two parts, the one *topical*, the other *promptuary*: the first points out the way in which we are to pursue the argument; the latter only lays up and disposes those things in the mind for which we have frequent occasion.

Invention furnishes the orator with those different kinds of arguments and motives, which are adapted to the various purposes he has in view. The requisites of invention are a vivid or lively imagination, and quickness of thought, great learning and extensive knowledge, previous consideration, and clear, enlarged apprehensions of the subject.

From Cicero de Oratore.

There are three things requisite to invention in speaking; quickness, method, which, if we please we may call art, and application. The chief part I must attribute to genius; but application will improve the slowness of genius itself. Application has great in-

* Only two of these are now extant.

fluence in all cases, but in pleading the greatest: it should be the principal object of our care and assiduity, and, with its assistance, there is nothing but we may surmount. It is by application we can make ourselves masters of a cause; it is by this that we give such attention to our antagonist as to lay hold, not only of his sentiments, but even of his words. In a word, it is owing to application that we can make advantage even of his very look, which is generally the index of the mind. But good sense must direct us to be so cautious, as that he can take no advantage of this. In the next place, it is owing to application that our mind can make an excursion into those fields which I shall soon open, so as to enter thoroughly into the cause, and have all its powers and recollection in readiness. But to apply memory, utterance, and strength, as it were, to illuminate all these matters, that is the great consideration. There is, indeed, some small space, into which we may place art between memory and application. But art only points out the place where you are to search, the place where the end of which you are in pursuit lies: all the rest consists in care; attention, reflection, vigilance, assiduity, and industry. I shall include all these in one word, which I have often mentioned, and that is application: for it is in this single virtue that all the other virtues consist.—*Lib. ii. cap. 35.*

What is invention?

Invention is the discovery of such arguments as are

proper to illustrate the subject, conciliate the minds, and move the passions of the audience.*

What is an argument?

An argument, says Quintilian, is a way for making good a proof, by which one thing is concluded from another, and what is doubtful is confirmed by what is not.†

On what are all arguments founded?

On reason, morals, or the affections.

What is the object of arguments from reason?

To inform the judgment, or to instruct.

How are arguments from reason divided?

Into inartificial and artificial.

What are inartificial arguments from reason?

They are such as do not arise from the subject, but from things of a different nature. They are all taken from authorities, and are, by Cicero, in his *Topics*, called testimony.

What proofs belong to the inartificial?

Prejudices, reports, tortures, written deeds or instruments, oaths, and witnesses.

Of what do artificial proofs consist?

Of signs, arguments, or examples.

* "Thus, the whole business of speaking depends upon three points of persuasion: to prove the side we take to be right; to conciliate the favor of our audience; and to direct their passions to every emotion that the nature of the cause requires."—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. ii. cap. 27.

† Cicero says, an argument is a reason which induces us to believe what we previously doubted.

OF THE DIVISION OF PROOFS.

Aristotle distinguishes two sorts of proofs, in which he has been generally followed by all succeeding authors. Some of these are extrinsic to the subject, and independent of art; others result from the subject, or are rather what the orator produces out of his own fund. The first have, therefore, been called *inartificial*, and the second *artificial*. To the inartificial belong prejudices, reports, tortures, written deeds, or instruments, oaths, and witnesses; all which afford matter for most lawsuits.—*Quint.*, lib. v. cap. 1.

We are now to speak of proof which is inartificial; which is proper in judicial causes. Now there are five things which constitute this sort of proof; the law, witnesses, compacts, examinations, and oaths.—*Arist. Rhet.*, lib. i. cap. 16.

“The second sort of proof, which is altogether artificial, consists of things proper to enforce credibility and conviction.”—*Quint.*, lib. iv. cap. 8.

“Every artificial proof consists of signs, arguments, or examples. I am not ignorant that they are considered by many as making a part of arguments, and this was one reason I had for distinguishing them, because of their near resemblance to inartificial proofs; for bloody clothes, outcries, bruises, and the like, bear a sort of affinity to instruments in writing, reports, and witnesses; being not of the orator’s invention, but brought to him with the cause.”—*Id.*, lib. iv. cap. 9.

“With regard to proof, two things present themselves to the orator: first, those points which are not

invented by him, but arise from the reason and nature of the subject; such as deeds, evidences, bargains, conventions, trials, laws, acts of the senate, precedents, decrees, opinions, and every such like point which is suggested to him by his cause and client: the other point is that which entirely consists in disputation, and the disposition of the orator's pleading. In the first of these divisions he is to employ his thoughts how to make the best of the arguments which are ready to his hand; but in the second, he is both to manage his arguments, and to invent them."—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. ii. cap. 27.

How many kinds of orations are there?

Three: *Demonstrative*, *Deliberative*, and *Judicial*.

Who was the author of this division?

Aristotle.

Why did he give another name to the deliberative kind?

In order to adapt his ideas to the democratic form of government then established at Athens.

What is the scope of a demonstrative oration?

To praise or dispraise persons or things.*

How is it used in speaking of a person?

When for his learning, eloquence, dignity, wisdom, and authority, we praise Cicero; or, for his infamous and abandoned life, censure Catiline.

How many methods do rhetoricians prescribe for praising or dispraising persons?

* Quintilian, in the third book of his *Institutes*, extends the application of *Demonstrative* discourses to the praise of gods; the praises and dispraise of men; and the praises of cities and places.

Two.

What are they?

The one is to follow the order in which everything happened, which is mentioned in the discourse, as Isocrates has done in his funeral oration upon Evagoras, King of Salamis; the other is to reduce what is said under certain general heads, without a strict regard to the order of time, as Suetonius, in his lives of the twelve Cæsars.

How is it used in speaking of a thing?

When from truth, honor, time, place, and manner, we applaud the voluntary return of Regulus to his enemies; or, on the contrary, condemn the self-murder of Cato at Utica.

What are the chief subjects of demonstrative eloquence?

Panegyrics, invectives, gratulatory and funeral orations.

What orations may be ranked under this head?

Cicero's oration concerning the answers of the soothsayers, his oration for Marcellus, and his invective against Piso.

FROM QUINTILIAN.

*Demonstrative Eloquence.**

I shall begin with the kind which is adapted for *praise* and *dispraise*. Aristotle and Theophrastus, who was of his opinion, seem to have excluded it from all civil affairs, and to have restrained its functions to the

* *Vide Cic. de Orat.*, lib. ii. cap. 84, 85.

excitement of pleasure in an auditory; because this is all that can be naturally expected from the show and ostentation from which it borrowed its name. But the Roman usages and customs have given it a place in the transactions of civil life; for funeral orations are duties frequently annexed to some public office, and are often pronounced by our magistrates by a decree of the senate; and to commend or depreciate the character of a witness is of some importance in trials. Persons accused are also allowed to retain their panegyrists; and the defamatory memorials published against those who stand in competition with each other, as against Piso, Clodius, and Curio, have sometimes influenced the senate to repute them as verdicts against them.

It is the property of praise to amplify and adorn things, especially *gods* and *men*, and sometimes *animate* and *inanimate beings*.

With regard to gods in general, we first respect the majesty of their nature; and next, descending to particulars, we may pass encomiums on their power, their inventions, and the several advantages in life they have introduced among men. Power is displayed, as in Jupiter, by governing mankind; in Mars by presiding over war; in Neptune by ruling the ocean. Inventions are commended, as of arts, in Minerva; of letters, in Mercury; of medicine, in Apollo; of corn, in Ceres; of wine, in Bacchus.

The praise of men has more variety, and is first distinguished by the time that preceded their birth, the time of their life, and what happened after their death. Country, parents, ancestors, preceded their birth, which may be considered two ways: if noble, they

have equalled the glory of their progenitors; if otherwise, they have dignified the obscurity of their birth by the lustre of their actions. Other particulars may also be enumerated; especially presages of future grandeur, as of the son of Thetis, who, as the oracle declared, was to be greater than his father.

Personal encomiums are deducible from the qualities of the mind, body, and external advantages. The last are the least considerable, and are spoken of differently according as the party is more or less endowed with them. One time, the comely form and strength of the hero are described, as Homer does in regard to Agamemnon and Achilles. At another time the weak frame of the body raises our admiration; so the same poet represents Tydeus, diminutive in size, but a gallant soldier.

The goods of the mind are always truly laudable. This is a copious subject, and the orator has a variety of resources for displaying his talents. He may follow the order of time and actions, and in the first years commend the genius and good disposition; he may next pass to education and acquired sciences, and afterwards to the consistent tenor of life in words and actions. To treat his subject in a different manner, he may reduce all to certain virtues, as fortitude, justice, temperance, assigning to each how far their votary has produced a copy of them in his life. It is the subject that must determine which of the two ways is preferable: and the more singular a thing is, the greater will be the pleasure of the auditory; for great must be their admiration when they hear that this was the only man, or the first that did so; or that very few can share

the glory with him; or that he exceeded expectation; or, that in what he engaged and accomplished, he showed a true disinterested spirit.

The same order may be observed in dispraise, but with a variation in the coloring; for if the meanness of birth be a disgrace to some, so also is nobility of birth to many, whose vices it makes more conspicuous, and brands with deeper infamy. Predictions gave sufficient warning of the calamities which Paris was to bring upon his country. Thersites, ugly and deformed, as Homer paints him, became the laughing-stock of the whole army. Nireus, a coward, and Plisthenes, a debauchee, show that a graceful form, without virtue, produces contempt. A mind may be as remarkable for vicious as virtuous qualities; and these may be treated both ways, as directed for opposite subjects of praise. Infamy has reached some even beyond the grave, as Mælius,* whose house was leveled with the ground: and the prenomen Marcus was forever extinguished in the family of Manlius.† As to the living, the judgment of the public must be the rule of our esteem, and the good or bad reputation they have acquired will be a sufficient sanction for our praise or dispraise.

Cities have their praise as well as men. Their founder is looked upon as a father, and their antiquity renders them very considerable: for which reason we see people who boast themselves as ancient as that tract of the earth they inhabit; and are confident of having preserved traditionary accounts of all their transactions, whether virtuous or vicious. These considerations are for cities in general; but there are some

* *Livy*, lib. iv.

† *Ibid.*, lib. vi.

peculiar to them, deduced from their situation, their fortifications, their citizens, whose glory makes that of the state, as the glory of children reflects on their parents. Certain places are also the theme of praise; such is Sicily, as represented in that elegant description of Cicero.* Their beauty and advantage are chiefly considered: beauty in harbors, plains, and pleasant groves and meadows; and advantage in the salubrity of the air, as well as the fruitfulness of the soil, and the like. As I would not, therefore, entirely confine the demonstrative kind to questions relating to what is honest, so I believe it should be confined to quality; although all the three states may unite in it, which Cicero observed in Cæsar, who used them all in his harangues against Cato.—*Lib. iii. cap. 7.*

In what does a deliberative oration consist?

In recommending, or dissuading from, some important public measure.†

To what is this species of eloquence chiefly confined?

To the agitation of public affairs in popular assemblies.

What is its object?

Persuasion.

How is the orator to accomplish this end?

By applying himself to all the principles of action in

* Verres, IV.

† "The chief things concerning which all men consult, and argue upon in deliberation, are five in number; of wealth, of war, and peace, of the preservation of the country, of what things are exported and imported, and of the making and observance of laws."—*Aris. Rhet.*, book i. ch. 4.

our nature; to the passions and to the heart, as well as to the understanding.

What topics are generally used in recommending, or dissuading from, public measures?

Safety, profit, pleasure, justice, honor, and facility.

What orations may be referred to the deliberative kind?

Cicero's fourth oration against Catiline; his first and ninth against Mark Antony; and Cato and Cæsar's speeches relative to the Catiline conspirators.

FROM QUINTILIAN.

Deliberative Eloquence.

I am surprised how some authors could have circumscribed the deliberative kind by *utility* alone. Were it necessary to reduce it to one object, I should prefer to follow the opinion of Cicero, who made this matter to consist chiefly in *dignity*. I make no doubt, however, that those authors, according to the specious maxim of the Stoics, acknowledge "nothing useful but what is honest;" and I would willingly admit the truth of their assertion, were we always to deliberate in concert with wise and virtuous men. But it is our fate to speak before a people chiefly unlearned, to whose intellects, it being their duty to decide these matters as judges, we must adapt our words and ideas. There are, indeed, many who do not think some things sufficiently useful, which they believe to be honest; and other things, which they cannot doubt of being base, they approve under the appearance of utility. Of this the

*Numantine peace and Caudinian capitulation are proofs.**

The generality of Greek† authors were of opinion that the deliberative kind belonged entirely to harangues made in the assemblies of the people, and therefore had no other object than the administration of the state. Cicero, for the most part, appears to be of the same opinion, and imagines, that in this kind an orator has scarcely any other topics to discuss but peace or war; troops to raise and provide for; works for the public good; contributions and subsidies. He should, therefore, be acquainted with the resources of a state, its usages and manner of ordering matters, that from the very nature of the things, and the disposition of minds, his arguments might be more strong and persuasive. I think, however, that this subject may admit of greater variety, as there are many kinds of deliberations, and persons who deliberate.

Wherefore, in persuading and dissuading, (the two parts of a deliberative discourse,) three things ought to be particularly considered: “*What the subject for deliberation is; the person who consults; and the person who is consulted.*”

1. As to the thing deliberated upon, it is either certain that it is practicable, or it is not. If uncertain, the whole question will here rest, or the principal part. For it often happens that we first prove, that though a thing may be practicable, it ought not to be done; and, secondly, that it is impracticable. A state of conjecture constitutes a question of the kind: as, “Whether

* *Livy*, lib. ix. *Cic. de Offic.*, lib. iii.

† *Arist. Rhet.*, lib. i. cap. 8.

some isthmuses could be cut through? whether a harbor could be made at Ostia? whether Alexander should find lands beyond the ocean?" Allowing, also, possibility, the state will be sometimes conjectural; as if the question should be: "Whether it be likely that the Romans will conquer Carthage? or, whether Hannibal will pass out of Italy should Scipio make Africa the seat of war? or, whether the Samnites will preserve inviolate the faith of treaties should the Romans lay down their arms?" Some things are possible and practicable, and in all probability may happen, but at another time, and in another place, and after another manner.

Where there is no room for conjecture, we may look to other particulars. And first, an affair is deliberated upon, either on its own account, or on account of other intervening extrinsic causes. On its own account, as when the Roman senators deliberated, "Whether they should raise a fund for the pay of the army,* and other military expenses?" This deliberation will be simple. On account of other intervening extrinsic causes, which are of two sorts. First, by showing reasons for doing a thing, as when the senate deliberated "Whether the three Fabii† should be delivered to the Gauls, who, if they were not, threatened to declare war? Secondly, by showing reasons for not doing a thing; as when Cæsar deliberated "Whether he should continue his march into Germany,‡ notwithstanding the consternation of his soldiers, who all made their wills, as promising to themselves certain death?" These subjects of deliberation contain two clauses: the first, because the Gauls

* See *Livy*, lib. iv.

† *Ibid.*, lib. v.

‡ *Cæsar*, lib. i.; de Bell. Gal.

threaten to declare war; but the question may be, whether, waiving the just resentment of the Gauls, it would not be proper to deliver up to them the three ambassadors, who, contrary to the law of nations, committed acts of hostility, by bringing on a battle, and killed the king, to whom they had been deputed on the business of the republic? In the other deliberation, nothing occurs to deter Cæsar from his enterprise, but the consternation of his soldiers; yet the question may be, whether, regardless of this accident, he ought to penetrate into Germany? But in these deliberations we should always begin with the principal question, which, even abstracting from all incidental questions, may form a proper subject for deliberation.

2. But with regard to the persons consulting, a proper decorum should be preserved; for, although examples may be of great weight in counsels, because men are easily induced to give their assent to what has been already experienced; yet we should weigh well the authority of the examples proposed, and before whom, and for whom, they are proposed. The minds of men are differently constituted; and they who deliberate are many assembled together, or single persons; but there is a difference in both. If many, it is of great importance whether it be the senate or people; the Romans, or Fidenates, Greeks, or Barbarians. If single persons, whether Cato or Marius ought to be a candidate for such honors; and whether Scipio, in preference to Fabius, should be consulted on the manner of conducting the war. Age, sex, and dignity, will also have their peculiar considerations; but the greatest

difficulty lies in the consideration of the party's moral character.

3. The character of the adviser is also of great importance; because past life, if illustrious, or noble extraction, or respectable age, or fortune, raises expectation on these occasions; and nothing of those things which may be spoken must be inconsistent with his character. But speakers of a contrary character require a more humble manner; as the liberty of speech assumed by the former would be called impertinence, and temerity in the latter. And while authority is fully sufficient for some, others can scarcely recommend themselves by all the force of reason.—*Lib. iii. cap. 8.*

FROM CICERO DE ORATORE.

Deliberative Eloquence.

But such particulars must appear with less pomp in the senate; for the senate is an assembly of wise men, where many must have liberty to speak in their several turns, and where one must avoid all affectation of wit, and all ostentation of abilities. But a public assembly requires all the energy, the weight, and the coloring of eloquence. Therefore, in debate, the principal character is *dignity*. For he who thinks that *utility* is, never considers what the person in debate most wishes for, but sometimes what he chooses to practise. For there is not a man, especially in so noble a state as this, who does not think that dignity is the most desirable character. But interest generally prevails when a man is afraid that, if his interest is neglected, he shall be incapable of retaining his dignity. But all difference

of sentiments among mankind consists in this: *which proposition is most advantageous?* Or, if that is agreed upon, whether they ought to pay more regard to *honesty* or *interest*? As these often seem incompatible with one another, the man who stands by his interest, expatiates upon the advantages of peace, riches, power, money, revenues, safety, and a fine army; together with other advantages, which are computed by their utility; at the same time, he exhibits the inconveniences of the contrary measures. The man who consults dignity will recount the examples of our ancestors, who pursued glory, though attended with danger; he will display the immortal fame that we leave to posterity; he will maintain that the interest of his country arises from her honor, and is inseparable from her dignity. But in both these questions the points in dispute are: *what can be done, or what cannot be done?* For all debate is at an end if it is admitted on all hands that a measure is either absolutely impossible, or inevitably necessary: and the man who has proved this before the other members are aware of it, must be allowed to see farther than the rest. But to have weight in political debates, the chief thing is, to be acquainted with the state of the republic, and to know the manners and customs of your country: these, as they often change, occasion as frequent changes in the manner of speaking; and although the power of eloquence is generally the same, yet because the dignity of the people is the highest, the cause of our country the weightiest, the inclinations and commotions of the many the strongest, all this seems to require a more grand and elevated manner of speak-

ing. And the greatest part of the harangue must be applied to the passions, either by way of encouragement, or commemoration, or they are to be worked upon by hopes, by fears, by desire, or by glory; and they are frequently to be reclaimed from rashness, resentment, hope, injury, hatred, and cruelty.—*Lib. ii. cap. 82.*

What is a judicial oration?

A judicial oration is that species of oratory which is used in accusing or defending.*

By what name is the principal question, or point of dispute, in all controversies designated?

States.†

What is meant by the state of a cause?

The principal point in dispute between contending parties, upon the proof of which the whole cause or controversy depends.‡

How is this exemplified?

Milo was accused for killing Clodius; Milo confessed he killed him, but said he did it justly: now the state

* Quintilian, in the third book of his *Institutes*, says: "I shall now speak of the judicial kind, which, although the most extensive and various, consists only of two offices, accusation and defence."

† The state of a controversy is expressed, by several other names, in ancient writers, as "The Constitution of the Cause"—"The General Head"—and "The Chief Question." Our common law expresses it by one word; namely, the *Issue*: which interpreters define, "that point of matter depending in suit whereupon the parties join, and put their cause to the trial."

‡ Status est quæstio, quæ ex prima causarum conflictione nascitur; ut, Sylla, conjuravisti cum Catilina; depulsio vero defensoris; non conjuravi: ex hac prima conflictione nascitur illa quæstio, conjuraveritne Sylla cum Catilina?—*Quint. Inst.*, lib. iii. cap. 6.

of the cause is, did Milo kill Claudius justly, or unjustly?

How many general states are there?

Three: Conjectural, Definitive, and the State of Quality.*

When is a cause conjectural?

When it is inquired whether the thing was done or not: as, did Cælius prepare poison for Clodia?

When is a cause definitive?

When the fact is not denied, but the dispute turns upon the name and nature of the crime; as, whether to take a sacred thing out of a private house be theft or sacrilege?

What is a cause in quality?

When the contending parties are agreed both as to the name and nature of the action, but the dispute turns upon its justice; as, was it lawful or unlawful for Milo to slay Clodius?

FROM QUINTILIAN'S INSTITUTES.

States.

This state of the cause is that which the orator proposes to himself chiefly to obtain, and into which the judge understands he must particularly examine; for on this the cause is built.

Most authors have distinguished three general states; of *Conjecture* *Definition*, and *Quality*. This is the

* Cicero and Quintilian reduce the states to three; to these Aristotle and Vossius add a fourth; namely, of Quantity; as, "Whether the injury be so great as it is said to be."

division which Cicero adopts in his books of the Orator, and thinks every matter of debate and contention may regard, "*Whether the thing is, what it is, and of what sort it is.*"

Let us, therefore, believe those to whose authority even Cicero has submitted, acknowledging that only three questions can arise in all manner of controversies; as, "Whether a thing be, what it is, and of what sort it is." This Nature herself teaches us; for we must first conceive that our doubts have some object, and we cannot form a judgment on the nature of this object and its quality, unless we are previously assured that it exists. This, therefore, will be the first question. But to be certain of its existence, does not prove that we know what it is. When this is cleared up, nothing remains except quality, beyond which there is nothing.—*Lib. iii. cap. 6.*

What distinction exists between deliberative and judicial eloquence?

In deliberative eloquence the great object is persuasion, and the speaker of course directs himself to the passions as well as to the understanding; but, in judicial eloquence, his object is conviction, and, therefore, it is chiefly or solely to the understanding that his eloquence is addressed.

What discourses may be referred to the judicial kind?

Cicero's orations for Milo, Rabirius, Coelius, and Ligarius.

What is the object of arguments from morals?

To procure favor, or to please.

What does this part of invention comprise?

The disposition, character, and qualifications of the speaker.*

By what name does Quintilian designate it?

A propriety of manners.

How many qualities are requisite in an orator, in order to render what he says acceptable to his hearers?

Four: wisdom, integrity, benevolence, and modesty.†

What is the object of arguments from the affections?

To move the passions, or to persuade.‡

How is this to be accomplished?

By being moved ourselves; by painting the object of that passion which we wish to raise, in the most natural and striking manner; and by describing it with

* "Honorable actions and upright lives, in the pleader and his client, greatly contribute to a successful termination of his cause, while a contrary character in the adverse party tends effectually to their defeat. The same effect is likewise produced by conciliating, as much as we can, the minds of the judges. A favorable opinion, again, is gained by dignity of character, by the actions which a person has performed, by his reputation, which are much more easily set forth if they are real than if they are fictitious."—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. ii. 43.

† It was a favorite position among the ancient rhetoricians, that in order to be a truly eloquent and persuasive speaker, nothing was more necessary than to be a virtuous man: "Non posse oratorem esse nisi virum bonum." Longinus, in the latter part of the forty-fourth section on the Sublime, asserts that genius can never exert itself, or rise to sublimity, where virtue is neglected and the morals are depraved. And the Archbishop of Cambray says, that "an orator cannot be fit to persuade people, unless he be inflexibly upright."

‡ The power to excite, appease, and sway the passions, agreeably to the design of the speaker, is what Quintilian calls "the soul and spirit of his art."

such circumstances as are likely to awaken it in the minds of others.

What are the affections, or passions?

They are certain emotions of the mind, accompanied either with pleasure or pain.

How does Aristotle define them?

The affections, says he, are those things by which men being moved, make a different judgment of things.*

What passions may be referred to the different kinds of orations?

To the demonstrative may be referred joy and sorrow, love and hatred, emulation and contempt; to the deliberative, fear, hope, and shame; and to the judicial, anger and lenity, pity and indignation.

FROM QUINTILIAN.

Judicial Eloquence.

I shall now speak of the *judicial* kind, which, although the most various and extensive, consists only of two offices, *Accusation* and *Defence*. Its parts, according to most authors, are five: *Exordium*, *Narration*, *Proof*, *Refutation*, and *Peroration*. To these some have added *Division*, *Proposition*, and *Digression*; but the first two are included in the Proof. As to *Digression*, if it be foreign to the cause, it cannot make a part

*. Cicero, in his *De Oratore*, book ii. chapter 42, says: "For men often judge under the influence of hatred, love, desire, anger, grief, joy, hope, fear, mistake, or some emotion of the mind, rather than of truth, precept, law, or equity."

of it; and if it belong to the cause, it may serve as a help or ornament to the parts from which it digresses. But if everything in a cause should be called a part of it, why should not *argument, similitude, common place, passions, and examples* be also called parts? Nor do I agree with those, as Aristotle, who exclude *Refutation* as included in Proof; for the one establishes, and the other destroys, which are different things. The same author differs also from us in opinion, by placing *Proposition*, and not *Narration*, after the exordium.

But I do not pretend that the orator must think of every one of these parts in the same order that he is to speak. His principal care should be *to examine into the nature of the cause which he undertakes; to know the state of the question; what makes for and against it; what he is to prove, and what to refute.* In the next place, *he must arrange his narration;* for its *exposition* is a preparation of proofs; nor can it be useful, unless it first appears what he may promise to himself from his proofs. And, lastly, he must consider the means of procuring the favor of the judges; for it must be from a diligent inspection into all parts of the cause, that he will be able to know the disposition of mind in which they may be, as gentle or severe, passionate or cool, inflexible or tractable, for deciding in his favor,—*Lib. iii. cap. 9.*

PART II.

DISPOSITION.

WHAT is disposition ?

Disposition is the proper arrangement of the arguments or parts of an oration.

How many parts are there in a regular formal oration, and in what order should they stand ?

Six: and generally stand in the following order: Exordium, Narration, Proposition, Confirmation, Refutation, and Peroration.*

What is the exordium ?

The exordium, or introduction, is that part of an oration in which the speaker gives some intimation of

* Hence the old verse :

Exorsus, Narro, Seco, Firmo, Refuto, Peroro.

Cicero expresses himself in a similar manner relative to the natural constituent parts of an oration: "Inventio in sex partes orationis consumitur, in Exordium, Narrationem, Divisionem, Confirmationem, Confutationem, et Conclusionem."—*Ad Heren.*, i. 3.

Blair says: "There may be many excellent discourses in public, where several of these parts are altogether wanting: where the speaker, for instance, uses no introduction, but enters directly on his subject; where he has no occasion either to divide or explain; but simply reasons on one side of the question, and then finishes."

the subject to the audience, in order to render them attentive, benevolent, and docile.*

What are the principal kinds of introductions?

The Exordium *ab abrupto*, *Principium*, and *Insinuatio*.

When is the Exordium *ab abrupto* used?

When the subject is such that the very mention of it naturally awakens some passionate emotion; or when the unexpected presence of some person or object in a popular assembly inflames the speaker, and makes him break forth with unusual warmth.†

When is Principium used?

When the orator plainly and directly professes his aim in speaking.

When is Insinuatio used?

When the orator, supposing the disposition of the audience to be prejudiced against him, artfully endeavors to conciliate their favor, before he openly discovers the point he has in view.‡

Enumerate the rules necessary to be observed in the composition of an exordium.

It should be such as the subject naturally suggests;§

* Cicero and Quintilian mention three ends, to one or other of which an exordium should be subservient: "Reddere, auditores, benevolos, attentos, dociles."

† The appearance of Catiline in the senate renders the vehement beginning of Cicero's first oration against him very natural and proper: Quousque tandem, Catilina, abutere patientia nostra?

‡ See Cicero's second oration against Rullus, and his seventh against Mark Antony.

§ It must appear, as Cicero beautifully expresses it: "Effloruisse penitus ex ea causa quæ tum agatur: To have sprung up, of its own accord, from the matter which is under consideration."—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. ii. 78.

it should not be composed until the speaker has meditated in his own mind the substance of his discourse;* it should not anticipate any material part of the subject; and it should possess clearness, modesty, and conciseness.

FROM QUINTILIAN.

Of the Exordium.

What the Latins call exordium, the Greeks express by the more significant term of προοιμῖον, which (from οἴμη, music or song, or οἶμος, a way) sufficiently denotes the part of the discourse that is pronounced before the subject is entered upon. For, whether they have bor-

Sallust's Introductions, prefixed to his Catilinarian and Jugurthine wars, violate this rule. They might as well have been introductions to any other history, or to any other treatise whatever; and, therefore, though elegant in themselves, they must be considered as blemishes in the work, from want of due connection with it.

* "When I have planned and digested all the materials of my discourse, it is my custom to think, in the last place, of the introduction with which I am to begin. For, whenever I wished to consider the introduction first, nothing occurred to me but what was dry, trifling, trite, and common."—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. ii. 77.

Quintilian says: "I cannot approve the course of those who think that the exordium should be the last thing written. For, as it is necessary to collect all the materials, and see how they ought to be disposed, before we begin to speak or write, so we ought to begin with what naturally occurs first. A painter or sculptor does not begin with the feet in a portrait or statue; nor does any art consummate a work where it must begin. And what shall an orator do if he has not time enough to compose entirely his discourse? Will he not find himself under an illusion in adhering to so preposterous a custom? He must, therefore, consider his matter in the order we have prescribed, and write it down in the order of delivery."—*Lib. iii. cap. 9.*

rowed the term from music, as musicians make a prelude for obtaining silence and attention before they play their pieces; so orators, before they begin the cause, have specified, by the same appellation, what they say by way of preface, for procuring towards them a benevolent disposition in the judges. Or, whether, as the same Greeks call *αἶμαρ*, a way, or introduction to a thing; so orators may have taken the word in the same sense, understanding by it that part which is necessary to acquire the favor of the judge before he receives any information of the cause.

The reason for an exordium can be no other than to dispose the auditory to be favorable to us in the other parts of the discourse. This, as most authors agree, is accomplished by making them *benevolent, attentive, and docile*; not but that a due regard should be paid to these three particulars during the whole action; but in the exordium they are especially necessary; as by it we so far gain an ascendancy over the mind of the judge, as to be able to proceed further.—*Lib. iv. cap. i.*

FROM CICERO DE ORATORE.

The Exordium.

As to the commencement of a speech, it should always possess accuracy, acuteness, sentiment, and propriety of expression, and be especially adapted to the practice of the bar. For the first judgment, and, as it were, prejudice, which is formed in favor of a speech, arises from its setting out, which ought instantly to soothe and entice the hearer. Here I used

to be surprised, not at those people who never applied to this business, but at Philip, a man of the first rank for eloquence and learning, who generally, when he rises up to speak, seems to be at a loss how to begin; yet, at the same time, he says, that after the first attack, then he fights in earnest; without reflecting that the very people from whom he borrowed this allusion, toss their first javelins with great coolness, with the design to make their address appear with greater grace, and to manage their strength. And there is no doubt but that pleading in its setting out often requires to be vigorous and spirited; but if, among men who fight for their lives, a great many flourishes pass before they actually engage, which appear to be more for parade than in earnest, how much more is this to be expected in speaking, where strength and sweetness are required to go hand in hand? There is no natural cause which pours itself out all at once, and vanishes by a sudden start: in like manner, nature has disguised with a gentle beginning, the progress of the most violent commotions.

But your preamble is not to be sought from abroad, nor from any other place, but must be taken from the very essence of your cause. For this purpose, after you have felt and surveyed your whole cause, after you have found out and prepared all its topics, you must consider which of them you are to employ in your preamble. This is easily found out, for it must be taken from the allegations which are most fertile, either in proofs, or best adapted to those characters, into which I have said we ought frequently to deviate. It can, therefore, never fail of being important, when it is borrowed, in a manner, from the chief force of our

pleading; and it will appear, that it is not only not common, and not applicable to other causes, but shoots, and, as it were, flourishes of its own accord, from the matter which is under consideration.

Every preamble of a speech ought either to give an intimation of the whole matter, or to open and prepare the way to the merits of the cause, or to serve for ornament and dignity. But, as in the architecture of houses and temples, their porticos and entries have their proportions; so in pleading, the preamble of a speech ought to be in proportion to the importance of its subject.

The beginning, therefore, should be so connected with the subsequent part of a speech as not to appear like the flourish of a musician, a thing detached; but like a proportionable member, of a piece with the whole body. For some speakers, after they have finished this premeditated part, make such a transition to the rest of their discourse, that they seem to demand that the audience should suit themselves to their fancies. An orator, then, should use a prelude, not as the Samnites do their spears, which they brandish before they engage, though they do not use them in the fight; for he ought to fight armed with the very sentiments he used in his prelude.—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. ii. cap. 78, 79, 80. See also *Cic. de Rhet.*, lib. i. cap. 6–11. *De Invent.*, lib. i. cap. 20–26.

What is the Narration?

The Narration, says Apollodorus, is a discourse informing the auditory of the matter in dispute,

What are the qualities which critics chiefly require in Narration?

Clearness and distinctness, probability and conciseness.*

What are the principal difficulties which occur in Narration?

For the orator to adhere strictly to veracity, and at the same time to avoid saying anything which would be prejudicial to his cause; to place in the most striking light every circumstance which appears to his advantage; and to soften and weaken such as make against him; render this part of the subject difficult in the execution.

FROM QUINTILIAN.

Narration.

The judge being prepared in the manner above specified, it is very natural, and it commonly is and ought to be done, to point out the affair upon which he is to pronounce judgment. This is the business of *Narration*.

Most authors are of opinion that a narration ought always to be made. This, however, is incorrect; for there are causes so short as to require rather to be proposed than recited.

* "Narrations," says Aristotle, "should be plain, brief, and probable: 'σαφείς και βραχυσίας.'"—*Rhet. ad Alex.*, cap. xxxi.

Quintilian, treating of Narration, in the fourth book of his Institutes, says: "Most writers, especially those who follow the opinions of Isocrates, will have it to be clear, short, and probable. The same division has my approbation."

This is sometimes the case of the two contending parties; either that they have no exposition to make, or that, agreeing on the fact, they contest only the right; as in a cause before the Centumviri: "Whether the son or brother ought to be heir to him who died intestate?" Secondly, the narration may be suppressed, when even there is room for it; and this happens when everything is already known to the judge, or an exact relation has been made by the orator who spoke first.

Another question, but the subject of a more frequent discussion, is to know, "Whether the narration ought immediately to follow the exordium." They who think it should, seem to have some reason on their side; for, as the design of the exordium is to dispose the judges to hear us with all the good will, docility, and attention we desire; and as arguments can have no effect without a previous knowledge of the cause, it naturally follows that they should have this knowledge as soon as it can be conveniently given.

The condition of causes, however, makes some alteration in this respect; and if it did not, Cicero, in that elegant oration he left written for Milo, might seem to have misplaced his narration, by proposing three previous questions. Either then it would be better to relate how Clodius lay in wait to attempt Milo's life, if it was not lawful to plead the cause of a criminal who had confessed himself guilty of manslaughter; or if Milo was prejudged by the senate as guilty; or if Pompey, who for certain reasons had blocked up all the avenues to the senate house with an armed force, had done so with the view of being supposed Milo's enemy. Cicero

likewise for Murena, but in a way different from this, does not begin the narration until he refutes the adversaries' objections. This method may be used to advantage as often as the crime is not only to be made void, but also charged upon another; for by annulling the imputation of guilt, the narration may afterwards be very seasonably entered upon, to insinuate that another is the guilty person; and thus it is in the art of fencing, the care of putting one's self in a posture of defence precedes that of an attack.

We may now proceed to the manner of Narration; which is of a thing done, or supposed to be done, and is conceived in a way proper to persuade; or it is, as Apollodorus defines it, a discourse informing the auditory of the matter in dispute.

Most writers, especially those who follow the opinions of Isocrates, will have it to be clear, short, and probable. The same division has also my approbation; although Aristotle dissents, in one respect, from Isocrates, making a jest of the precept of brevity; as if narration, necessarily long or short, admitted no medium. The disciples of Theodorus receive only the verisimilitude, because it is not always useful to give a brief and clear account of a thing. The condition of each must, therefore, be carefully distinguished, in order to know how we may properly avail ourselves of them.—*Lib. iv. cap. 2.*

FROM CICERO DE ORATORE.

Narration.

A narrative should be as striking as any other part of a discourse. This, however, will cost us more trouble, because it is more difficult to avoid obscurity in a narrative than in the beginning, in the proof, the exculpation, or the peroration. And the consequences of obscurity are much more dangerous here than elsewhere; either because obscure expressions, in any other place, are attended with no other inconvenience than that they go for nothing; but obscurity in a narrative throws a cloud upon the whole discourse; or because, in case you should make use of an obscure expression in any other part, you have it in your power to explain it elsewhere; but a narrative can only stand in one place. The way, however, to render a narrative perspicuous, is to convey it in plain expressions, in a regular method as to time, and without any interruption of the circumstances.

But when to introduce, or not to introduce a narrative, is a prudential consideration; for it is improper to give a detail of a matter that is notorious and self-evident; nor after our opponent has done it, unless with a view to refute him. And if at any time we are engaged in a narrative, we are to take care not to insist with too much vehemence upon any suspicious criminal circumstances that may make against us, and we are to extenuate whatever may; otherwise we may fall into the error of hurting our own cause, which Crassus says never happens except from design, and not ignorance;

for the material part of the whole cause depends upon our laying down the subject either cautiously or incautiously; because the narrative is the foundation of the whole of the remaining speech.—*Lib. ii. cap. 80, 81.* See also *Cic. Rhet.*, lib. i. cap. 12–16. *De Invent.*, lib. i. cap. 27–30.

What is Proposition?

The Proposition is a distinct and express manner of laying down the subject upon which the speaker designs to treat.*

FROM QUINTILIAN.

Proposition.

Some subjoin Proposition to Narration, as a part of the judicial matter, which opinion we have already answered. Every proposition seems to me the beginning of a proof, which usually takes place, not only in pointing out the principal question, but sometimes also in every argument. But we now speak of the first.

It is not always necessary to use it, as it sometimes sufficiently appears without a proposition what the purport of the question is; especially if the narration ends

* Orators sometimes lay down the subject of their discourse in one general proposition. Thus Cicero, in his speech to the senate, the day after Cæsar was assassinated, says: "This being the state of our affairs, I think it necessary that we should lay aside all the discord and enmity which have arisen among us, and return again to our former peace and unanimity." He then proceeds to offer his reasons for this advice without any division.

where the question begins, or is followed by a short recapitulation, as it commonly happens in the proofs: "This affair was transacted as I told you, judges; he who laid the snare perished in it; violence was repelled by violence, or rather valor triumphed over insolence."*

But the proposition is sometimes of considerable advantage, particularly when the fact cannot be denied, and is only defensible by a question of right; as in the case of him who stole the money of a private person out of a temple, the only question to which the judge should attend is this: "Does he stand guilty of sacrilege?" The same may be said of obscure and complicated causes, or such as are embarrassed by a number of incidents.

Propositions are simple and complex. This happens various ways. Thus, when many crimes are alleged together, as when Socrates was accused of corrupting the Athenian youth, and introducing new superstitions. And one fact is deduced from, or corroborated by many, as Æschines, accused of ill conduct in his embassy, is charged with falsehood; with doing nothing according to his instructions; with delaying beyond the time fixed for his return; and with taking bribes. By annexing each of these propositions to their respective proofs they will constitute many; but if united together, it will be the business of the division of the pleading to make them appear in their proper light.—*Lib. iv. cap. 4.*

When a formal distribution of an oration into parts is requisite, what is it called?

Partition, or Division.

* *Cic. pro Mil.*

What is Division ?

Division, says Quintilian, is an enumeration of our own propositions, or those of our opponent, or both together, disposed in order.*

What are the most material rules to be observed in Partition, or Division ?

The several parts into which the subject is divided should be really distinct from one another; the subject should be divided into those parts into which it is most easily and naturally resolved; the several members of a division ought to exhaust the subject; the terms in which partitions are expressed should be as concise as possible; and an unnecessary multiplication of heads should be avoided.†

FROM QUINTILIAN.

Of Division.‡

Division is an enumeration of our own propositions, or those of our opponent, or both together, disposed in order.

Some are of opinion that division should be always

* Cicero, in defence of Muræna, says: "I perceive the accusation consists of three parts: the first respects the conduct of his life; the second his dignity; and the third contains a charge of bribery."

† Quintilian says: "But if division should seem requisite, I am not inclined to assent to the notion of those who would not have it extend to more than three heads. Indeed, when the partitions are too many, they escape the judge's memory and distract his attention; but a cause is not to be scrupulously tied down to this number, as it may require more."

Cicero, however, never divided any of his orations into more than three heads: and Aristotle, in his *Rhet. ad Alex.*, cap. xxxii., says: we may divide them into three parts: "ταξομεν δε αυτας δια τριων."

‡ See *Cic. de Invent.*, lib. i.

used; as the cause will appear more clear, and the judge more attentive and docile when he knows of what we speak, and of what we intend afterwards to speak. Others consider this course attended with danger to the orator, either by sometimes forgetting what he had promised, or by something else occurring to the judge or auditor of which he did not think in the division. I cannot well imagine how this may happen, unless in regard to one who may be either destitute of sense, or rash enough to plead without preparation. In any other respect, nothing can set a subject in so obvious a light as a just division. It is a means to which we are directed by the guidance of nature; because, not losing sight of the heads on which we speak is of the greatest assistance to memory.

But if division should seem requisite, I am not inclined to assent to the opinion of those who would not have it extend to more than three points. Indeed, when the partitions are too many they escape the judge's memory and distract his attention; but a cause is not to be scrupulously tied down to this number, as it may require more.

There are better reasons for not always using division; and the principal one is, that most things are better received, when they have the appearance of extemporaneous invention, and do not seem to savor of the closet, but to arise in the pleading from the nature of the subject itself.

Add to this, that the judge is to be led into pleasing deceptions, and amused by a variety of stratagems, to keep him from discovering our designs. There are sometimes harsh propositions, which, if the judge

should foresee, he will take the alarm, like a patient who, being to undergo an operation, dreads the surgeon's incision knife before he feels it; whereas, if, by not previously proposing anything you give him no time to reflect with himself, your discourse will take full possession of him, and effect more than can be well expected.

Besides, will not many things light and weak of themselves become considerable when assembled into a body? They are, therefore, rather to be mustered together, and we must fight as by a sally of main force; yet this expedient should be seldom adopted, and then from necessity, and when reason in a great degree compels us to act against reason.

But, although division may not be always necessary, and at some times superfluous, yet when appropriately adopted, it gives light and beauty to a discourse. This it accomplishes, not only by adding more perspicuity to what is said, things by it being drawn out of their confusion, and placed conspicuously before the judges; but also by refreshing the audience with a view of each part circumscribed within its bounds. In like manner, mile-stones ease, in some measure, the fatigue of travelers; because they experience pleasure in knowing the extent of the labor they have undergone; and to know what remains encourages them to persevere; as nothing can seem necessarily long when there is a certainty of coming to the end. Quintus Hortensius acquired deservedly great praise for his exactness in division, although his way of computing the points on his fingers was sometimes humorously ridiculed by Cicero. There is, however, a certain medium to be observed,

by avoiding a division too precise, which, indeed, lessens the dignity of the discourse, and instead of distinguishing the parts makes them not members, but a collection of scraps.

Every division, therefore, when it may be employed to advantage, ought to be, in the first place, clear and intelligible; for what is worse than being obscure in a thing, the use of which is for guarding against obscurity in other things? In the second place, it should be short, and not encumbered with any superfluous words, because we do not enter upon the subject matter, but only to point it out.

It will be proper also to consider whether it be defective or redundant. It is commonly redundant, when we either divide into the species, the genus being sufficient; or subject the species to the genus: as, "I shall speak of virtue, justice, temperance;" whereas, justice and temperance are species of virtue.

The most natural division proposes what is certain and what is doubtful in a cause. The first head takes in our concessions, and those of the adverse party. The second the reasons for and against us.

Upon the whole, there cannot be a greater fault than the want of a proper execution of the proposed order.

—*Lib. iv. cap. 5.*

What is the Confirmation?

The Confirmation, says Cicero, is that part of a discourse which contains the arguments which are

necessary, in order to strengthen and illustrate the subject.*

How many different methods may be used in the Confirmation, or Argumentative part of an oration?

Two; the Analytic and Synthetic.

What is the Analytic method?

The Analytic is when the speaker conceals his intention concerning the point he is to prove, until he has gradually brought his hearers to the designed conclusion. They are led on step by step from one known truth to another, till the conclusion be stolen upon them, as the natural consequence of a chain of propositions.†

What is the Synthetic method?

The Synthetic method of reasoning, which is most generally used, and which is best adapted to the train of popular speaking, is when the point to be proved is fairly laid down, and one argument after another is

* Aristotle says that in our confirmation "we must strengthen what went before by *credible, just, and proper* proofs."

† As, when one intending to prove the being of a God, sets out with observing, that everything we see in the world has had a beginning; that whatever has had a beginning must have had a prior cause; that in productions, art shown in the effect, necessarily infers design in the cause; and proceeds, leading you on from one cause to another, till you arrive at one supreme first cause, from whom is derived all the order and design visible in his works.

Plato was the author of the Analytic art, which is essentially the same with the Socratic method by which that philosopher silenced the sophists of his age. But there are few subjects which will admit this method, and not many occasions on which it is proper to be employed. Besides, it is not so well adapted to continued discourses, as to those which are interlocutory; and therefore we find it oftenest in the Socratic Dialogues of Plato and Xenophon.

made to bear upon it, till the hearers are fully convinced.

What is the most proper method of arranging the arguments of a discourse?

Rhetoricians generally advise to place the weakest in the middle, and the strongest partly in the beginning, to preoccupy the hearers early, and partly at the end, in order to make a successful impression on the audience.*

What is the Refutation?

The Refutation, or Confutation, is an answer to our opponent's arguments; either by contradicting them, or showing some mistake in the reasoning, or their invalidity when granted.†

* Quintilian, in the fifth book of his Institutes, says: "It has also been a matter of dispute, whether the strongest proofs should be placed in the beginning, to make an immediate impression on their minds; or at the end, to make the impression continue with them; or to distribute them, partly in the beginning, and partly at the end, placing the weaker in the middle, according to the order of battle set forth in Homer, (see Homer's Il, book iv., v. 297;) or lastly, to begin with the weakest, and proceed gradually to the strongest. For my part, I think this should depend on the nature and exigencies of the cause; yet with this reserve, that from powerful the discourse might not dwindle into nugatory and frivolous arguments."

Ergo ut in oratore optimus quisque, sic et in oratione, firmissimum quodque sit primum: dum illud tamen in utroque teneatur, ut ea, quæ excellent, servantur etiam ad perorandum: si quæ erunt mediocria (nam vitiosis nusquam esse oportet locum) in mediam turbam, atque in gregem coniciantur.—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. ii. 77.

† In the Refutation, says Aristotle, "It is necessary to extenuate your adversaries' arguments and amplify your own: 'δει τα μεν εκεινων μειωποιων, τα δε σ αυτης αυξειν.'"—*Ad. Alex.*, cap. xxxiv.

FROM QUINTILIAN.

Refutation.

The Refutation has two different objects in view, either as it regards defence, which entirely consists in refuting; or answering objections, which should be equally cleared upon both sides.

It is not, however, without reason, as Cicero often bears witness, that it has always been thought more difficult to defend than to accuse. The accusation is much more simple. There is only one way of proposing, but there are several ways of answering. The accuser considers it sufficient if what he advances be true; whereas the advocate for the accused must deny the charge, or maintain it as lawful; must make it something else, or excuse, or deprecate punishment; must mitigate, lessen, or show that it is not according to the due form of law; or he must despise, or turn it into ridicule. The accuser, besides, brings from home many particulars upon which he has well studied and reflected, which the advocate must answer, and frequently what he little expected. The accuser produces witnesses, and the advocate must invalidate the purport of their depositions. Orators, therefore, of moderate abilities have been found sufficient as accusers, but the most eloquent only have been found capable of conducting a defence. To declare, however, my real sentiments of this matter, I may say, that accusation is so much easier than defence, as it is easier to make than cure wounds.

In order to make a good defence, it will be extremely necessary to attend to the adversary's charge, and his manner of executing it. The first consideration, therefore, should be, whether that to which we must answer belongs or is foreign to the cause.

If it belongs to the cause, it must either be denied, or defended, or proved defective in form of law. Besides these three, there is no other resource to get clear of a process.

We have already shown that there are two ways of denying; either that the thing has not been done, or was not done in that manner. Now whatever is not defensible, nor defective in form, must be denied; not only when, by defining it, we may change its nature, but even when no other source remains but denial. If witnesses are produced, much may be alleged against them; if a written instrument, a forgery may be discovered by comparing the difference of the handwriting. In fine, nothing is worse than confession.

When there is no room left for defending and denying, the last point that remains to be controverted in an action is, whether it has been brought in due form of law?

If the adversary's allegation is foreign to the cause, and yet has some affinity to it, I should rather say, that it has nothing in common with the question, or so trifling in its consequence, that there is no occasion for spending time about it. Forgetfulness may also be pretended by the advocate, which will be very pardonable in this respect, from the earnest desire that may appear in him for serving his party.

We should next consider whether it be more advisa-

ble to refute the accuser's proofs altogether, or one after another. Many are attacked together, if either so weak that all may be made to yield to the same effort, or so annoying that it would be inconvenient to encounter them one by one. So circumstanced, we must charge the enemy by one general shock, and fight, as it were, with all our forces mustered in the front of battle. Should we, however, find a difficulty in overpowering the adversary's arguments, we may, at least, compare ours with his, in order to show that the advantage, if any, lies on our side.

The proofs which are strong, collected in a body, must be refuted separately: "You were his heir, you were poor and harassed, sued for large sums by your creditors, you disobliged your kinsman, and you know that he designed to alter his will." These proofs, thus urged together, press hard; but if you take them singly, the flame that was strong from its heaped up quantity of fuel, will soon appear languid by dispersing the combustibles. In like manner, great and deep rivers, branched out into streams, become everywhere fordable.

There is a fault of appearing over-anxious, and too much embarrassed about every trifling difficulty which occurs. It makes the judge distrust the cause, and frequently the things which, when said extemporaneously, might remove all doubt, become suspected by delays and preparatory precautions; as it would appear that recourse was only had to them for want of something more substantial. Let, therefore, the orator show himself confident, and let him always speak as if he entertained the best opinion of his cause. This

was an excellency in Cicero, as in all other respects. Everything he advances is seconded by so great an air of security and authority, that it has the force of a proof, and leaves no room to doubt his veracity.

Now he who knows the stronghold of the adverse party and his own, will easily judge what he has to refute and what to insist upon. In no other part the order to be observed will be attended with less trouble; for if we are plaintiffs, our own proofs are first to be established, and next the adversary's refuted. If we are defendants, we are to begin with refuting. But it should be a principal consideration with both parties to know the main point and force of the argument; as it commonly happens that many things are said in causes, and few judged.—*Lib. v. cap. 13.*

FROM CICERO DE ORATORE.

You are next to state the case, in doing which you are to have in view the point in dispute. You are then to form the strongest arguments you can to support your side of the question, both by invalidating the reasoning of your antagonist, and establishing your own. For the argumentative part upon proofs in a speech is of a single and peculiar nature, yet, at the same time it requires both confirmation and confutation. But, as you cannot confute your antagonist without establishing your own allegations, nor can you establish your own without confuting his, these, therefore, are joined both in their nature and utility.—*Lib. ii. cap. 81.*

Of what does the Peroration consist?

The Peroration, or Conclusion, consists of a recapitulation of the strongest arguments concentrated into one view,* and an address to the passions.†

* Quintilian says, in the sixth book, chapter i., of his Institutes: "The Peroration, called by some the Completion, by others the Conclusion of a discourse, is of two sorts, and regards either the matter discussed in it, or the moving of the passions.

"The repetition of the matter, and its collection together, which is called by the Greeks (*ανακεφαλαιωσις*) Recapitulation, and by some of the Latins Enumeration, serves for refreshing the judge's memory, for placing the whole cause in one direct point of view, and for enforcing many proofs in a body, which, separate, made less impression."

† "But it should not be imagined, as some have thought, that all this excitement of the passions, all these sentimental emotions, ought to be confined to the Exordium and Peroration. In them, indeed, they are most frequent, yet other parts admit them also, but in a shorter space, as their greatest stress should be reserved for the end. For here all the springs of eloquence are to be opened. It is here we secure the minds of the audience, if what went before was well executed. Now, having passed the rocks and shallows, we may expand all our sails for being swelled with a favorable gale. And as amplification makes a great part of the peroration, we may then embellish our style with the most pompous expressions and elevated thoughts."—*Quint. Inst.*, lib. vi. cap. i.

Cicero, in his *de Oratore*, book ii., chapter 81, says: "But all speeches are generally concluded with amplifications, in order either to exasperate or mollify the judge; and all the abilities of an orator, as in the Exordium, so more especially in the Conclusion of the speech, are to be exerted in giving the strongest impulse to the feelings of the judges in our favor."

FROM QUINTILIAN.

*The Peroration.**

The Peroration, called by some the Completion, by others the Conclusion, of a discourse, is of two sorts; and regards either the matter discussed, or the moving of the passions.

The repetition of the matter, which is called by the Greeks recapitulation (*ἀνακεφαλαίωσις*), and by some of the Latins enumeration, serves for refreshing the judge's memory, for placing the whole cause in one direct point of view, and for enforcing in a body many proofs, which, separately, made less impression. This repetition should be very short, and the Greek term adequately denotes that we ought to run over only the principal heads; for, should we be tedious, it will not be an enumeration we make, but, as it were, a second discourse. The particulars, however, which may seem to require this enumeration, ought to be pronounced with some emphatical weight, and enlivened with apposite thoughts, and diversified with figures; otherwise nothing will be so disagreeable as a mere cursory repetition, which appears to show a diffidence of the judge's memory. A multiplicity of figurative expressions are adapted for this purpose: thus Cicero, when addressing Verres, says: "Even if your father was to be judge in the case, what should he say on producing proof of these allegations?" and then he proceeds to enumerate them. Or when, in another place, against the same,

* See *Cic. de Invent.*, lib. i.

by invoking the gods to bear witness, he makes an enumeration of all their temples which had been pilaged by the Pretor.

This appears to be the only sort of peroration which was admissible by most of the Athenians, and by almost all the philosophers who left anything written on the art of oratory. The Athenians, I suppose, were of that opinion, because it was customary at Athens to silence, by the public crier, any orator who should attempt to move the passions. I am less surprised at the philosophers, who considered every perturbation of the mind as vicious; nor did it seem to them compatible with sound morality to divert the judge from truth; nor consistent with the idea of an honorable man to have recourse to any sinister stratagem. Moving the passions, however, will be acknowledged necessary when truth and justice cannot be otherwise obtained, and when a public good is concerned in the decision of the matter.

All agree that a recapitulation may be also employed to advantage in other parts of the pleading, if the cause is complicated, and requires many arguments to defend it; and, on the other hand, many causes are so short and simple as to have no occasion in any part of them for a recapitulation. This part of the peroration is equally common to the accuser, and to the defendant's advocate.

The favor of the judges towards us, is more rarely solicited in the beginning, it being then sufficient to find admittance; as the whole discourse remains for making further impressions. But in the peroration, we must strive to make the judge assume that dispo-

sition of mind it would be necessary for us that he should retain when he comes to pass judgment. When the peroration is finished we can say no more, neither is anything reserved for another place. It is, therefore, common to the contending parties to conciliate to themselves the judge; to make him unfavorable to the adversary; to raise and allay occasionally his passions; and to say those things which would make the greatest impression on themselves if they sat as judges.

But it must not be imagined, as some have thought, that all this excitement of the passions, all these sentimental emotions, should be confined to the exordium and peroration. In these they are most frequent, although other parts admit them likewise, but in shorter compass, as their greatest force should be reserved for the end. For here, if anywhere, the orator may be allowed to open all the fountains of eloquence. If we have executed all other parts to advantage, here we take possession of the minds of the judges, and, having escaped all rocks and shelves, may expand all our sails for being swelled with a favorable gale; and as amplification makes a great part of the peroration, we may then raise and embellish our style with the choicest expressions and brightest thoughts. And, indeed, the conclusion of a speech should bear some resemblance to that of tragedy and comedy, when the actor courts the spectators' applause. In other parts, the passions may be touched, as they naturally rise out of the subject, and no horrible or miserable thing should be exposed without accompanying it with a suitable sentiment. When the debate may be on the quality of a thing, it is properly subjoined to the proofs of

each matter. When we plead a cause involved or complicated with a variety of circumstances, then it will be necessary to use, as it were, many perorations, as Cicero has done against Verres. There he shed tears for Philodamus, for the masters of ships, for the crucified Roman citizens, and for many others.—*Lib. vi. cap. 1.*

FROM CICERO DE ORATORE.

Peroration.

But all speeches are generally wound up by exaggeration, in order either to exasperate or mollify the judges; and all the abilities of an orator, as in the preamble, so more especially in the conclusion of the speech, are to be applied in giving the strongest emotions to the passions of the judges in our own favor.—*Lib. ii. cap. 81.*

EXEMPLIFICATIONS OF THE PRECEDING RULES.

Satan's Speech to his rebel host.

(a) O myriads of immortal spirits! O powers
Matchless but with the Almighty! and that strife
Was not inglorious, though th' event was dire,

(a) Exordium.

As this place testifies, and this dire change,
 Hateful to utter: (a) But what power of mind,
 Foreseeing or presaging, from the depth
 Of knowledge past or present, could have fear'd
 How such united force of Gods, how such
 As stood like these, could ever know repulse?
 For who can yet believe, though after loss,
 That all these puissant legions, whose exile
 Hath emptied Heav'n, shall fail to reascend,
 Self-rais'd, and repossess their native seat?
 For me, be witness all the host of Heaven,
 If counsels different, or dangers shunn'd
 By me, have lost our hopes. But he, who reigns
 Monarch in Heav'n, till then as one secure
 Sat on his throne, upheld by old repute,
 Consent or custom, and his regal state
 Put forth at full, but still his strength conceal'd,
 Which tempted our attempt, and wrought our fall.
 Henceforth his might we know, and know our own,
 So as not either to provoke, or dread
 New war, provoked: (b) Our better part remains:
 To work in close design, by fraud or guile,
 What force effected not: that he no less
 At length from us may find, who overcomes
 By force, hath overcome but half his foe.
 Space may produce new worlds; (c) whereof so rife
 There went a fame in Heav'n that he ere long
 Intended to create, and therein plant
 A generation, whom his choice regard
 Should favor equal to the sons of Heav'n:
 Thither, if but to pry, shall be, perhaps,

(a) Narration.

(b) Proposition.

(c) Confirmation.

Our first eruption, thither or elsewhere:

- (a) For this infernal pit shall never hold
 Celestial spirits in bondage, nor th' abyss
 Long under darkness cover. (b) But these thoughts
 Full counsel must mature: peace is despair'd,
 For who can think submission? War, then, war,
 Open or understood, must be resolv'd.

Milt. Par. Lost, book i. 622.

*St. Paul's eloquent Defence before King Agrippa, and
 Festus the Roman Governor in Judea.*

Acts xxvi.

(c) I think myself happy, King Agrippa, because I shall answer for myself this day before thee, touching all the things whereof I am accused of the Jews; especially, because I know thee to be expert in all customs and questions which are among the Jews: wherefore I beseech thee to hear me patiently.

(d) My manner of life from my youth, which was at the first among mine own nation at Jerusalem, know all the Jews, who knew me from the beginning, (if they would testify,) that, after the straitest sect of our religion, I lived a Pharisee: and now I stand and am judged for the hope of the promise made of God unto our fathers; unto which promise our twelve tribes, instantly serving God day and night, hope to come; for which hope's sake, King Agrippa, I am accused of the Jews.

(a) Refutation. (b) Peroration. (c) Exordium. (d) Narration.

(a) Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you that God should raise the dead?

(b) I verily thought with myself, that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth. Which thing I also did in Jerusalem: and many of the saints did I shut up in prison, having received authority from the chief priests; and when they were put to death I gave my voice against them: and I punished them oft in every synagogue, and compelled them to blaspheme; and, being exceedingly mad against them, I persecuted them even to strange cities. Whereupon, as I went to Damascus with authority and commission from the chief priests, at midday, O king! I saw in the way a light from heaven, above the brightness of the sun, shining around about me and them who journeyed with me. And, when we were all fallen to the earth, I heard a voice speaking to me, and saying in the Hebrew tongue, Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks.—And I said, who art thou, Lord! and he said, I am Jesus, whom thou persecutest. But rise, and stand upon thy feet; for I have appeared unto thee, for this purpose; to make thee a minister and a witness, both of these things which thou hast seen, and of those things in the which I will appear unto thee: Delivering thee from the people, and from the Gentiles, unto whom now I send thee; to open their eyes, and to turn them from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God; that they may receive forgiveness of sins, and inheritance among them who are sanctified by faith that is in me. Whereupon, O king

Agrippa, I was not disobedient to the heavenly vision; but showed first unto them of Damascus, and at Jerusalem, and throughout all the coasts of Judea, and then to the Gentiles, that they should repent and turn to God, and do works meet for repentance.

(a) For these causes the Jews caught me in the temple, and went about to kill me. Having therefore obtained help of God, I continue unto this day, witnessing both to small and great; saying none other things than those which the prophets and Moses did say should come: "That Christ should suffer; and that he should be the first that should rise from the dead; and should show light unto the people and to the Gentiles."

(b) I am not mad, most noble Festus, but speak forth the words of truth and soberness: for the king knoweth of these things before whom also I speak freely; for I am persuaded, that none of these things are hidden from him: for this thing was not done in a corner. King Agrippa, believest thou the prophets? I know that thou believest. I would to God, that not only thou, but also all that hear me this day, were both almost, and altogether such as I am, except these bonds.

Oratio Catilinæ.

(c) Ni virtus fidesque vestra spectata mihi forent, nequicquam opportuna res cecidisset; spes magna, dominatio in manibus frustra fuissent: neque ego per

(a) Refutation.

(b) Peroration.

(c) Exordium.

ignaviam, aut vana ingenia, incerta pro certis capta-rem. Sed quia multis et magnis tempestatibus vos cognovi fortes fidosque mihi; eo animus ausus maximum atque pulcherrimum facinus incipere: simul quia vobis, eadem mihi, bona malaque intellexi; nam idem velle atque nolle, ea demum firma amicitia est.

(a) Sed ego, quæ mente agitavi, omnes jam antea diversi audistis cæterum mihi in dies magis animus accenditur, cum considero, quæ conditio vitæ futura sit nisi nosmet ipsi vindicamus in libertatem. Nam postquam respublica in paucorum jus atque ditionem concessit; semper illis reges, tetrarchæ vectigales esse; populi, nationes stipendia pendere; cæteri omnes strenui, boni, nobiles atque ignobiles, fuimus vulgus, sine gratia, sine auctoritate, his obnoxii, quibus, si respublica valerat, formidini essemus. Itaque omnis gratia, potentia, honos, divitiæ apud illos sunt, aut ubi illi volunt: nobis reliquerunt, pericula, judicia, egesatem. Quæ quousque tandem patiemini, fortissimi viri!

(b) Nonne emori per virtutem præstat, quam vitam miseram atque inhonestam, ubi alienæ superbix ludibrio fueris, per dedecus amittere? verum enimvero pro Deum atque hominum fidem! Victoria in manu nobis est.

(c) Viget ætas, animus valet; contra illis, annis atque divitiis omnia consenuerunt: tantummodo incepto opus est; cætera res expediet.

(d) Etenim quis mortalium, cui virile ingenium, tolerare potest, illis divitias superare, quas profundant in extruendo mari, et montibus coæquandis; nobis rem familiarem etiam ad necessaria deesse? Illos binas

(a) Narratio. (b) Propositio. (c) Confirmatio. (d) Refutatio.

aut amplius domos continuare; nobis larem familiarem nusquam ullum esse? Cum tabulas, signa, toreumata emunt; nova diruunt, alia ædificant; postremo, omnibus modis pecuniam trahunt, vexant; tamen summa lubidine divitias suas vincere nequeunt? At nobis est domi inopia, foris æs alienum; mala res spes multo asperior; denique, quid reliqui habemus, præter miseram animam?

(a) Quin igitur expurgiscimini? En illa, illa, quam sæpe optastis, libertas! Præterea, divitiæ, decus, gloria, in oculis sita sunt! fortuna ea omnia victoribus præmia posuit.—Res, pericula, tempus, egestas, belli spolia magnifica, magis quam oratio mea, vos hortentur. Vel imperatore, vel milite, me utimini; neque animus, neque corpus, a vobis aberit. Hæc ipsa, ut spero, vobis cum una consul agam nisi forte animus fallit, et vos servire magis, quam imperare parati estis.

Sal. Bell. Catil.

Catiline's Oration in English.

(b) Had I not sufficient proofs of your courage and fidelity, in vain had this favorable opportunity offered itself; great hopes and dominion had been in our hands to no purpose: nor would I grasp at uncertainty for certainty, by the help of men of inactive and unsteady dispositions. But because I have found you valiant and faithful to me upon many and important occasions, my mind has dared to undertake one of the greatest and noblest enterprises: as also, because I am persuaded that

(a) Peroratio.

(b) Exordium.

your interest must be affected by what is advantageous or injurious to me; for a similitude of desires and aversions is the only lasting foundation of friendship.

(a) You have all separately heard already what I have projected in my mind: but my desire is daily more inflamed, when I consider, what will probably be our condition of life, if we assert not our own liberty. For since the commonwealth has fallen to the management and disposal of a few, kings and tetrarchs have always been subject to them; states and nations have paid them tribute: the rest of us, the brave, the good, the noble and the ignoble, have all been as the vilest of the vulgar, without interest, without authority, exposed to those to whom we should be a terror, if the administration were in its proper state. Hence, all interest, power, honor, and riches, have been engrossed by them, or disposed of at their pleasure: to us they have left dangers, repulses, impeachments, and poverty. Which indignities, how long will you, the bravest of men, tamely endure?

(b) Is it not better to die bravely, than, by disgrace to lose a miserable and inglorious life, after you have been the sport of other men's insolence? But, by the faith of gods and men, we have certain victory in our hands!

(c) We have youth, strength, and courage on our side: on the contrary, everything with them is impaired by years and luxury; there is need only of a beginning: the undertaking itself will accomplish all the rest.

(d) And what mortal, who has the spirit of a man,

(a) Narration. (b) Proposition. (c) Confirmation. (d) Refutation.

can bear that *they* should have riches in abundance, to lavish in building in the sea, and in leveling mountains; and that *we* should want even a competency for the necessities of life? That *they* should have numbers of houses together: *we* not so much as a household-god left us?

While *they* purchase paintings, statues, embossed figures; pull down their new buildings, and erect others more stately; in a word, by all methods, raise and consume their money; yet, with their utmost extravagance, they cannot exhaust their riches. But *we* have poverty at home, and debts abroad; our circumstances bad, our expectations much more desperate. To conclude:—What have we left us, except a life of misery?

(a) Then why do you not awake? Behold that liberty! that glorious liberty you have often wished for! Moreover, wealth, honor and glory are placed in your view! Fortune has proposed all rewards to the conquerors. May the occasion, opportunity, dangers, distresses, and the magnificent spoils of war excite you more than my oration. Use me, either as your general or fellow-soldier. My heart and hand shall be inseparably with you. I hope to be able to assist you in the enterprise, with the consular power, unless, perhaps, my mind deceives me, and you be disposed rather to be slaves than to command.

(a) Peroration.

WHAT IS A THEME?

A Theme is a short and formal treatise on a given subject.*

Into how many parts is it divided?

Seven: Proposition, Reason, Confirmation, Simile, Example, Testimony, and Conclusion.

Gnome tractata brevissime.

Festina lente.

1. *Propositio.*

Damnosa est in gerendis rebus nimia festinatio.

2. *Ratio.*

Quia nihil consilio tam inimicum est quam temeraria negotii præcipitatio.

3. *Confirmatio.*

Sine consilio autem, quicquid sit, recte fieri non potest.

* Themata vel celebres auctorum sententiæ quæ in scholis ad exercenda puerorum ingenia proponi solent, duo fere habent genera; vel enim *Chreia* sunt vel *Gnomæ*. Gnome dicitur quæ præcipitur aliquid vel *agendum* vel *omittendum*, fugiendumve: ut,

Vive tibi, quantumque potes prælustria vita,

vel,

Ne quid nimis:

Chreia vero est quædam nuda rei notitia, sed ea etiam utilis vitæ; quæ sine præceptione aliqua vel suasionem proponitur, ut, *Mors omnibus communis est.*

Eodem fere modo utraque tractatur brevissime quidem sic.

4. *Simile.*

Ut æstas frugibus, ita deliberandi spatium maturandis negotiis necessarium.

5. *Exemplum.*

Fabius Maximus [ut dicitur] Romanam cunctando restituit rem.

6. *Vetus Testimonium.*

Noverat enim verum esse vetus illud verbum; omnia fieri sat cito sat bene.

7. *Conclusio.*

Bene igitur videtur consulere, qui lente monet festinare.

THEMA II.

Imprimis venerare Deum.

Prop. Videtur illud mihi officium pietatis perquam necessarium, antequam ad obeunda quotidianæ vitæ opera nos accingamus, ab invocatione divini numinis auspicari.

Rat. Quomodo enim fieri potest ut in operibus institutis feliciter progrediamur, nisi propitium nobis faventemque imprimis Deum reddiderimus?

Confirm. Nam sine ejus auxilio nihil est, quod quisquam suscipere, vel conari, vel cogitare, necdum perficere, possit.

Simile. Quemadmodum agricola terram frustra quidem colit, nisi pluviam cælestes reddant fructiferam; ita nos inutiliter prorsus operi cuiquam admovebimus manum, si divina id gratia non irrigaverit, qua quod suscepimus ad exitum felicem perducamus.

Exemp. Memoriam traditum est Romanos olim nihil sollicitos fuisse inauspicato molire, nihil aggredi, non explorata prius deorum suorum voluntate. Quanto id magis nos facere Christianos decet!

Vet. Test. Itaque Poeta recte monet, qui “a Jove principium, a Deo monet auspicandum.”

Conclus. Quare si quis habet in vortis ut omnia sibi negotia prospere cadant, operam imprimis det, ut precibus sibi conciliet voluntatem Dei; quoniam solus, ut poetæ verbis concludam: “Vires ille dat, ille rapit.”

CHREIA.

THEMA III.

Mors omnibus communis.

Prop. Hominibus tandem serius aut citius moriendum est omnibus.

Rat. Hanc enim naturæ legem constituit omnipotens Deus, nequis e nostro genere immortalis sit.

Conf. Dei autem leges perfringi nullo modo possunt.

Simile. Quare, ut Cato venit in theatrum ita nos in hunc mundum, ut exeamus.

Exemp. Sanctissimus David, sapientissimus Solomon, Samson fortissimus, morti omnes succubuerunt.

Ver. Test. Adeo verum est illud poetæ: “Omnes una manet nox, et calcanda semel via lethi.”

Conclus. Vita igitur hac brevi nunc utamur fruamurque, videlicet ex terra ficti in terram redituri.

THEMA IV.

Labor improbus omnia vincit.

Prop. Nihil adeo est arduum, nihil tam operosum, quod assiduitate laboris et constantia non possit aliquando expugnari.

Rat. Nam quæ duæ res omnium videntur difficilimæ, cum sint pulcherimæ, si quis diligenter operum dat, utramque sibi tandem conciliabit, rerum cognitionem atque virtutem.

Conf. Quippe virtutem, quæque alia in bonis habentur, omnia posuisse Deus dicitur “sudoris in arce:” quam qui enitendo secutus fuerit, hæc omnia simul consequitur.

Simile. Quemadmodum enim gutta cavat lapidem, non vi sed sæpe cadendo; ita quæ durissima sunt neque primo impetu superari possunt, industriæ tamen et sedulitati assiduæ cedunt.

Exemp. Accepimus olim perpetuis laboribus tantas res gessisse Herculem, quantas ab homine geri potuisse vix profecto jam credimus.

Vet. Test. Adeo verum est id quod præclare Q. Curtius inquit, “Nihil tam alte natura posuit, quo virtus non possit eniti.”

Conclus. Est igitur hoc sole meridiano clarius, ea quemque in quibus laboraverit nervosque omnes intenderit, exanimi sententia confecturum esse omnia; at merito indecorum et turpe habendum sit a rebus honestis atque præclaris metu difficultatis absterreri.

THEMA V.

Πεδακος ἐξ ἑξῆς οὐλγῇ λιθας.—*Callimachus*.

Prop. Cujuslibet rei elegantia concinnitate partium magis quam magnitudine commendatur.

Rat. Quodcunque enim reipsa pulchrum est, nihil additamenti indiget.

Conf. Plerumque etiam grandiora quæ sunt, defectus, qualescunque sint, magis conspicuos exhibeant necesse est.

Simile. Neque enim hoc a natura ratione abhorret, quæ in minutis avibus decorandis magis operosa est, quam in elephanti mole conformanda.

Exemp. Silicet non ducem alium quam naturam habet hominum judicium, qui Pindarum venerantur, Anacreontem diligunt magis, et amplectuntur.

Vet. Test. Testem habemus Martialem:

Sæpius in libro memoratur Persius uno,
Quam levis in tota Marsus Amazonide.

Concl. Quum ita sint, si quid nobis componendum proponatur, potius, ut numerus omnibus absolutum sit, quam prolixum, studeamus.

THEMA VI.

Plurimum enim intererit, quibus artibus et quibus hunc tu Moribus instituas.—*Juv. Sat. xiv. 73.*

For it shall be of great consequence in what arts and in what morals you instruct him.

Prop. Nemo potest illos dediscere mores, aut eam excutere vivendi rationem, ad quam ab ipsis olim incubilis assuevit.

Rat. Quoniam impetus ille primus, tenerâ pueritâ inditus, tam magnum habet in universa hominum vita monumentum, ut dediscat id sero, quod quis didicit diu.

Conf. Quum enim longa annorum serie, frequentissimaque actionum iteratione acquiruntur, in alteram quasi naturam transeunt.

Simile. Quemadmodum avium pulli et ferarum catuli, semel mansuefacti, semper manent cicures etiam quando in grandiores evaserint: non dissimiliter quos didicerit mores puerilis ætas, eosdem etiam tum quando adoleverit, penitissime sibi infixos usque retinebit.

Exemp. Ovidio, scribendis versibus a teneris annis dedito, tam familiaris ac pene naturalis facta est poetica facultas, ut illi per universam deinceps vitam:

Sponte sua numeros carmen veniebat ad aptos.

Nec dissimiliter contigit in reliquis artibus vivendi que institutis.

Vet. Test. Ad quid enim aliud respexit Cicero, cum dixerit, “Nullum nos posse majus meliusve reipublica afferre munus, quam docendo et erudiendo juventutem,” nisi quod recta juventutis institutio ad summum reipublicæ emolumentum conducat maxime.

Conclu. Proinde si quis in votis habeat, liberos suos ad virtutem formare ac bonos mores; id imprimis operam det ut virtutis atque pietatis odore, ab ipsis statim fasciis, intimius imbuantur; quem ad extremam usque senectutem redolebunt.

Adeo in teneris assuescere multum est.—*Virg.*

A Theme in English; the Thesis and Substance taken from 1 Esdras, iv.

Great is the Truth, and stronger than all things.

Prop. Truth is great, and mighty above all things. All the earth calleth upon it, the heaven blesseth it, all works shake and tremble at it, and with it is no unrighteous thing.

Reas. Because with her there is no accepting of persons, or rewards; but she doeth the things which are just, and all men approve her works.

Confirm. For in her judgment there is no unrighteousness, and she is the strength, dominion, power, and majesty of all ages.

Simile. Even as God, the great Creator, is greater than the spacious earth, the high heaven, or the swift sun that compasseth the heavens, and returns to his own place in one day; so is Truth greater and stronger than all things.

Exemp. Hence it is that David so frequently calls God a God of Truth. The Lord is my rock and my fortress, and my deliverer. Psal. xviii. 2. I have hated them that regard lying vanities: but I trust in the Lord: O Lord God of Truth. Psal. xxxi. 5, 6.

Test. And our Saviour Christ himself, to show the greatness, superiority, and eternity of Truth, calls himself the Truth. I am the way, and the Truth, and the life. John xiv. 6.

Concl. Wine, therefore, is wicked, kings are wicked, women are wicked, all the children of men are wicked,

and such are all their wicked works, all which must perish; but as for Truth, it endureth, and is always strong; it liveth and conquereth for evermore: I conclude, and cry out, that, Great is the Truth, and stronger than all things. Blessed be the God of Truth.

The same Theme in Greek.

Μεγαλη η Αληθεια, και ισχυροτερα παρα παντα.

Great is the Truth, and stronger than all things.

(a) Μεγαλη η αληθεια και ισχυροτερα παρα παντα. Πασα η γη την Αληθειαν καλει, και ο υβρις αυτην ευλογει, και παντα τα εργα σειεται και τρεμει, και ηκ εστι μελ αυτης αδικον υδεν.

(b) Οτι ηκ εστι παρ αυτην λαμβανειν προσωπα, υδε διαφορα, αλλα και τα δικαια ποιει και παντες ευδοκωσι ταις εξουσις αυτης.

(c) Ουνεκα ηκ εστιν εν τη κρισει αυτης υδεν αδικον και αυτη, η ισχυς, και το βασιλειον, και η εξουσια, και η μεγαλειότης των παντων αιωνων.

(d) Καθως ο ΘΕΟΣ, ος παντα ποιει, μειζων η μεγαλη γη υψιλος, υβρις, εις ταχυς ο ηλιος, ος στρεφεται εν τα κυκλω τε υβρις, και παλιν αποτρεχει εις τον εαυτη τοπον εν μια ημερα· ουτως η Αληθεια μειζων και ισχυροτερα παρα παντα.

(e) Εντευθεν ο ΔΑΒΙΔ πολλakis ονομαζει Θεον τον Θεον της Αληθειας. Κυριος στερεωμα μη, και καταφυγη μη, και ρυστης μη. *Psalm*, xviii. 2. Εμισησα της διαφυλασσοντας ματαιότητος διακηνς εγω δε επι τω Κυριω ηλπισα Κυριε ο Θεος της Αληθειας. *Psalm*, xxxi. 5, 6.

(f) Και Κυριος ημων ο ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ αυτος, ινα δειξη οτι παρα παντα η Αληθεια υπερισχυει, ειπεν—Εγω ειμι η οδός, και η ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ, και η ζωη.—*Joan*, xiv. 6.

(g) Ουκ αδικος ο νομος, αδικος ο Βασιλευς, αδικαι αι Γυναικες, αδικοι παντες οι νομοι των ανθρωπων, και αδικα παντα τα εργα αυτων τα τοιαυτα, και απολυνται. Αλλ η Αληθεια μειει και ισχυει εις τον αιωνα, και ζη και κρατει εις τον αιωνα τε αιωνος. Επιλεγω και φωνευ—Μεγαλη η Αληθεια, και ισχυροτερα παρα παντα. Ευλογητος ο Θεος της Αληθειας.

- | | | | |
|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-------------|
| (a) Propositio. | (b) Ratio. | (c) Confirmatio. | (d) Simile. |
| (e) Exemplum. | (f) Testimonium. | (g) Conclusio. | |

PART III.

ELOCUTION.

What is Elocution?

Elocution is the proper, polite, and ornamental expression of our thoughts.*

Into how many parts is it divided?

Three: Composition, Elegance, and Dignity.†

What is Composition?

Composition is such a structure of words and periods as conduces most to accuracy of expression and harmony of sound.‡

* Omnis oratio tres habet virtutes, ut *emendata*, ut *dilucida*, ut *ornata* sit.—*Quint. Inst.*, lib. i. cap. 5.

† Hinc tria in se habere debet, *Compositionem*, *Elegantiam*, et *Dignitatem*.—*Cic. ad Her.*, lib. iv. cap. 12.

‡ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in his Treatise on the Structure of Words, has recounted the different sorts of style, has divided each into the periods of which it is composed, has again subdivided those periods into their different members, those members into their words, those words into syllables, and has even anatomized the very syllables into letters, and made observations on the different natures and sounds of the vowels, half-vowels and mutes. He shows also by examples from Homer, Herodotus, and Thucydides, with what artful management those distinguished writers have sweetened and ennobled their composition,

Enumerate the parts of Composition?

Period,* Order,† Juncture,‡ and Number.§

and made their sound to echo to the sense. In lib. de Comp., cap. 2, he says: "Ἔστι τῆς Συνθεσεως εἰργα, οἰκειως θειναι τα τε ονοματα παρ' ἀλληλα, και τοις κωλοις απυδναι την προσηκυσαν ἄρμινιαν, και ταις περιοδοις διαλαβειν αυτον ὅλον τον λογον:" "The business of composition⁶ is to arrange our words in exact order respecting each other, to render to each member its proper harmonious sound, and to distinguish the whole oration into its most agreeable periods."

* Cicero distinguishes sentences into two kinds: the one he calls "tracta," direct or straight; and the other "contorta," bent or winding. By the former he designates those sentences whose members follow each other in a direct order without any inflection; and by the latter, those consisting of correspondent parts, so formed that the voice, in pronouncing them, may have a proper elevation and cadence; and as the latter part returns back and unites with the former, the period, like a circle, surrounds and encloses the whole sense. For *περιδος* in Greek signifies a circle, or circuit; and the Latins called it *circuitus* and *ambitus*. In the construction of periods, two things require attention; their *length* and *cadence*. Although the precise length of periods cannot be ascertained by any definite measure, yet the ancient rhetoricians seldom used more than four members or colons. The termination of each member should form a pause or rest in pronouncing: and these rests should be so distributed as to make the course of the breathing easy; for, to extend them farther than the voice can manage, must be painful to the speaker, and, consequently, unpleasant to the audience. As to cadence, Cicero says, that the ears judge what is full and what is deficient; and Quintilian says, "Let there be nothing harsh or abrupt in the conclusion of the sentence on which the mind pauses and rests. This is the most material part in the structure of discourse. Here every hearer expects to be gratified; here his applause breaks forth." The only important rule, says Blair, that can be given here is, that the sound should be made to grow to the last; the longest members of the period, and the fullest and most sonorous words should be reserved to the conclusion.

† Order is of two kinds, *Natural* and *Artificial*: the one is peculiarly adapted to the genius of all the modern languages of Europe; the other to the Latin, Greek, Slavonic, Russian, and Gaelic. By the former, we arrange our words according to the order in which the *understanding*

In what does Elegance consist?

In the perspicuity and propriety of language; purity in the choice of words; and care and dexterity in their happy arrangement.

directs those ideas to be exhibited to the view of another: and by the latter, the ancients generally arranged their words according to the order in which the ideas arose in the speaker's imagination. The natural order is more clear and distinct; the artificial more striking and animated. The modern arrangement appears to be the consequence of greater refinement in the art of speech; the ancient gratifies more the rapidity of the imagination, which naturally runs first to that which is its chief object; and having once named it, carries it in view throughout the rest of the sentence. In the ancient languages, the arrangement which most commonly obtains, is to place first in the sentence that word which expresses the principal object of the discourse, together with its circumstances; and afterwards, the person or the thing that acts upon it. In the construction of artificial sentences, Quintilian says, that the verb should stand last, "because the force of the sentence lies in the verb." The object of the ancients, therefore, was that, as the whole sentence is imperfect without the verb, the mind being thus held in suspense might receive a more permanent impression from it at last.

‡ With regard to Juncture, it may be observed, that when the preceding word ends with a vowel, the subsequent one ought to begin with a consonant; and *vice versa*. But when it is more perspicuous or convenient for vowels or consonants to end one word and begin the next, it is proper that the vowels be a long and short one: and that the consonants be either a liquid and a mute, or liquids of different sorts. And lastly, the same syllable ought not to be repeated at the end of one word and the beginning of the subsequent one. The following verse, at the beginning of the first book of Virgil's *Æneid*, possesses all these properties:

Arma virumque cano, Trojæ qui primus ab oris.

Where any word, in this verse, ends with a vowel, the next begins with a consonant; and where any one ends with a consonant, the next begins with a vowel; and there is no repetition of the same sound throughout the whole line. It will be found extremely difficult, how-

How is Elegance acquired?

By studying the most correct writers, and by frequent and accurate composition.*

ever, on all occasions, to observe this harmonious construction; especially in the English language, which abounds with consonants.

§ In the Greek and Roman languages every syllable has its distinct quantity; and is either long, short, or common: two or more of these joined together in a certain order, make a foot, and a determinate number of these in a different order constitute their several sorts of metre. This variety of sounds gives a much greater harmony to their poetry than what can arise only from the seat of the accent, and the similitude of sound at the end of two verses, which chiefly regulate our metre. And although their prose was not so confined with regard to the feet, as their metrical composition, yet it had a sort of measure, particularly in the rise and cadency of their periods, which they called *rhetorical number*. Accordingly, the ancient rhetoricians taught what feet were best adapted to the beginning, middle, or end of a sentence. As such rules, however, are not applicable to our language, which has not that accurate distinction of quantity in its syllables, the following general directions may contribute to modulate our periods, and adjust their cadency. A considerable number of long or short words near each other should be avoided; a succession of words of the same termination should also be avoided; nor should a sentence conclude with an adverb, a preposition, or any inconsiderable word. In general, says Blair, it seems to hold, that a musical close, in our language, requires either the last syllable, or the penult, that is, the last but one, to be a long syllable.

From these remarks on the constituent parts of Composition, namely, Period, Order, Juncture, and Number, it will appear manifest that the first treats of the structure of sentences; the second, of the parts of sentences, which are words and members; and the two last, of the parts of words, which are letters and syllables; the former exhibiting their connection, and the latter their quantity.

* *Elegantia acquiritur doctrina puerili, et consuetudine sermonis quotidiani, et lectione oratorum et poetarum confirmatur.—Cic. ad M. Brut. de Orat.*

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, on this subject thus expresses himself:
 “Εἰ δὲ τοῖς τῶν παλαιῶν ἐντυχαίειν συγγραμμάσιν, ἢ ἐντεῦθεν μὴ μόνον τῆς

In what does dignity consist?

In elevation and grandeur of thought, magnificence of expression,* and a skilful application of Tropes and Figures.†

What is a Trope?

A Trope (from *τρεπω*, to turn) is the *turning* a

υποθεσεως την ολην αλλα και τον των ιδιοματων ζηλον χρησηθημεν. Η γαρ ψυχη τη αναγινωσκοντος, υπο της συνεχης παρατηρησεως, των ομοιοτητα τη χαρσκτηρος εφελεται.”—*De Prisc. Script.*, cap. 1. “We ought to be conversant in the writings of the ancients, not only for subject matter, but for the sake of imitating them in every particular. For the mind of a reader, by a perpetual observation, insensibly contracts a similitude of style.”

To these instances may be added the following extract from the thirteenth section of Longinus on the Sublime: “For hence it is, that numbers of imitators are ravished and transported by a spirit not their own, like the Pythian priestess when she approaches the tripod. There is, if fame speaks true, a chasm in the earth, from whence exhale Divine evaporations, which impregnate her on a sudden with the inspiration of her god, and cause in her the utterance of oracles and predictions. So, from the sublime spirit of the ancients, there arise some fine effluvia, like vapors from the sacred vents, which work themselves insensibly into the breasts of imitators, and fill those who naturally are not of a towering genius, with the lofty ideas and fire of others.”

* Isocrates, speaking of *Dignity*, in *Orat. v.*, contra Sophist., says: “των καιρων μη διαμαρτειν, αλλα και τοις ενθυμησασι πρεποντας ολον τον λογον καταποιικilai, και τοις ονομασιν ευρυδμως και μεσικως ειπειν ταυτα δε πολλης επιμελειας δειται. και ψυχης αιδρικης και δοξαστικης εργον εστι:” “To adapt everything to the occasion, to diversify, with becoming decency, the subject matter of an oration, and to place the words in a musical, harmonious order, require much diligence, sublime thought, and piercing penetration.”

† Majore autem cura rhetor doceat Tropos omnes et Figuras, quibus præcipue non modo poema, sed etiam Oratio ornatur.—*Quint. Inst.*

Longinus, in one place, speaking of figures, says: “For these, when judiciously used, conduce not a little to greatness:” and, in another place, “Figures naturally impart assistance to, and, on the other side, receive it again, in a wonderful manner, from sublime sentiments,”

word from its native and proper to a relative improved sense.*

What occasioned the introduction of Tropes?

Necessity, Emphasis, and Ornament.†

How many *primary* Tropes are there?

Four; *Metaphor, Metonymy, Synecdoche, and Irony.*‡

* Quintilian says, "a Trope is the change of a word or speech from its proper signification to another, in order to greater perfection."

Cicero, in his treatise entitled *Brutus*, says: "As to Tropes in general, they are particular forms of expression, in which the proper name of a thing is supplied by another, which conveys the same meaning, but is borrowed from its adjuncts or effects."

† Cicero, in his third book *de Oratore*, says: "Modus transferendi verba late patet; quam necessitas primum genuit, coacta inopia et angustias; post autem delectatio, jucunditas que celebravit. Nam ut vestis frigoris depellendi causa reperta primo, post adhiberi cæpta est ad ornatum etiam corporis et dignitatem sic verbi translatio instituta est inopiæ causa, frequentata, delectationis: 'The figurative usage of words is very extensive; an usage to which *necessity* first gave rise, on account of the paucity of words, and barrenness of language; but which the pleasure that was found in it afterwards rendered frequent. For as garments were first contrived to defend our bodies from the cold, and afterwards were employed for the purpose of ornament and dignity, so figures of speech, introduced by want, were cultivated for the sake of entertainment.' "

Quintilian, in book viii. chap. 6, says, we now make use of Tropes, "Aut quia *necesse* est, aut quia *significantius*, aut quia *decentius*: 'Through *necessity*, or to express a thing more *emphatically*, or for the sake of *ornament*.' "

‡ Præcipuorum Troporum præstantia si quærat; longe princeps erit *Metaphora*, *Ironia* deinde succedet, tertia erit *Metonymia*, postrema *Synecdoche*. Usus autem etiam frequentissimus est *Metaphoræ*, deinde *Metonymiæ*, tum *Synecdoches*, rarissimus *Ironiæ*.—*Aud. Taleus*.

Inter omnes illæ commendatissimæ habentur *Metaphoræ*, quæ rebus sensu expertibus actum quendam ac quasi animum tribuunt. Ut cum dicitur fluvius *Araxis* impositum sibi ab *Alexandro* pontem *indignatus* evertisse.—*Walker, Rhét.*, lib. i. cap. 14.

Define and exemplify the primary Tropes.

A *Metaphor*, in place of proper words, 1
Resemblance puts, and dress to speech affords.

EXAMPLES.

1. Quintilian says, "a metaphor is a short similitude." And Cicero calls it a "similitude reduced to a single word." The peculiar effect of a metaphor is to give light and strength to description; to make intellectual ideas, in some sort, visible to the eye, by giving them color, and substance, and sensible qualities. Of all the flowers that embellish the regions of eloquence, there is none that rises to such an eminence, that bears so rich and beautiful a blossom, that diffuses such a copious and exquisite fragrance, or that so amply rewards the care and culture of the poet or the orator. Quintilian reduces them to four kinds.

The first kind of metaphors is founded on a comparison of the qualities of animate beings: as, Achilles was a *lion*. So in the Evangelist Luke, our Saviour, in alluding to Herod, says: "Go and tell that *fox*." And Cicero, in his *de Oratore*, says: "Was it owing to art that my brother, here, when Philip asked him why he *barked*, answered, because I see a thief?" The second, of one inanimate thing with another: as, "Clouds of smoke;" "floods of fire;" "he loosed the navy's reins." The third, of animals with inanimate things: as, "Ajax was the *bulwark* of the Greeks;" "the two Scipios were *thunderbolts* of war." The last kind of metaphors is that by which the actions and

Term translated.

1. Translation.

A *Metonymy* does new names impose, 2
And things for things by near relation shows.

EXAMPLES.

other properties of animals are attributed to inanimate objects. Thus, Virgil says:

Araxes' stream
Indignant with a bridge to be confined.

And Homer: he said,

Divine Calypso at the sound
Shudder'd, and in *winged* accents thus replied.

2. Quintilian says, that "Metonymy consists in substituting one name for another." Vossius calls it "a trope, which changes the names of things which are naturally united, but in such a manner, as that one is not of the essence of the other." Metonymies are commonly distinguished into four kinds.

The first is, when the cause is put for the effect: as, "He reads Homer," that is, Homer's works; "they have Moses and the prophets;" meaning the writings of Moses and the prophets. The second puts the effect for the cause. Thus Virgil calls the two Scipios the destruction of Libya, because they were the agents who effected it. Horace also compliments Mæcenas with the titles of being his guard and honor: that is, his guardian, and the author of his honor. And in another place he says: "*Pale* death knocks at the cottages of the poor and the palaces of kings, with an impartial pace."

Term translated.

2. Changing of names.

Synecdoche the whole for part doth take;
Or, of a part for whole, exchange doth make. 3

EXAMPLES.

The third is when the subject is put for the adjunct. By the subject here may be understood that in which some other thing is contained; as also the thing signified, when put for the sign. By the former of these modes of expression, we say the kettle boils; he drank the foaming bowl: and by the latter, this is my body, and this is my blood. The fourth kind of Metonymy is when the adjunct is put for the subject. It is a Metonymy of the adjunct when the thing contained is put for that which contains it, and when the sign is put for the thing signified. By the former kind Virgil says they lie down upon purple, that is, upon couches dyed with purple. And again, they crown the wine, meaning the bowl which contained the wine; and by the latter, to assume the sceptre, is a phrase for entering on royal authority. So Virgil, describing the temple of Juno at Carthage, in which the actions of the Trojan war were represented, and the images of the heroes, makes Æneas, upon discovering that of Priam among the rest, cry out:

Lo! here is Priam!

3. A thing may be considered as a whole in three different respects; which logicians call an *universal*, *essential*, and *integral* whole; hence arise six species or sorts of Synecdoche.

Term translated.

3. Comprehension.

EXAMPLES.

By the first of these the genus is put for the species. Thus, when our Saviour delegated his apostles to preach the gospel to every creature, his meaning was, to every *rational* creature. The second is, when the species is put for the genus: as, wine destroys more than the sword, that is, than any hostile arms. And the legal form of banishment among the Romans was to prohibit persons the use of fire and water: that is, the most common and ordinary necessities of life, in which all others were included. The third is, when the essential whole is put for one of its parts. Thus, in the Evangelist, Mary Magdalen says: "They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid him;" meaning his body. The fourth is, when the name of one of the constituent parts is put for the whole essence: as, "the soul that sinneth, it shall die;" and "all the souls that came with Jacob into Egypt were threescore and six." So we imitate the Latins in using the word *caput* or head, to denote either a person or thing. For, as with them *lepidum caput*, so with us a *witty head*, signifies the same as *a man of wit*.

The fifth is, when the whole of any material thing or quantity, whether continued or discrete, is put for a part of it. Thus Cicero says: "A war is kindled through the whole world;" in compliment to his country, he calls the Roman empire the world. So St. Luke: There went out a decree from Cæsar Augustus that *all the world* should be taxed. And our Saviour, using this trope, said he should be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth; meaning part of the first

An *Irony*, dissembling with an air, 4
Thinks otherwise than what the words declare.
How many *Secondary Tropes* are there?

EXAMPLES.

and third day, and all the second day; and by this kind of synecdoche the plural number is sometimes put for the singular. Thus, St. Matthew says, the thieves who were crucified with our Saviour reviled him: though it is manifest from St. Luke that only one of them acted in that manner. By the sixth kind of synecdoche a part of any material thing or quantity is put for the whole. Accordingly, some ancient writers, when they speak of the Grecian Armada which sailed against Troy, call it a fleet of a thousand ships; although, according to Homer's list, it contained 1186. In like manner, the Greek interpreters of the Old Testament are commonly called the Seventy; whereas, in reality, they were seventy-two.

4. Quintilian says, that "an Irony may be understood by the tone of the voice, character of the person, or nature of the thing." Thus, the irony is very plain from the manner of pronunciation in that passage of Terence, where Simo, speaking to his servant, says, by way of reproof for his negligence: "You have taken great care, indeed." Cicero addressing Catiline, says: He went to your companion, that *excellent man*, Marcus Marcellus. And when he begins his oration for Ligarius, by saying, Cæsar, this is a *new* crime, and never

Term translated.

4. Dissimulation.

Fourteen; *Sarcasmus*, *Diasyrmus*, *Charientismus*, *Asteismus*, *Catachresis*, *Hyperbole*, *Metalepsis*, *Allegory*, *Parœmia*, *Ænigma*, *Antonomasia*, *Litotes*, *Onomatopœia*, and *Antiphrasis*.

EXAMPLES.

heard of till now: the thing he is speaking of, shows it to be an Irony; for it was not *new*, as all who were present very well understood.

Ironies are sometimes applied by way of jest and raillery, as when Cicero says of the person against whom he was pleading: "We have much reason to believe that the modest man would not ask him for his debt when he pursues his life." At other times, by way of insult and derision. Thus, when Cicero would represent the forces of Catiline as mean and contemptible, he says: "O terrible war, where Catiline's prætorian guard consists of such a dissolute, effeminate crew! Against these gallant troops of your adversary, prepare, O Romans, your garrisons and armies."

The subjects of Irony are vices and follies of all kinds; and this mode of exposing them is often more effectual than serious reasoning. The gravest persons have not denied the use of this trope, on proper occasions. The wise and virtuous Socrates used it so frequently, in his endeavors to discountenance vicious and foolish practices, that he was designated by the appellation of εἰρων, or the ironical philosopher. Even in the Sacred Writings we have numerous examples of it. The prophet Elijah, when he challenged the priests of Baal to prove the truth of their deity, "mocked them, and said: Cry aloud, for he is a god; either he is talk-

Define and exemplify the secondary Tropes.

Sarcasmus, with a bitter jeer, doth kill, 5

And ev'ry word with strongest venom fill.

A *Diasyrmus* must ill nature show, 6

And ne'er omit to insult a living foe.

Charientismus, when it speaks, doth choose 7

The softer for the harsher words to use.

Asteismus loves to jest with strokes of wit, 8

EXAMPLES.

ing, or he is pursuing, or he is in a journey, or peradventure he sleepeth, and must be awaked." See Matth. xxvi. 50; Gen. iii. 22; 2 Sam. vi. 20; Job xii. 2; Matth. xxvi. 45.

5. Tomyris, queen of Scythia, having taken Cyrus prisoner, cut off his head and threw it into a vessel full of human blood, saying, "Now, Cyrus, satiate yourself with blood." So, in St. Matthew: "Hail, King of the Jews!" See also Psalms cxxxvii. 3; Mark xv. 31, 32.

6. Turnus thus addresses Drances in the eleventh book of Virgil's *Æneid*: "Wherefore, thunder on in noisy eloquence, as you are wont, and arraign me of cowardice, thou valiant Drances, since thy right-hand hath raised so many heaps of slaughtered Trojans, and everywhere thou deckest the fields with trophies."

7. Davus, in the *Andria* of Terence, Act i. Scene 2, says: Softly, sir, softly, I beseech you. And Virgil: Be not incensed, great priest.

8. Virgil says, "Who hates not Bavius' verse, may

Terms translated.

5. A bitter taunt.

6. Detraction.

7. Softening.

8. Civility.

And slily with the point of satire hit.*
 A *Catachresis* words too far doth strain; 9
 Rather from such abuse of speech refrain.

EXAMPLES.

love thine, O Mævius: and the same fool may join
 foxes in the yoke, and milk he-goats.”

9. This trope is chiefly used by poets, who make
 choice of it for novelty or boldness. Thus Milton, de-
 scribing the descent of the angel Raphael from heaven,
 says:

Down thither, prone in flight,
 He speeds, and, through the vast ethereal sky,
Sails between worlds and worlds.

And Virgil says, that the Greeks, wearied by the
 length of the siege of Troy,

An *horse* erect,
 Of mountain bulk, by Pallas’ art divine.

So, Homer:

Phemius! let acts of gods and heroes old,
 What ancient bards in hall and bow’r have told
 Attemper’d to the lyre, your voice employ,
 Such the pleased ear will *drink* with silent joy.

It is sometimes found, however, in the gravest au-
 thors, and even in the Sacred Writings: as, “Thou didst
 drink the pure *blood* of the grape;” “And I turned to
see the voice that spake with me.” See Hosea iv. 8;
 Psal. cxxxvii. 5; Jer. xlv. 10.

Term translated.

9. Abuse.

* Holmes says that Sarcasmus, Diasyrmus, Charientismus, and As-
 teismus, may be referred to an Irony.

Hyperbole soars high or creeps too low; 10
Exceeds the truth things wonderful to show.*

EXAMPLES.

10. Quintilian defines Hyperbole “an exaggeration surpassing truth, which may be equally proper for argumentation and diminution.”

Longinus says, “Hyperboles equally serve two purposes; they enlarge and they lessen. Stretching anything beyond its natural size is the property of both.”

“I saw their chief,” says the scout of Ossian, “tall as a rock of ice; his spear the blasted fir; his shield the rising moon: he sat on the shore like a cloud of mist on the hill.”

So Cassius speaks invidiously of Cæsar, in order to raise the indignation of Brutus:

Why, man, he doth bestride the narrow world
Like a Colossus, and we petty men
Walk under his huge legs, and peep about
To find ourselves dishonorable graves.

Pope says:

Milton's strong pinions now at Heav'n can bound,
Now, serpent-like, in prose he sweeps the ground.

And Virgil:

On each side mighty rocks; above the rest
Two threaten heav'n.

Term translated.

10. Excess.

* The excess in this trope is called *Auxesis*, and the contrary extreme *Meiosis*.

By *Metalepsis*, in one word combin'd 11
More tropes than one you easily may find.*

EXAMPLES.

Herodotus has used hyperbole concerning those warriors who fell at Thermopylæ: "In this place they defended themselves with the weapons that were left, and with their hands and teeth, till they were buried under the arrows of barbarians."

Although hyperboles should, in most cases, exhibit an air of probability, yet Longinus says, that "in comedy, circumstances wholly absurd and incredible pass off very well, because they answer their end, and raise a laugh. As in this passage: 'He was owner of a piece of ground not so large as a Lacedemonian letter.' " See Job xxxix. 19; 2 Sam. i. 23; Deut. ix. 1.

11. During the civil war between Sylla and Marius, Sylla, observing the boundless ambition of Julius Cæsar, said: "In one Cæsar there are many Mariuses." In this expression there is a *Metalepsis*: for the word *Marius*, by *Synecdoche*, or *Antonomasia*, is put for any ambitious or turbulent person, and this, again, by a *Metonymy* of the cause for the effects of such a pernicious disposition to the state. Sylla's meaning, therefore, was, that Cæsar would prove a very dangerous person to the Roman people, which eventually proved true.

Term translated.

11. Participation, or Transumption.

* Tropus rarrissimus et maxime improprius.—*Quint. Inst.*, lib. viii.

An *Allegory* tropes continue still,* 12
Which with new graces every sentence fill.

EXAMPLES.

The following words of Dido, in Virgil, contain a Metalepsis:

Happy, ah truly happy, had I been
If Trojan ships our coast had never seen.

Here, by a Metonymy of the adjunct, the ships are put for the Trojans in the ships; and these, by a Synecdoche of the whole, for Æneas, who was one of them; and again, his arriving on the coast, by a Metonymy of the cause, for her seeing him; and, lastly, her seeing him, by the same trope, for the passion she entertained for him. Her meaning, therefore, was, that she would have been happy had she never loved Æneas.

12. As a Metalepsis comprises several tropes in one word, so this is a continuation of several tropes in one or more sentences. Allegories are of two kinds; *pure* and *mixed*. The fourteenth ode of the first book of Horace, in which, by a ship, he means the commonwealth; by the agitations of stormy seas, civil wars; and by a harbor, peace and concord, may be an example of the former kind. And Cicero says: "I am surprised at, and even pity that man, who has so hankering a desire after calumny, that rather than refrain

Term translated.

12. Speaking differently from meaning.

* To the Allegory may be referred all apologues, such as Æsop's Fables, the parables of Scripture, and the Song of Solomon. Paræmia and Enigma are also species of Allegory.

Ænigma, in dark words, the sense conceals; 13
But that, once known, a riddling speech reveals.

Paræmia, by a proverb, tries to teach 14
A short, instructing, and a nervous speech.

EXAMPLES.

from it, he chooses to sink the vessel in which he sails." But the *mixed* Allegory is more frequently used. Thus, Cicero says: "As for other storms and tempests, I always believed Milo had no occasion to be apprehensive of any, except amidst those boisterous waves of the assemblies of the people." If he had not added "the assemblies of the people," it would have been a *pure* Allegory; but, by adding those words, it became mixed, and in that manner it receives beauty from the borrowed words, and perspicuity from the proper. See Eccles. xii. 5, 6; Psal. lxxx. 8-14; Job xxix. 6.

13. Quintilian says: "When the Allegory is involved in obscurity, it becomes an enigma, which I must think, indeed, to be a vice, and for no other reason, than because perspicuity is a perfection. Poets, however, use it;" as, Tell me (and you shall be my great Apollo) where heaven's circuit extends not farther than three ells. See Gen. xl. and xli.; Dan. iv. 10, 11, &c.; Judg. xiv. 14; Isa. xi. 1, 2, &c.

14. "You wash the blackmoor white;" that is, you labor in vain. So, in Terence: "I have a wolf by the ears;" that is, I know not which way to turn me. And in the prophet Ezekiel: As is the mother, so is her daughter.

Terms translated.

13. A Riddle.

14. A Proverb.

Antonomasia proper names imparts, 15
 From kindred, country, epithets, or arts.
Litotes doth more sense than words include, 16
 And often by two negatives have stood.

EXAMPLES.

15. Quintilian says: "The *Antonomasia* is a trope which puts an equivalent in the place of a name." Thus Virgil, by using an attribute characteristic of Jupiter, says:

The sire of gods and king of men.

And Longinus, alluding to Homer, says: "Among a thousand instances, we may see, from what *the poet* has said, with so much boldness, of the *Aloides*."

On the contrary, it is used when a proper name is put for a general term: and when we call a great warrior an *Alexander*; a great orator a *Demosthenes*; and a great patron of learned men a *Mæcenas*. *Antonomasia* may also be used when we intend to convey a lively image to the mind. So Milton:

O'er many a frozen, many a fiery *Alp*.

See John xi. 28; Matth. ix. 6.

16. In the *Andria* of Terence, Act ii. Scene 6, Davus says: "I don't approve it," that is, *I censure it*. And in the seventh book of Virgil's *Æneid*, Latinus thus addresses Ilioneus: "Trojan, what you demand shall be given: *nor do I reject* your presents;" that is, I willingly receive them. And the apostle says: But

Terms translated.

15. For a name.

16. A Lessening.

Onomatopœia coins a word from sound, 17
 By which alone the meaning may be found.
Antiphrasis makes words to disagree 18
 From sense; if rightly they derived be.

EXAMPLES.

with many of them God was *not well pleased*; for they were overthrown in the wilderness. See also Psalm li. 17; Matth. ii. 6; Psalm ix. 12.

17. Quintilian says: "There have been many words invented by the first authors of our language, in order to adapt sounds to the natures of the affections they desired to express; and hence we may account for the origin of the words to bellow, to hiss and to murmur." The following example occurs in Homer:

And when the horn was rounded to an arch,
 He *twang'd* it. *Whizz'd* the bowstring, and the reed
 With full impatience started to the goal.

Hamlet thus censures the violent and unnatural gesture of some actors: "I would have such a fellow whipped for out-doing Termagant: it *out-herods Herod*." And Swift expresses himself in the following manner relative to Blackmore, the author of a translation of the Psalms into English verse:

Sternhold himself he *out-sternholded*.

18. Thus *Lucus*, from Lux, light, signifies a dark shady grove; *Bellum*, from Bellum, fine or pretty, signifies war; and *Parcæ*, from parco, to spare, signifies fate; because fate spares none.

Terms translated.

17. Coining a word from the sound.

18. Contrary word.

What is a Figure?

A figure is that language which is suggested either by the imagination or the passions.

What is the difference between *Tropes* and *Figures*?

Tropes affect only single words; *Figures* whole sentences.

How are the principal figures usually divided?

Into *Repetitions of Sounds*, and *Figures of Sentences*.

What are *Repetitions of Sounds*?

They are such as gracefully repeat either the same word, or the same sound in different words.

How many *Repetitions* are there?

Fifteen: *Anaphora*, *Epistrophe*, *Symploce*, *Epanalepsis*, *Epanodos*, *Anadiplosis*, *Epizeuxis*, *Ploce*, *Polyptoton*, *Antanaclasis*, *Paronomasia*, *Paregmenon*, *Homoioteleuton*, *Climax*, and *Synonymy*.

Define and exemplify the *Repetitions of Sounds*.

Anaphora gives more sentences one head; 19

As readily appears to those who read.

EXAMPLES.

19. Cicero uses this figure in his first oration against Catiline: "Does neither the night guard of the palace, *nor* the city watch, *nor* the people's fear, *nor* the union of all good men, *nor* the meeting of the senate in this fortified place, *nor* the countenances and looks of this assembly, move you?"

And Virgil, in his tenth Eclogue, says:

Here cooling fountains roll through flow'ry meads;

Here woods, Lycoris, lift their verdant heads;

Term translated.

19. Rehearsal.

Epistrophe more sentences doth close 20
With the same words, whether in verse or prose.

EXAMPLES.

Here could I wear my careless life away,
And in thy arms insensibly decay.

Another beautiful instance of this figure occurs in the lamentation of Orpheus for Eurydice, in Virgil's fourth *Georgic*:

Thee, his loved wife, along the lonely shores;
Thee, his loved wife, his mournful song deplores;
Thee, when the rising morning gives the light,
Thee, when the world was overspread with night.

In the book of Psalms, David says: "*The voice of the Lord* is upon the waters: *The voice of the Lord* is powerful; *the voice of the Lord* breaketh the cedars of Lebanon." See also Jer. viii. 2; 1 Cor. i. 20; Psal. cxviii. 8, 9; Rom. viii. 38; Jer. l. 35, 36, 37.

20. There is scarcely a more beautiful instance of this figure, than in Cicero's second oration against Antony.—"You mourn, O Romans! that three of your armies have been slaughtered—they were slaughtered by Antony: you lament the loss of your most illustrious citizens—they were torn from you by Antony: the authority of this order is deeply wounded—it is wounded by Antony: in fine, all the calamities we have ever since beheld, (and what calamities have we not beheld?) if we reason rightly, have been entirely owing to Antony. As Helen was of Troy, so the bane, the misery, the destruction of this state—is Antony."

Term translated.

20. A turning to.

Symploce joins these figures both together, 21
And from both joined makes up itself another.

Epanalepsis words doth recommend, 22
The same at the beginning and the end.

EXAMPLES.

And St. Paul says: "When I was *a child* I spake as *a child*, I understood as *a child*, I thought as *a child*." See also Psal. cxv. 9, 10, 11; Matth. vii. 23; Joel ii. 26, 27; Amos iv. 6, 8.

21. Cicero, in his oration for Milo, says: "*Who* required these witnesses? *Appius*. *Who* produced them? *Appius*." And in another place: "*Who* was the author of the law? *Rullus*. *Who* deprived a majority of the people of their suffrages? *Rullus*. *Who* presided at the elections? *Rullus*." And again: "*Who* often broke their treaties? *The Carthaginians*. *Who* waged a cruel war in Italy? *The Carthaginians*. *Who* laid waste Italy? *The Carthaginians*. *Who* sue for pardon? *The Carthaginians*."

A beautiful example of this figure occurs in St. Paul, when he says: "*Are they* Hebrews? *So am I*. *Are they* Israelites? *So am I*. *Are they* the seed of Abraham? *So am I*." See also Psal. xlvii. 6; Psal. cxviii. 2, 3, 4; cxxxvi. 1, 2, 3; Rom. xiv. 8.

22. Quintilian gives the following example of this figure, from Cicero: "*Many* and terrible punishments were invented for parents, and for relations, *many*." And Cicero addressing Cæsar, in his oration for Marcellus, says: "We have seen your victory terminated

Terms translated.

21. Complication, or Connection.

22. Repetition.

By *Epanodos* a sentence shifts its place; 23

Takes first and last and also middle space.

Anadiplosis ends the former line, 24

With what the next does for its first design.

EXAMPLES.

by the war: your drawn sword in the city we have not seen." St. Paul also uses this figure when he says: "*Rejoice* in the Lord alway: and again I say, *rejoice*." See 1 Cor. iii. 21, 22; Psal. viii. 1, 9.

23. Minutius Felix, exposing the absurdity of the Egyptian superstition, says: "Isis, with Cynocephalus and her priests, laments, bemoans, and seeks her lost son; her attendants beat their breasts, and imitate the grief of the unhappy mother; in a little time the son is found, upon which they all rejoice. Nor do they cease every year to lose what they find, or find what they lose. And is it not ridiculous to lament what you worship, or worship what you lament?"

Another example of this figure occurs in the eighth Eclogue of Virgil, which is thus translated by Smith:

Whether the worst? the child accurst,

Or else the cruel mother?

The mother worst, the child accurst;

As bad the one as the other.

The following beautiful example is from the book of Judges: "*The river of Kishon* swept them away, that ancient river, the river *Kishon*." See also Ezek. vii. 6; Rom. vii. 19; John viii. 47; 2 Thess. ii. 4; Ezek. xxxv. 6.

24. Cicero, in his first oration against Catiline, says:

Terms translated.

23. A Regression.

24. Reduplication.

An *Epizeuxis* twice a word repeats 25
 Whate'er the subject be whereon it treats.
 By *Ploce* we a proper name repeat; 26
 Yet as a common noun the latter treat.

EXAMPLES.

"He *lives*; *lives*! did I say? he even comes into the senate." And in the same oration: "As long as there is one who dares to defend thee, thou shalt *live*; and *live* so as thou now dost, surrounded by the numerous and powerful guards which I have placed about thee." So in the tenth Eclogue of Virgil: "These you will make acceptable to *Gallus*; to *Gallus*, for whom my love grows as much every hour as the green alder shoots up in the infancy of spring." And in the book of Deuteronomy: "For the Lord thy God bringeth thee into a good *land*; a *land* of brooks of water." See also Rom. viii. 16, 17; Isa. xxx. 9; Psal. xlviii. 8; Psal. cxxii. 2, 3; Luke vii. 31, 32.

25. Cicero, expressing his extreme indignation against Antony, as the promoter of the civil war, says: "*You, you* Antony, pushed Cæsar upon the civil war." And in Virgil: "Ah! Corydon, Corydon, what frenzy has possessed you?" So in Matt. xxiii. 37: "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets," &c. See also Isa. li. 9; 2 Sam. xviii. 33.

26. Milton affords an instance of this figure in the ninth book of *Paradise Lost*:

Frail is our happiness if this be so,
 And Eden were no *Eden* (*i. e. pleasure*) thus exposed.

Terms translated.

25. A joining together.

26. Continuation.

A *Polyptoton* still the same word places, 27
 If sense require it, in two diff'rent places.
Antanaclasis in one sound contains 28
 More meanings; which the various sense explains.

EXAMPLES.

Another example occurs in the book of Genesis: "Is not he rightly named *Jacob*? (*i. e. a supplanter*;) for he hath supplanted me these two times." And Cicero says: "Young Cato wants experience, but yet he is *Cato*;" meaning that he possessed the inflexible integrity of the family. So the proverb: "An ape is an ape dress it ever so fine."

27. Cicero, in his oration for Cælius, says: "We will contend with arguments, we will refute accusations by evidences brighter than light itself: fact shall engage with fact, cause with cause, reason with reason." And Virgil, describing the battle between the Trojan and Latin armies, says: "Foot to foot is fixed, and man to man is closely joined." So in the following passage from Romans: "For *of him*, and *through him*, and *to him* are all things." See Dan. ii. 37; John iii. 13.

28. When Proculius complained that his son wished for his death, the son, to clear himself of suspicion, assured him that he did not *wait* for it. His father replied, I desire you to *wait* for it. Here it is obvious that the word *wait* is taken in two different senses. So in St. Matthew: "But Jesus said unto him, follow me; and let the *dead* bury their *dead*." In the one clause

Terms translated.

27. Variation of case.

28. A Reciprocatation.

Paronomasia to the sense alludes, 29
 When words but little varied it includes.
Paregmenon derived from one recites 30
 More words, and in one sentence them unites.
Homoioтелеuton makes the measure chime, 31
 With like sounds, in the end of fettered rhyme.

EXAMPLES.

of this verse *dead* denotes a moral or spiritual death, and in the other a natural death. See Matth. x. 39; John iv. 13, 14; Matth. xxvi. 29; Isa. lix. 18.

29. The following are examples of this figure: "*Friends* are turned *fiends*;" "After a *feast* comes a *fast*;" "A friend *in need* is a friend *indeed*." And Cicero, in the second book of *de Oratore*, says that Cato called the *nobility* *mobility*." This figure frequently occurs in the sacred writings. Thus St. Paul says: "For though we *walk* in the flesh we do not *war* after the flesh. And in another place: "As *unknown* and yet *well known*."

30. Cicero, in his *Essay on Friendship*, says: "In the present performance, it is a *friend* explaining to a *friend* his notions concerning *friendship*." So in the book of Daniel: "He giveth *wisdom* unto the *wise*, and *knowledge* to them that *know* understanding." See 1 Cor. xv. 47; Prov. xi. 15, 25.

31. The mountains skipped like *rams*, and the little hills like *lambs*.

Terms translated.

29. Likeness of words.

30. Derived from the same.

31. Alike ending.

Climax by gradation still ascends, 32

Until the sense with finished period ends.

Synonymy doth diff'rent words prepare, 33

Yet each of them one meaning doth declare.

EXAMPLES.

32. There is great strength as well as beauty in this figure, when the several steps rise naturally out of each other, and are closely connected by the sense which they jointly convey. This mutual relation of parts we may perceive in the following example: "There is no enjoyment of property without government, no government without a magistrate, no magistrate without obedience, and no obedience where every one acts as he pleases." In the same manner, when Cicero is pleading for Milo, he says: "Nor did he commit himself only to the people, but also to the senate; nor to the senate only, but likewise to the public forces; nor to these only, but also to the power of him with whom the senate had entrusted the whole commonwealth." And, in another place, he says: "What hope is there remaining of liberty, if whatever is their pleasure it is lawful for them to do; if what is lawful for them to do they are able to do; if what they are able to do they dare do; if what they dare do they really execute; and if what they execute is no way offensive to you?" See Rom. v. 3, 5; 2 Pet. i. 5, 7; Rom. viii. 29, 30, 38, 39; 1 Cor. iii. 21, 23.

33. As there are scarcely two words, in any lan-

Terms translated.

32. A ladder.

33. Partaking together of a name.

How are Figures of Sentences divided?

Into figures for *reasoning*, and figures for *moving the passions*.

How many figures for reasoning are there?

Seven: *Erotesis*, *Prolepsis*, *Epitrope*, *Anacænosis*, *Antithesis*, *Oxymoron* and *Aporia*.

Define and exemplify the figures for reasoning.

By *Erotesis*, what we know we ask, 34

Prescribing to ourselves a needless task.

EXAMPLES.

guage, that convey precisely the same idea, the use of this figure is so far extended as to comprehend words of a near affinity in their signification. Thus Cicero, speaking of Piso, says: "His whole countenance, which is the tacit language of the mind, *has drawn men into a mistake, and deceived, cheated, and imposed* on those who did not know him." And Ilioneus, in his speech to Dido, thus speaks relative to Æneas: "Whom if the *fates preserve, if he still breathes the vital air, and does not yet rest with the ruthless shades.*" The following beautiful example is from the nineteenth chapter of Isaiah: "The *fishers* also shall *mourn*, and all *they that cast angles into the brooks* shall *lament*, and *they that spread nets upon the waters* shall *languish.*" See Prov. iv. 14, 15.

34. Demosthenes thus addresses the Athenians: "Would you go about the city, and demand what news? What greater news can there be, than that a Macedonian enslaves the Athenians, and disposes of

Term translated.

34. Interrogation.

Prolepsis your objection doth prevent, 35
With answers suitable and pertinent.

EXAMPLES.

the affairs of Greece? Is Philip dead? No: but he is sick. And what advantage would accrue to you from his death? For, if anything happens to this Philip, you will immediately raise up another." Germanicus thus reproaches his mutinous soldiers: "What is there in these days that you have not attempted? What have you not profaned? What name shall I give to this assembly? Shall I call you soldiers? You, who have besieged with your arms, and surrounded with a trench the son of your emperor? Shall I call you citizens? You, who have so shamefully trampled upon the authority of the senate? You, who have violated the justice due to enemies, the sanctity of embassy, and the rights of nations?" Balaam thus expresses himself to Balak: "The Lord is not a man that he should lie, neither the son of man that he should repent. Hath he said, and shall he not do it? or, hath he spoken, and shall he not make it good?" See Job viii. 3; Psal. lxxvii. 7-9.

35. Cicero, for several years after he began to plead, had employed his eloquence only in defence of his friends. And, therefore, when the Sicilians prevailed with him to manage the prosecution against Verres, he begins his oration with this *Prolepsis*: "If any one present should wonder that I, whose practice for so many years, in causes and public trials, has been such

Term translated.

35. Prevention.

Epitrope gives leave and facts permits, 36
Whether it speaks sincere or counterfeits.

EXAMPLES.

as to defend many and accuse none, now suddenly change my custom, and descend to the office of an accuser; when he shall have heard the occasion and reason of my design, he will both approve it, and think that I deserve the preference to all others, in the management of the present affair." And then he proceeds to enumerate the reasons which induced him to adopt this determination.

We have a beautiful instance of this figure in Cato:

"But, grant that others can with equal glory,
Look down on pleasures and the bait of sense,
Where shall we find the man that bears affliction,
Great and majestic in his ills, like Cato?"

And St. Paul says: "But some man will say, how are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come? Thou fool! that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die." See Matth. xv. 26, 27; 1 Kings xviii. 17, 18.

36. Cicero, pleading for Flaccus, in order to invalidate the testimony of the Greeks, who were witnesses against his client, allows them every quality but that which was necessary to make them credited. "This, however, I say concerning all the Greeks:—I grant them learning, the knowledge of many sciences; I do not deny that they have wit, fine genius, and eloquence;

Term translated.

36. Permission.

Anacænosis tries another's mind, 37
The better counsel of a friend to find.

EXAMPLES.

nay, if they lay claim to many other excellencies, I shall not contest their title: but this I must say, that nation never paid a proper regard to the religious sanctity of public evidence; and are total strangers to the obligation, authority, and importance of truth." Nothing more confounds an adversary than to grant him his whole argument, and, at the same time, either to show that it is nothing to the purpose, or to offer something else that may invalidate it, as in the following example: "I allow that nobody was more nearly related to the deceased than you; I grant that he was under some obligations to you; nay, that you have always been in friendly correspondence with each other: but what is all this to the last will and testament?" Another example of this figure occurs in the eleventh chapter of Romans: "Thou wilt say, then, the branches were broken off that I might be grafted in. Well; because of unbelief they were broken off; and thou standest by faith. Be not high-minded, but fear."

37. Cicero thus appeals to Piso in his oration for Cæcina: "Suppose, Piso, that any person had driven you from your house by violence, how would you have behaved?" A similar appeal he makes use of in his oration for Rabirius: "But what could you have done in such a case, and at such a juncture?—when to have

Term translated.

37. Communication.

Antithesis doth change a syllable or letter, 38
Or holds up contrasts as men think better.*

EXAMPLES.

sat still, or to have withdrawn, would have been cowardice; when the wickedness and fury of Saturninus had sent for you into the capitol, and the consuls had called you to protect the safety and liberty of your country? whose authority, whose voice, which party would you have followed? and whose orders would you have chosen to obey?" So the prophet Malachi: "A son honoreth his father, and a servant his master. If I then be a father, where is mine honor? and if I be a master, where is my fear?" See Isa. v. 3, 4; Jer. xxiii. 23; Luke xi. 19; 1 Cor. iv. 21; Gal. iv. 21.

38. The following examples will illustrate this figure:

"Though deep, yet clear; though gentle, yet not dull;
Strong, without rage; without o'erflowing, full."

"If Cato may be censured, severely indeed, but justly, for abandoning the cause of liberty, which he would not, however, survive, what shall we say of those who embrace it faintly, pursue it irresolutely, grow tired of it when they have much to hope, and give it up when they have nothing to fear."

"For the wages of sin is death: but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord."

Term translated.

38. Opposition.

* For *Antithesis*, as a grammatical figure, see distich 77.

In *Oxymoron* contradictions meet, 39
 And jarring epithets and subjects greet.
Aporia, in words and actions, doubts; 40
 And with itself, what may be best, disputes.

EXAMPLES.

39. Cicero, in his first oration against Catiline, says: "But with regard to you, Catiline, the silence of the senate declares their approbation, their acquiescence amounts to a decree, and by *saying nothing* they *proclaim their consent*." And Ovid says of Althea, that *she was impiously pious*. In like manner Cato said of Scipio Africanus, that "he was never less at leisure, than when he was at leisure; nor less alone, than when alone." And St. Paul says: "But she that liveth in pleasure is *dead* while she *liveth*."

40. Cicero, in his defence of Cluentius, says: "I know not which way to turn myself. Shall I deny the infamy thrown upon him, of bribing the judges? can I say, the people were not told of it? that it was not talked of in the court? mentioned in the senate? can I remove an opinion so deeply and long rooted in the minds of men? It is not in my power. You, judges, must support his innocence, and rescue him from this calamity." Livy gives a very elegant example of this figure, in a speech of Scipio Africanus to his soldiers after a sedition: "I never thought I should have been at a loss in what manner to address my army. Not that I have applied myself more to words than things; but because I have been accustomed to the genius of

Terms translated.

39. A witty foolish saying

40. A doubting.

How many Figures are there for moving the passions?

Fifteen; *Ecphonesis*, *Enantiosis*, *Aposiopesis*, *Parallelipsis*, *Epanorthosis*, *Anastrophe*, *Asyndeton*, *Poly-syndeton*, *Periphrasis*, *Hypotyposis*, *Epiphonema*, *Enallage*, *Hyperbaton*, *Apostrophe*, and *Prosopopæia*.

Define and exemplify the Figures for moving the passions.

By *Ecphonesis* straight the mind is rais'd, 41

When by a sudden flow of passion seiz'd.

EXAMPLES.

soldiers, having been trained up in the camp almost from my childhood. But I am in doubt what or how to speak to you, not knowing what name to give you. Shall I call you *citizens*, who have revolted from your country? *Soldiers*, who have disowned the authority of your general, and broken your military oath? *Enemies*? I perceive the mien, the aspect, and habit of citizens; but discern the actions, words, designs, and dispositions of enemies."

An excellent example of *Aporia* is in the cxxxix Psalm: "Whither shall I go from thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence?" See also Phil. i. 22, 23; Lam. ii. 13; Rom. vii. 24, 25.

41. Cicero, in his second Philippic, speaking of Pompey's house, which Mark Antony had purchased, thus addresses him: "Oh consummate impudence! dare you go within those walls? dare you venture over that venerable threshold, and show your audacious countenance

Term translated.

41. Exclamation.

Enantiosis poiseth diff'rent things, 42

And words and sense as into balance brings.

EXAMPLES.

to the tutelar deities which reside there?" And speaking of his banishment, from which he had been so honorably recalled, he says: "Oh mournful day to the senate and all good men! calamitous to the senate, afflictive to me and my family; but to posterity glorious and worthy of admiration!" And in compliment to Cæsar, he says: "O admirable clemency! worthy of the greatest praise, the highest encomiums, and most lasting monuments!" It is frequently used by the sacred writers: as, "O that I had the wings of a dove, that I might flee away and be at rest!" And again: "O death, where is thy sting! O grave, where is thy victory!" So in St. Matthew: "My God! my God! why hast thou forsaken me?"

42. Cicero opposing the conduct of Verres, when governor of Sicily, to that of Marcellus, who took Syracuse, the capital of that island, says: "Compare this peace with that war; the arrival of this governor with the victory of that general; his profligate troops with the invincible army of the other; the luxury of the former with the temperance of the latter: you will say that Syracuse was founded by him who took it, and taken by him who held it when founded." And in his oration for the Manilian law, speaking of Pompey, he says: "He waged more wars than others had read: conquered more provinces than others had governed:

Term translated.

42. Contrariety.

Aposiopesis leaves imperfect sense; 43
 Yet such a silent pause speaks eloquence.
 A *Paraleipsis* cries, I leav't behind, 44
 I let it pass; tho' you the whole may find.

EXAMPLES.

and had been trained up from his youth to the art of war; not by the precepts of others, but by his own commands; not by miscarriages in the field, but by victories; not by campaigns, but by triumphs." So in the third chapter of Proverbs: "The *wise* shall inherit *glory*, but *shame* shall be the promotion of *fools*."

43. The old man in Terence, when he was jealous that his servant obstructed his designs, uses this imperfect, but threatening expression: "Whom, if I find." And Neptune, enraged that the winds should presume to agitate the sea without his permission, is represented by Virgil as addressing them in the following abrupt manner:

"Whom I—but first I'll lay the storm."

And Cicero, in a letter to Cassius, says: "Brutus could scarcely support himself at Mutina; if he is safe, we have carried the day; but if—heaven avert the omen! all must have recourse to you." His meaning is, "if Brutus should be defeated." So in St. John: "Now is my soul troubled; and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour: but, for this cause came I unto this hour." See also 1 Kings xxi. 7; Psal. vi. 4; Luke xix. 42.

44. Cicero, in his defence of Sextius, introduces his

Terms translated.

43. Suppression.

44. Omission.

Epanorthosis doth past words correct, 45
And, only to enhance, seems to reject.

EXAMPLES.

character in the following manner, with a design of recommending him to the favor of the judges: "I might say many things of his liberality, kindness to his domestics, his command in the army, and moderation during his office in the province; but the honor of the state presents itself to my view, and, calling me to it, advises me to omit these lesser matters." There is an excellent example of this figure in St. Paul's epistle to Philemon: "I, Paul, have written it with my own hand; I will repay it: *Albeit, I do not say to thee* how thou owest unto me even thine own self besides."

45. Cicero makes use of this figure in his oration for Milo: "Can you be ignorant, among the conversation of this city, what laws—if they are to be called laws, and not rather the firebrands of Rome, and the plagues of the commonwealth—this Clodius designed to fasten and fix upon us?" Another example occurs in the following passage of Cicero, in his defence of Plancius: "For what greater blow could those judges—if they are to be called judges, and not rather parricides of their country, have given to the state, than when they banished that very man, who, when prætor, delivered the republic from a neighboring, and who, when consul, saved it from a civil, war?" So in St. Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians: "I labored more abundantly than they all: *yet not I*, but the grace of God,

Term translated.

45. Correction.

Anastrophe makes words that first should go 46
The last in place: verse oft, will have it so.

EXAMPLES.

which was with me." See Gal. iv. 9; Isa. xlix. 15;
Luke xi. 27, 28; Rom. viii. 34.

46. Milton begins his *Paradise Lost* by a beautiful example of this figure:

Of man's first disobedience, and the fruit
Of that forbidden tree, whose mortal taste
Brought death into the world, and all our woe,
With loss of Eden, till one greater man
Restore us, and regain the blissful seat,
Sing heav'nly muse! that on the sacred top
Of Oreb, or of Sinai, didst inspire
That shepherd who first taught the chosen seed,
In the beginning how the heavens and earth
Rose out of chaos.

The natural order of the words in this passage would have been, *Heav'nly muse, sing of man's first disobedience, &c.*

Another example occurs in the eleventh book of the same poem:

The angelic blast
Filled all the regions: from their blissful bow'rs
Of amaranthine shade, fountain, or spring,
By the waters of life, where'er they sat
In fellowship of joy, the sons of light
Hasted, resorting to the summons high,
And took their seats."

The natural order of the words would be, *the sons of*

Term translated.

46. Inversion.

Asyndeton, or, (which the same implies,) 47

Dialyton the cop'lative denies.

In *Polysyndeton* conjunctions flow, 48

And every word its cop'lative must show.

EXAMPLES.

light hasted from their blissful bow'rs. See Eph. iii. 20, 21.

47. Longinus says, that "sentences, artfully divested of conjunctions, drop smoothly down, and the periods are poured along in such a manner that they seem to outstrip the very thought of the speaker." "Then," says Xenophon, "closing their shields together, they were pushed, they fought, they slew, they were slain." The hurry and distraction of Dido's spirits, at Æneas's departure, are visible from the abrupt and precipitate manner in which she commands her servants to endeavor to stop him:

Haste, haul my galleys out; pursue the foe;
Bring flaming brands, set sail and quickly row.

And St. Paul, in his first Epistle to the Corinthians, says: "Charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil." See 1 Tim. iii. 2, 3; Rom. i. 29-31; Rom. iii. 11, 12; 2 Cor. vi. 4-10.

48. This figure adds weight and gravity to an expression, and makes what is said to appear with an air of solemnity, and, by retarding the course of the sen-

Terms translated.

47. Omission of a copulative.

48. Many copulatives.

Periphrasis of words doth use a train, 49
Intending one thing only to explain.

EXAMPLES.

tence, gives the mind an opportunity to consider and reflect upon every part distinctly. Thus, Demosthenes encourages the Athenians to prosecute the war against Philip, king of Macedon, because "they had ships, *and* men, *and* money, *and* stores, *and* all other things which might contribute to the strength of the city, in greater number and plenty than in former times." A beautiful instance of this figure occurs in the eighth chapter of Romans: "For I am persuaded, that *neither* death, *nor* life, *nor* angels, *nor* principalities, *nor* powers, *nor* things present, *nor* things to come, *nor* height, *nor* depth, *nor* any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." See also Acts i. 13; Gal. iv. 10; Psal. xviii. 2.

49. Longinus says: "For as in music an important word is rendered more sweet by the divisions which are run harmoniously upon it: so a *Periphrasis* sweetens a discourse carried on in propriety of language, and contributes very much to the ornament of it, especially if there be no jarring or discord in it, but every part be judiciously and musically tempered." Longinus gives the following example of this figure from Plato, in the beginning of his funeral oration: "We have now discharged the last duties we owe to these our departed friends, who, thus provided, make *the fatal voyage*. They have been conducted publicly on their way by

Term translated.

49. Circumlocution.

Hypotyposis to the eye contracts 50

Things, places, persons, times, affections, acts.

EXAMPLES.

the whole body of the city, and, in a private capacity, by their parents and relations." Here he calls death "the fatal voyage," and discharging the funeral offices, a public conducting of them by their country. And Cicero, in his defence of Milo, instead of saying that Milo's slaves *had killed Clodius*, uses the following Periphrasis, in order to conceal the horror of the murder: "The servants of Milo acted upon this occasion without the orders, without the knowledge, without the presence of their master, as every man would wish his own servants should act in like circumstances." So in the first book of kings: "I go the way of all the earth;" that is, *I die*. See 2 Pet. i. 14; Josh. xxiii. 14; Mark xiv. 25; Job xviii. 14; John xxi. 7, 24.

50. Cicero, in order to prevail with the senate to direct the execution of those conspirators with Catiline, who were then in prison, paints that horrible design in the strongest colors: "Methinks I see this city, the light of the world, and citadel of all nations, suddenly falling into one fire; I perceive heaps of miserable citizens buried in their ruined country; the countenance and fury of Cethegus raging in your slaughter, presents itself to my view." And in two lines he thus paints the anger of Verres: "Inflamed with a mad and wicked intention, he came into the forum; his eyes sparkled with rage, and cruelty appeared staring in

Term translated.

50. Representation,

Epiphonema makes a final clause, 51

When narratives and proofs afford a cause.

EXAMPLES.

every feature of his face." See Psal. cvii. 25-29; Prov. xxiii. 29; Job. xxxix. 19-25.

51. Virgil, in the first book of his *Æneid*, says: "Declare, O Muse! the causes why he suffered; what deity he had offended, and why the queen of heaven was provoked to doom a man of such distinguished piety to struggle with a series of calamities, to encounter so many hardships: *dwells such resentment in heavenly minds?*" And having, in the same book, described the calamities which Æneas and his associates suffered previous to their settlement in Latium, he says: "So vast a work it was to found the Roman state." When Cicero has shown that recourse should never be had to force and violence, except in cases of the greatest necessity, he concludes with the following remark: "Thus to think is prudence; to act, fortitude; both to think and act, perfect and consummate virtue." And having observed, in his *Essay on Old Age*, that all men are solicitous to live to an advanced age, but uneasy under it when attained, he says: "So great is their inconstancy, folly, and perverseness." So in the book of Psalms: "Kiss the son, lest he be angry, and ye perish from the way, when his wrath is kindled but a little. *Blessed are all they that put their trust in him.*" See also Matth. xxii. 13, 14; Acts xix. 19, 20.

Term translated.

51. Acclamation.

Enallage doth alter person, tense, 52
Mood, gender, number, on the least pretence.*

EXAMPLES.

52. "Change of *persons*," says Longinus, "has a wonderful effect, in setting the very things before our eyes, and making the hearer think himself actually present and concerned in dangers, when he is only attentive to a recital of them." So in the fifteenth book of Homer's *Iliad*:

No force could vanquish them, *thou* wouldst have thought,
No toil fatigue, so furiously they fought.

"When you introduce things *past*," says Longinus, "as actually *present*, and in the moment of action, you no longer relate, but display, the very action before the eyes of your readers." Thus Xenophon, in the seventh book of his *Cyropædia*, says: "A soldier *falls* down under Cyrus's horse, and being trampled under foot, *wounds* him in the belly with his sword. The horse, impatient of the wound, *flings* about and *throws* off Cyrus. He *falls* to the ground." Longinus also says that "*Plurals* reduced and contracted into singulars, have sometimes much grandeur and magnificence." Thus Demosthenes, in his oration on the crown, says: "Besides, all Peloponnesus was at that time rent into factions." Instead of "all the inhabitants of Peloponnesus were at that time rent into factions." A re-

Term translated.

52. A change of order.

* Changes of gender and mood do not fall under the province of the English tongue. •

Hyperbaton makes words and sense to run 53
 In order that's disturbed; such rather shun.
Apostrophe, from greater themes or less, 54
 Doth turn aside to make a short address.

EXAMPLES.

markable instance of this figure is in Psalm cxxviii. 1, 2.
 "Blessed are all they that fear the Lord and walk in
 his ways. For *thou* shalt eat the labor of thy hands:
 happy shalt *thou* be, and it shall be well with thee."
 See Prov. viii. 3, 4; Luke v. 14.

53. There is a fine *Hyperbaton* in the fifth book of
 Paradise Lost:

Sweet is the breath of morn, her rising sweet,
 With charm of earliest birds: pleasant the sun,
 When first on this delightful land he spreads
 His orient beams, on herb, tree, fruit, and flow'r,
 Glist'ring with dew: fragrant the fertile earth
 After soft show'rs: and sweet the coming on
 Of grateful evening mild: then silent night,
 With this her solemn bird, and this fair moon,
 And these the gems of heav'n, her starry train.
 But neither breath of morn, when she ascends,
 With charms of earliest birds: nor herb, fruit, flow'r,
 Glist'ring with dew: nor fragrance after show'rs:
 Nor grateful ev'ning mild: nor silent night,
 With this her solemn bird: nor walk by noon,
 Or glitt'ring starlight, without thee is sweet.

Another example of this figure is in Ephes. ii. 1, 5.
 "And you being dead; even you being dead hath he
 quickened."

54. Quintilian says: "The discourse, turned from the

Terms translated.

53. A passing over.

54. Address, or turning aside.

EXAMPLES.

judge, and therefore called *Apostrophe*, is of singular efficacy, whether we attack the adversary: as, ‘*Tubero, what was your naked sword doing in the battle of Pharsalia?*’ ” “Or, turn to some invocation, as, ‘*O ye Alban monuments and groves!*’ ” “Or, implore the assistance of the laws to make the infractor of them more odious, as, ‘*O Porcian and Sempronian laws!*’ ” Demosthenes, in his oration on the crown, says: “But it cannot be! No, my countrymen! it cannot be that you have acted wrong in encountering danger bravely, for the liberty and safety of all Greece. No! I swear by those generous souls of ancient times, who exposed their lives at Marathon! By those who stood arrayed at Plataea! By those who encountered the Persian fleet at Salamis, who fought at Artemisium! By all those illustrious sons of Athens, whose remains lie deposited in the public monuments!” Ossian abounds with beautiful *Apostrophes*. Thus: “Weep on the rocks of roaring winds, O maid of Inistore! bend thy fair head over the waves, thou fairer than the ghost of the hills, when it moves in a sunbeam at noon over the silence of Morven! He is fallen! thy youth is low; pale beneath the sword of Cuthullin!” Virgil sometimes uses this figure:

Nor Pantheus! thee, thy mitre, nor the bands
Of awful Phœbus, saved from impious hands.

And in another place: “Thus he possessed the gold by violence. O cursed thirst of gold! what wickedness dost thou not influence men’s minds to perpetrate?” So in the prophet Hosea: “The wild beast shall tear

Prosopopæia a new person feigns, 55

And to inanimates speech and reason deigns.

What other figures are sometimes used by Rhetoricians?

Pleonasmus, *Ellipsis*, *Synathræsmus*, *Hendiadis*, *Hysteron*, *Hypallage*, *Hellenismus*, *Ætiology*, *Tmesis*, *Antimeria*, *Antimetabole*, *Paradiastole*, *Epimone*, and *Antiptosis*.

EXAMPLES.

them. O! Israel thou hast destroyed thyself." See Gen. xlix. 17, 18; Psal. xxviii. 8, 9; Isa. i. 2.

55. There is a great propensity in human nature, under emotion, to animate all objects. When we say "the ground *thirsts* for rain," or "the earth *smiles* with plenty;" when we speak of "*frowning* disdain," or "*meek-eyed* contentment;" such expressions show the facility with which the mind can accommodate the properties of living creatures to things which are inanimate, or to abstract conceptions of its own formation. Thus Cicero, in his first oration against Catiline, says: "If my country, which is far dearer to me than my own life, if all Italy, if the whole republic, should say to me: Marcus Tullius, what are you doing?" And, in the same oration: "Your country, Catiline, reasons with you, and thus tacitly addresses herself to you: not an atrocious crime has been perpetrated for many years but has had you for its author." Philoctetes, in Sophocles, pours out to the rocks and caves of Lemnos the following complaint:

Term translated.

55. The fiction of a person.

Define and exemplify these figures?

A *Pleonasmus* has more words than needs; 56

And, to augment the emphasis, exceeds.

EXAMPLES.

O mountains, rivers, rocks, and savage herds,
To you I speak! to you alone I now
Must breathe my sorrows! *you are wont to hear*
My sad complaints, and I will tell you all
That I have suffered from Achilles' son!

The impatience of Adam to know his origin, is supposed to prompt the personification of all the objects he beheld, in order to procure information:

Thou sun, said I, fair light!
And thou, enlightened earth, so fresh and gay!
Ye hills and dales, ye rivers, woods, and plains,
And ye that live and move, fair creatures, *tell,*
Tell, if you saw, how came I thus, how here?

So Isaiah xxxv. 1: "The wilderness and the solitary place shall be *glad* for them: and the desert place shall *rejoice*, and blossom as the rose." See Josh. xxiv. 27; Judg. ix. 8, &c.; Psal. xcvi. 8; Prov. viii. 1, &c.; Prov. ix. 1, &c.

56. This figure is sometimes used for the purpose of rendering an expression more emphatical: as, "Where in the world is he?" At other times it is designed to ascertain the truth of what is said. Thus, the servant in Terence, when the truth of what he related was called in question, replied: "It is certainly so; I saw it with these very eyes." So in Isa. vi. 10. "Lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears," &c.

Term translated.

56. A Superfluity.

Ellipsis leaves a word or sentence out, 57
 When the conciseness causes not a doubt.
 A *Synathræsmus* sums up various things, 58
 And as into one heap together brings.
Hendiadis, for adjectives doth choose 59
 Their proper substantives themselves to use.

EXAMPLES.

57. Quintilian says: "The retrenched word is sufficiently understood by the rest as in Cœlius against Antony."—"The Greeks all in confusion with joy." "As soon as we have heard these words, we perceive that 'began to be' is understood." So in Acts vi. 2: "Then the twelve (*i. e.* apostles) called the multitude of the disciples unto them."

58. The following example is from the third Satire of Juvenal: "He is a grammarian, rhetorician, geometrician, painter, anointer, soothsayer, rope-dancer, physician, magician; a hungry Grecian knows everything." And Dido, in Virgil, beholding, from her watch tower, the departure of the fleet of Æneas, says: "I might have hurled firebrands into his camp, filled the hatches with flames, extirpated the son, the sire, with the whole race, and flung myself upon the pile." There is another instance of this figure in Cicero's Oration for Marcellus: "The centurion has no share in this honor, the lieutenant none, the cohort none, the troop none." See Rom. i. 29, 31.

59. Virgil, in his second Georgic, says: "This will be prolific of grapes, this of such liquor as we pour

Terms translated.

57. A defect.

58. A gathering together.

59. One into two.

Hysteron doth misplace both words and sense 60
 And makes the last, what's first by just pretence.
Hypallage doth cases oft transpose: 61
 A liberty that's never used in prose.

EXAMPLES.

forth in libation from *gold* and *cups*;" that is, from *golden cups*. And in his third book: "Nor would I dislike her if streaked with *white* and *spots*;" that is, with *white spots*.

60. Æneas, in Virgil, perceiving that the Greeks had taken the city of Troy, thus addresses his associates: "Let us die, and rush into the thickest of our armed foes." And in the ninth book of the Æneid, Nisus uses this abrupt exclamation, which admirably marks his disorder and perturbation of mind: "On me, on me, here am I who did the mischief; O turn your swords on me, Rutulians." So in Terence's *Self-tormentor*, act iii. scene i.; "He is well and alive." Homer frequently uses this figure; hence, says Cicero, in one of his epistles to Atticus: "I will answer you, like Homer, by *Hysteron Proteron*." An instance of this figure occurs in the book of Psalms: "Behold, he travaileth with iniquity, and hath conceived mischief."

61. Ovid says: "My mind induces me to speak of forms changed into new bodies;" for bodies changed into new forms; and in the third Eclogue of Virgil: "Nor have I yet applied my lips to them," for, nor have I yet applied them to my lips.

Terms translated.

60. This figure is commonly called "*Hysteron Proteron*," which signifies *putting the last first*.

61. A change.

'Tis *Hellenismus*, when we speak or write, 62
 In the like style and phrase as Greeks indite.
Ætiology gives every theme a reason; 63
 And, with convincing arguments, doth season.
 By *Tmesis* words divided oft are seen, 64
 And others 'twixt the parts do intervene.
 By *Antimeria*, for one part of speech 65
 Another's put which equal sense doth teach.
Antimetabole puts chang'd words again 66
 By contraries; some beauty to explain.

EXAMPLES.

62. "I kept him from *to die*;" that is, from death.

63. Despise pleasure; *for pleasure bought with pain is hurtful*.

64. Milton, in the second book of his *Paradise Lost*, says:

And in *what* place *soe'er*
 Thrive under evil, and work ease out of pain,
 Through labor and endurance."

And in St. John: "For *what* things *soever* he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise."

65. He is new, for newly, come home.

66. Quintilian gives an instance of this figure from Cicero's oration for Sextus Roscius: "For though he is master of so much art as to seem the only person alive who is fit to appear upon the stage; yet he is possessed of such noble qualities, that he seems to be

Terms translated.

62. A Græcism, or Greek phrase.

63. Giving a reason.

64. A division.

65. One part for another.

66. Changing by contraries.

Paradiastole explains aright 67
 Things in an opposite and different light.
Epimone repeats the same words o'er 68
 At intervals, to move affection more.
 By *Antiptosis* you may freely place 69
 One (if as proper) for another case.

EXAMPLES.

the only man alive who may seem worthy never to appear there."

So in Romans vii. 19: "For the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do."

67. "Virtue may be overshadowed, but not overwhelmed." And St. Paul, in 2 Cor. iv. 8, 9, says: "We are troubled on every side, yet not distressed: we are perplexed, but not in despair; persecuted, but not forsaken; cast down, but not destroyed."

68. Virgil, in his eighth Eclogue, repeats this sentence eight times: "Begin with me, my pipe, Mænalian strains." And in the same Eclogue he repeats the following one nine times: "My charms, bring Daphnis from the town, bring Daphnis home to me." Theocritus, in like manner, in his first Idyl, repeats this verse fourteen times: "Begin, O Muses, begin the pastoral song." See Gen. xviii. 24-32; John xxi. 15-17; Matth. xii. 31, 32.

69. This figure is peculiar to the ancient languages: as

Urbem (pro urbs) quam statuo, vestra est.—*Virg.*

Terms translated.

67. Contradistinction.

68. Persisting in the same words.

69. A case put for a case.

Figures of Orthography.

Prosthesis, to the front of words doth add 70
Letters or syllables they never had.

Aphæresis from the beginning takes, 71
What properly a part of the word makes.

Syncope leaves part of the middle out; 72
Which causeth oft of case and tense to doubt.

EXAMPLES.

So in the ninth book of Homer's *Iliad*:

Μηδε σε δαιμων
Ενταυθα τρεψειε, φιλος.

And in the third book of the *Odyssey*:

’Ω φιλος, η σε εολπα κακον και αναλκιη εσεσθαι.

The word *φιλος*, in both examples, is put, by this figure, for *φιλε*.

70. Milton, in the first book of his *Paradise Lost*, says:

And what resounds
In fable or romance of Uther's son,
Begirt with British and Armoric knights.

And Spenser:

But ah! *Mæcenas* is *yclad* in clay,
And great Augustus long ago is dead.

71. Milton says:

’*Twixt* upper, nether, and surrounding fires.

72. O'er heaps of ruins stalked the stately hind.

Terms translated.

70. Adding to.

71. Taking from.

72. Cutting out.

Epenthesis to the middle adds one more 73
 Than what the word could justly claim before.
Apocope cuts off a final letter 74
 Or syllable, to make the verse run better.
A Paragoge adds unto the end; 75
 Yet not the sense, but measure to amend.
Metathesis a letter's place doth change, 76
 So that the word appears not new or strange.
Antithesis doth change a syllable or letter, 77
 Or holds up contrasts, as men think better.

Figures of Prosody.

Ecthlipsis M in th' end hath useless fixt, 78
 When vowel or H begins the word that's next.
 By *Synalæpha* final vowels give way, 79
 That those in front of following words may stay.

EXAMPLES.

73. Blackamoor for Blackmoore.
 74. Rush *thro'* the thickets, down the valleys sweep.
 75. My ain kind *deary*.
 76. Crudle, for curdle, is used both by Spenser and Shakspeare.
 77. In vain he spoke, for ah! the sword *addrest*
 With ruthless rage had pierced his lovely breast.
 78. Si vita' inspicias, for Si vitam inspicias.
 79. Si vis anim' esse beatus, for Si vis animo esse beatus.

Terms translated.

- | | |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 73. Interposition. | 74. A cutting off. |
| 75. Producing, or making longer. | 76. Transposition. |
| 77. Opposition. | 78. A striking out. |
| | 79. A mingling together. |

A *Systole* long syllables makes short; 80
 The cramp'd and puzzl'd poet's last resort.
Diastole short syllables prolongs; 81
 But this, to right the verse the accent wrongs.
Syncæresis, whenever it indites, 82
 Still into one two syllables unites.
Dicæresis one into two divides; 83
 By which the smoother measure gently glides.

EXAMPLES.

80. Stetērunt, for Stetērunt.
 81. Naufrāgia, for Naufrăgia.
 82. Alveo, a dissyllable, for Alveo, a trissyllable.
 83. Evoluisset, for evolvisset.

Terms translated.

- | | |
|--------------------|------------------|
| 80. A shortening. | 81. Lengthening. |
| 82. A contraction. | 83. A division. |

TROI PROPRII QUATUOR.

Dat propriæ similem translata *Metaphora* vocem : 1

EXEMPLA.

1. Sunt variæ Metaphoræ. Quædam ab animatis ad animata: ut,

Quid enim hic meus frater ab arte adjuvari potuit, cum a Philippo interrogatus, quid *latraret* furem se videre respondit?—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. ii. 54.

Και ειπεν αυτοις Πορευθεντες επατε τη αλωπεκι ταυτη.—*Luc.* xiii. 32.

Et ait illis: Euntēs dicite *vulpi* illi.

Aliæ ab inanimatis ad inanimata: ut,

Sic fatur lacrymans, classique immittit *habenās*.—*Virg.*

Aliæ ab inanimatis ad animata: ut,

—Aut geminos, duo *fulmina* belli

Scipiadas.—*Virg.*

Ουτος δ' Αιας εστι πελωριος ερκος Αχαιων.—*Hom.*

Hic vero Ajax est ingens *propugnaculum* Achivorum.

Postremo ab animatis ad inanimata: ut,

Indomitique Dahæ, et pontem *indignatus* Araxes.—*Virg.*

*Ως φατο ειγησεν δε Καλυψω, δια Θεων,

Και μιν φωνησας, επεα πτεροεντα προσηυδα.—*Hom.*

Derivation.

1. Α μεταφερω, transfero.

Atque *Metonymia* imponit nova nomina rebus. 2
Confundit totum cum parte *Synecdoche* sæpe. 3

EXEMPLA.

Sic dixit: autem cohorrui Calypso, eximia inter deas,
Et ipsum compellans verbis *alatis* allocutus est.

2. Sunt etiam variæ *Metonymiæ*. Sic *causa pro effectu*: ut,

At rubicunda *Ceres* medio succiditur æstu.—*Virg.*

ΔΕΥΕΙ ΑΥΤΩ Ἀβρααμ· ἔχουσιν Μωσεα, καὶ τὰς προφῆτας.—*Luc.* xvi. 29.

Ait illi Abrahamus: habent *Mosen* et *prophetas*.

E contra effectus pro causa: ut,

—Aut geminos, duo fulmina belli

Scipiadas, *cladem Libyæ*?—*Virg.*

Mæcnas, atavis edite regibus,

O et *præsidium*, et *dulce decus meum*!—*Hor.*

Aut subjectum pro adjuncto: ut,

Ille impiger hausit

Spumantem pateram, et pleno se proluit auro.—*Virg.*

ΤΕΤΟ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΟ ΣΩΜΑ ΜΕ, ΚΑΙ ΤΕΤΟ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΟ ΑΙΜΑ ΜΕ.—*Marc.* xiv. 22, 24.

Hoc est corpus meum, et hic est sanguis meus.

Postremo adjunctum pro subjecto: ut,

Crateras magnos statuunt, et *vina coronant*.—*Virg.*

En *Priamus*.—*Id.*

3. *Synecdoche* est simili modo varia. Aut enim *ex genere speciem intelligimus*: ut, Πορευθεντες εις τον κοσμον απαντα, κηρυξατε το ευαγγελιον παση τη κτισει.—*Marc.* xvi. 15. Eunt in mundum universum, prædicate evangelium *omni creaturæ*.

Aut e contra *ex specie genus*: ut, Τον αετον ημων τον

Derivationes.

2. Α μετανομαζω, transnomo.

3. Α συνεκδεχομαι, comprehendo.

Ironia jocis contraria signat acutis. 4

EXEMPLA.

ἐπιουσιον δος ἡμιν σημερον.—*Matt.* vi. 11. *Panem nostrum quotidianum da nobis hodie.*

Præterea *ex toto partem*: ut, ἦσαν τον κυριον μὲ, καὶ οὐκ οἶδα πον ἐθηχαν αὐτον.—*Joan.* xx. 13. *Sustulerunt Dominum meum, nec scio ubi posuerunt eum.*

Aut *ex parte totum*: ut, Anima quæ peccat, ipsa morietur.—*Ezech.* xviii. 4. *Omnes animæ quæ ingressæ sunt cum Jacobo in Egyptum sexaginta sex erant.*—*Gen.* xlv. 26.

Aut *ab plurali singularem*: ut, Το δ' αὐτο καὶ οἱ λησται, οἱ συσταυρωθεντες αὐτω, ωνειδιζον αὐτω.—*Matt.* xxvii. 44. Id ipsum autem etiam latrones qui crucifixi erant cum eo, exprobrabant ei.

E contra ex singulari pluralem: ut,

ἐπεὶ Τροίης ἱερὸν πτολιθεῖον ἐπερσε.—*Hom.*

Postquam Trojæ sacrum oppidum devastavit.—(*Neque ille enim solus, sed una cum aliis Græcis Trojam evertit.*)

4. Curasti probe.—*Ter. And.*, act v. sc. ii. Ad Q. Metellum prætorem venisti: a quo repudiatus, ad sodalem tuum *virum optimum*, Marcum Marcellum, demigrasti.—*Cic. in Cat.*

Novum crimen, C. Cæsar, et ante hunc diem inauditum propinquus meus, ad te Q. Tubero detulit, Q. Ligarium in Africa fuisse.—*Cic. pro Lig.*

O bellum magnopere pertimescendum, cum hanc sit

Derivatio.

4. Ab ἐχρίνω: εὐνομαι, dissimulo.

Insultans hosti illudit *Sarcasmus* amare. 5

Hostili mordens *Diasyrmus* scommate lædit 6

Dat *Charientismus* pro duris mollia verba. 7

Asteismus jocus urbanus seu scommata facetum est. 8

EXEMPLA.

habiturus Catilina scortatorum cohortem prætoriam!
Instruite nunc, Quirites, contra has tam præclaras Ca-
tilinæ copias vestra præsidia, vestrosque exercitus.—*Cic.*
in Cat.

Ut ludificans eos Elija diceret, clamate voce magna
quando quidem deus est, nam colloquium, aut nam in-
sectatio est ei, aut nam iter est faciendum ei: fortasse
dormit, ut evigilet.—*Regum*, lib. prior, cap. xviii. 27.

Τότε ἐρχεται πρὸς τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ, καὶ λέγει αὐτοῖς· Κα-
θευδετε το λοιπον καὶ ἀναπανεσθε.—*Matt.* xxvi. 45. Tunc
venit ad discipulos suos, et dicit illis: *Dormite cæterum,*
et requiescite.

5. Satia, te inquit, sanguine quem sitisti, cujusque
insatiabilis semper fuisti.—*Just.* lib. i. cap. 8.

Χαίρει, ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἰουδαίων.—*Matt.* xxvii. 29.

Gaude, rex Judæorum.

6. Proinde tona eloquio, solitum tibi, meque timoris
Argue tu, Drance, quando tot stragis acervos
Tuecrorum tua dextra dedit, passimque tropæis
Insignos agros.—*Virg.*

7. Bona verba quaeso.—*Ter And.*, act i. scene 2.

—Ne sævi magna Sacerdos.—*Virg.*

8. Qui Bavium non odit amet tua carmina, Mævi;
Atque idem jungat vulpes, et mulgeat hircos.—*Id.*

Derivationes.

5. Α σαρκάζω, carnes detraho, vel irrideo.

6. Α διασυνω, convitior.

7. Α χαριεντιζομαι, jocos.

8. Ab αστειος, urbanus.

Durior impropriæ est *Catachresis* abusio vocis. 9
 Extenuans, augensve, excedit *Hyperbole* verum. 10
 Voce tropos plures nectit *Metalepsis* in una. 11

EXEMPLA.

9. Instar montis *equum* divina Palladis arte
Ædificant.—*Virg.*
 Hic mihi, dum teneras defendo a frigore myrtos
Vir gregis ipse caper deerraverat.—*Id.*
 Olentis *uxores mariti*.—*Hor.*

Και επεστρεψα βλεπειν την φωνην ητις ελαλησε μετ' εμε.—
Apoc. i. 12.

Et conversus sum *videre vocem* quæ loquebatur cum
 me.

- Μη και τι κακον απολαυσαμεν της φλυαριας.—*Luc. Dial.*
Ne lucremur aliquod etiam mali ex garrulitate.
 Ω τρυφε των λευκων αιγων ανεξ.—*Theoc. Idyl.* viii. 49.
O hircæ albarum caprarum vir.
10. Hinc atque hinc vastæ rupes, geminique minantur
 In cælum scopuli.—*Virg.*
 —ipse arduus, *altaque pulsât*
Sidera.—*Id.*
 Λευκοτεροι χιονος, θειειν δ' ανεμοισιν ομοιοι.—*Hom.*
Hi candore nivem superant, cursuque aquilonem.
 Αγρον ειχ' ελαττω γην εχοντ' ας' επιστολης
Λακωνικης.—*Longin.*
Agrum habuit habentem in se terram minorem epistola
Laconica.
11. Felix heu nimium felix! si litora tantum
 Nunquam Dardaniæ tetigissent nostra carinæ.—*Virg.*
Fuit Ilium et ingens gloria Dardanidum.—*Hor.*

Derivationes.

9. Α καταχρασμαι, abutor. 10. Ab υπερχαλλω, supero.
 11. Α μεταλαμβανω, transumo.

Continuare tropos solet *Allegoria* plures. 12
Ænigma obscuris involvit sensa loquelis. 13
 Præmonet experto bene nota *Paræmia* dicto. 14
 Personis aliud facit *Antonomasia* nomen. 15

EXEMPLA.

12. O navis, referent in mare te novi
 Fluctus? O quid agis? Fortiter occupa
 Portum, &c.—*Hor.*

Equidem cæteras tempestates et procellas in illis duntaxat fluctibus concionum semper putavi Miloni esse subeundas.—*Cic. pro Mil.*

Sine *Cerere* et *Baccho* friget *Venus*.—*Ter.*

Sed nos immensum spatiis confecimus æquor
 Et jam tempus equum fumantia solvere colla.—*Virg.*

13. Dic quibus in terris, et eris mihi magnus Apollo,
 Tres pateat cœli spatium non amplius ulnas.—*Id.*
 Dic quibus in terris, inscripti nomina regum
 Nascantur flores.—*Id.*

14. Lupum auribus teneo.—*Ter.*
 Laterem lavem.—*Id.*

15. —Divûm pater atque hominum.—*Virg.*

Irus est et subito, quî modo *Cræsus* erat.—*Ov.*

Qui *Curios* simulant et *Bacchanalia* vivunt.—*Juv.*

Ὡς (πρὸς μυριοῖς ἀλλοῖς) καὶ τὰ πλεῖς τῆς Ἀλφειοῦ τῷ ποιητῇ
 παρὰ τετολμημένα.—*Longin.*

Velut (præter innumera alia) etiam illa, quæ de
 Aloidis a poeta sunt audacia felici dicta.

Derivationes.

12. Ab ἀλληγορεῖν, aliud dico. 13. Ab αἰνιττώ, obscure loquor.
 14. A παροιμιαζομαι, proverbialiter loquor.
 15. Ab ἀντι, pro, et ὀνομαζω, nomino.

Fortius affirmat *Litotes* adversa negando. 16

A sonitu voces *Onomatopœia* fingit. 17

Oppositas rebus voces *Antiphrasis* aptat. 18

De Figuris.

Figuræ Dictionis ejusdam soni.

Diversis membris frontem dat *Anaphora* eandem. 19

EXEMPLA.

16. *Non laudo; id est Reprehendo.*—*Ter. And.*

—*Dabitur, Trojane, quod optas:*

Munera nec sperno.—*Virg.*

Est, qui nec veteris pocula Massici

Spernit, (id est, magnopere amat.)—*Hor.*

Αλλ, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς πλείοσιν αὐτῶν εὐδοκῆσεν ὁ Θεός· κατεστρωθῆσαν
γὰρ ἐν τηρεσημῶ.—1 *Cor. x. 5.*

Sed non in pluribus eorum probavit Deus: prostrati sunt enim in deserto.

17. Bombalio, clangor, stridor, taratantara, murmur.

Αἰγξε βίος, νεύει μὲν ἰαχὲν, αὐτο δ' οἶστος

Ὀξύκελης.—*Hom.*

Striduit arcus, nervus autem valde sonuit, salitque sagitta acutam habens cuspidem.

Δουπήσεν δὲ πεσὼν ἀραχθε δὲ τευχὲς ἐπ' αὐτῶ.—*Id.*

Fragorem vero edidit cadens, sonitumque dedere arma super ipsum.

18. *Lucus*, a luceo, significat nemus opacum. *Bellum*, a bellus, a, um, quod *minime* sit bellum. Fata dicuntur *Parcæ*, quia *nemini parcunt*.

19. *Nihilne* nocturnum præsidium palatii, *nihil* urbis

Derivationes.

16. Α λιτός, tenuis.

17. Ab ὀνομα, nomen facio.

18. Ab ἀντιφράζω, per contrarium loquor.

19. Ab ἀναφέρω, refero.

Unum diversis finem dat *Epistrophe* membris. 20

Incipit et finit pariter duo *Symploce* membra. 21

EXEMPLA.

vigiliæ, *nihil* timor populi, *nihil* consensus bonorum omnium, *nihil* hic munitissimus habendi senatûs locus, *nihil* horum, ora vultusque moverunt?—*Cic. in Cat.*

Hic gelidi fontes, *hic* mollia prata, Lycori,

Hic nemus: *hic* ipso tecum consumerer ævo.—*Virg.*

Te, dulcis conjux, *te* solo in litore secum,

Te veniente die, *te* decedente canebat.—*Id.*

Νιρσευς, δ' αὖ Συμηθεν ἀγεν τρεῖς νηας εἰσας,

Νιρσευς Ἀγλαίης θ' υἱός, Χαροποιοῖο τ' ἀνακτορῶ*

Νιρσευς, ὃς καλλιστοῦς ἀνῆρ ὑπὸ Ἰλίων ἦλθε.—*Hom.*

Nireus tres Symâ naves adduxit et ipse,

Nireus Aglaiâ Charopoque potente creatus,

Nireus, quo Trojam venit, non pulchrior alter.

20. Doleatis tres exercitus populi Romani interfectos; interfecit *Antonius*: desideratis clarissimos cives; eosque eripuit vobis *Antonius*: auctoritas hujus ordinis afflicta est; afflixit *Antonius*.—*Cic. in M. Ant.*

Namque ego, crede mihi, si te modo *pontus* haberet,

Te sequerer, conjux et me quoque *pontus* haberet.

21. *Quis* eos postulavit? *Appius*: *quis* produxit? *Appius*.—*Cic. pro Mil.*

Quis legem tulit? *Rullus*: *quis* majorem populi partem suffragiis privavit? *Rullus*: *quis* comitiis præfuit? idem *Rullus*.—*Cic.*

Quam bene Caune, tuo poteram nurus esse parenti!

Quam bene, Caune, meo poteras gener esse parenti.—*Ov.*

Derivationes.

20. Ab ἐπιστρέφω, converto.

21. Α συμπλεκω, connecto.

Incipit et voce exit *Epanalepsis* eadem. 22

Inverso repetens dat *Epanodos* ordine voces. 23

EXEMPLA.

22. *Multi* et graves dolores inventi parentibus, et propinquis *multi*.—*Cic.*

Vidimus tuam victoriam præliorum exitu terminatam; gladium vagina vacuum in urbe non *vidimus*.—*Cic. pro M. Marcel.*

Multa super Priamo rogitans, super Hectore *multa*.—*Virg.*

Non amo te, Sabidi, nec possum dicere quare;

Hoc tantum possum dicere, *non amo te*.—*Mart. lib. i. Ep. 33.*

Victus amore tui, cognato sanguine *victus*.—*Virg.*

Una dies Fabios ad bellum miserat omnes,

Ad bellum missos perdidit *una dies*.—*Ov.*

Χαίρετε ἐν Κυρίῳ παντοτε, πάλιν ἐξῶ, χαίρετε. — *Philipp.*
iv. 4.

Gaudete in Domino semper, iterum dico, *gaudete*.

23. —*Crudelis* tu quoque *mater*;

Crudelis mater magis, an *puer improbus ille*?

Improbus ille puer, *crudelis* tu quoque *mater*.—*Virg.*

Ecquam putatis civitatem pacatam fuisse, quæ locuples sit?

Ecquam locupletem, quæ illis pacata esse videatur?

Cic. pro L. Man.

Ἀγῆς τε βροτολογίος, Εἰς τ' ἀμοτον μεμάνια,

Ἢ μὲν, ἐχέυστα κυδοίμων ἀναιδέα δημοτῆτος·

Ἀγῆς δ' ἐν παλαμῆσι πελώριον ἐγχος ἐνώμα. — *Hom.*

Mars homicida, dea et Contentio litigiosa,

Hæc etiam turbas ciet, ac hostilia multa:

Mars autem manibus prægrandem concutit hastam.

Derivationes.

22. Ab ἐπι, et ἀναλαμβάνω, repeto. 23. Ab ἐπι, et ἀνάδος, ascensus.

Voce *Anadiplosis* quâ finit incipit ipsa. 24

Confirmat vocem repetens *Epizeuxis* eandem. 25

EXEMPLA.

24. Hic tamen *vivit; vivit?* Imo vero etiam in senatum venit.—*Cic. in Cat.*

Quamdiu quisquam erit qui te defendere audeat, *vives*: et *vives* ita ut nunc vivis, multis meis et firmis præsiidiis obsessus.—*Id.*

Pierides: vos hæc facietis maxima *Gallo*;
Gallo, cujus amor tantum mihi crescit in horas.—*Virg.*
 Addit se sociam, timidisque supervenit *Ægle*;
Ægle Naïadum pulcherrima.—*Id.*
 Ecce Dionæi processit Cæsaris *astrum*;
Astrum, quo segetes gauderent frugibus.—*Id.*

Τε δ' ἐγὼ ἀντίος εἰμι, καὶ εἰ πυρὶ χεῖρας εἰσικεν,
 Εἰ πυρὶ χεῖρας εἰσικεμένος δ' αἰθωνί σιδηρῶ.—*Hom.*
 Hunc adversus eo, quamvis sit *flammea dextra*,
Flammea dextra licet, vis ignea denique ferri.

25. *Tu, tu*, inquam, M. Antoni, princeps C. Cæsari, omnia perturbare cupienti, causam belli contra patriam inferendi dedisti.—*Cic. in M. Ant.*

Ah, *Corydon, Corydon*, quæ te dementia cepit!—*Virg.*

Excitate excitate eum, si potestis, ab inferis.—*Cic. pro Mil.*

Crux, crux, inquam, infelici et ærumnoso comparatur.—*Cic. in Ver.*

Totum hoc (quantumcunque est, quod certe maximum est) *totum* est, inquam, tuum.—*Cic. pro Marcel.*

Derivationes.

24. Ab ἀναδιπλω, reduplico.

25. Ab ἐπιζευγνυμι, conjungo.

Verba *Ploce* repetit paulum mutantia sensum. 26

Nomen idem variis *Polyptoton* casibus effert. 27

Dat varium sensum voci *Antanaclasis* eidem. 28

EXEMPLA.

Ἱερουσαλημ, Ἱερουσαλημ, ἡ αποκτεινυσα τες προφητας.—*Matt.* xxii. 37.

Hierusalem, Hierusalem, occidens prophetas.

26. Ad illum diem *Memmius* erit *Memmius*, sc. sibi similis.

Simia est *Simia*, etiamsi aurea gestat insignia.

In hac victoriâ *Cæsar* fuit *Cæsar*, sc. mitissimus victor.

27. Argumentis agemus; signis omni luce clarioribus crimina refellemus; *res cum re, causa cum causa, ratio cum ratione* pugnabit.—*Cic. pro Cæl.*

Jam clypeus clypeis, umbone, repellitur umbo,

Ense minax ensis, pede pes, et cuspide cuspis.—*Stat. Th.* viii.

Mors mortis morti mortem nisi morte dedisset,

Æternæ vitæ janua clausa foret.—*Epig. de Christo.*

Ὅτι ἐξ αὐτες, καὶ δι' αὐτες, καὶ εἰς αὐτον τὰ πάντα.—*Rom.* xi. 36.

Quoniam ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso omnia.

28. Cum *Proculius* quereretur de filio, quod mortem suam exoptarit; et ille dixisset, se vero non *expectare*; imo, inquit, rogo *expectes*.—*Quint.**

Quis neget *Æneæ* natum de stirpe *Neronem*? *Sustulit* hic (sc. interfecit) matrem, *sustulit* ille (sc. deportavit) patrem.—*Mart. Epig.*

Derivationes.

26. Α πλεκω necto, vel flecto. 27. Α πολυς, multus, et πτωσις casus.

28. Αb αντι, contra, et ανακαλεω, revoco.

Paronomasia alludit sonitumque imitatur. 29

Naturæ ejusdem sibi verba *Paregmenon* addit. 30

EXEMPLA.

Quid ergo? ista culpa *Brutorum*? Minime illorum quidem, sed aliorum *brutorum*, qui se cautos et sapientes putant.—*Cic. Ep. ad Att.*

Ὁ δε Ἰησους εἶπεν αὐτῷ· Ἀκολυθεῖ μοι, καὶ ἀφες τὰς νεκροὺς θάψαι τὰς αὐτῶν νεκροὺς.—*Matt. viii. 22.*

At Jesus ait illi: sequere me, et dimitte *mortuos* sepelire suos *mortuos*.

29. Inceptio est *amentium*, haud *amantium*.—*Ter. And.*

Tibi parata erunt *verba*, huic *verbera*.—*Ter. Heaut.*

Nunquam satis *dicitur*, quod nunquam satis *discitur*.—*Sen. Ep. 28.*

Itaque plebiscitum, quo magis *oneratus* quam *honoratus*, sum, primus antiquo abrogoque.—*Liv.*

De oratore arator factus.—*Cic.*

Σὺ εἰ Πέτρος, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ οἰκοδομήσω μὲ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν.—*Matt. xvi. 18.*

Tu es *Petrus*, et super hac *pætra* ædificabo meam ecclesiam.

30. Sed ut tum ad *senem* *senex* de *senectute*, sic in hoc libro ad *amicum* *amicissimus* de *amicitia* scripsi.—*Cic. de Amicitia.*

Tu quoque Pieridum *studio*, *studiose*, teneris;

Ingenioque faves, *ingeniose*, meo.—*Ov.*

Is demum *miser* est, cujus *nobilitas* miserias nobilitat.

Derivationes.

29. Α παρὰ, juxta et ὄνομα, nomen. 30. Α παραγομαι, juxta ducor.

Fine sonos similes conjungit *Homoioteleuton*. 31

Verba *Climax* repetit gradibus quoque pergīt eundo. 32

EXEMPLA.

31. Non ejusdem est facere *fortiter*, et vivere *turpiter*.
—*Cic.*

Vivis *invidiose*, delinquis *studiose*, loqueris *odiose*.
Quid est in Cælo? Nescio, sed dico quod non est:
Non ibi debilis, aut homo flebilis;
Aut furor, aut lis:
Aut cibus, aut coquus, aut Venus, aut Jocus
Aut tumor, aut vis.—*Bern. Mor.*

Quos anguis dirus tristi mulcedine *pavit*;
Hos sanguis mirus Christi dulcedine *lavit*.

Χρη ξεινον παρειοντα ΦΙΛΕΙΝ, εθελοντα δε ΠΙΕΜΠΕΙΝ.—*Hom.*

32. Neque vero se populo solum, sed etiam senatui commisit; neque senatui modo, sed etiam publicis præsidiis, et armis: neque his tantum, verum etiam ejus potestati, cui senatus totam rempublicam commiserat.—
Cic. pro Mil.

Quæ reliqua spes libertatis manet, si illis, et quod libet, licet; et quod licet, possunt; et quod possunt, audent; et quod audent, faciunt; et faciunt quodcunque molestum est?—*Cic.*

Facinus est vincere civem Romanum; scelus verberare, prope parricidium necare; quid dicam in crucem tollere?—*Cic. pro Rabir.*

Επιχορηγησατε εν τη πιστει υμων την αρετην, εν δε τη αρετη την γνωσιν, εν δε τη γνωσει την εγκρατειαν, εν δε τη εγκρατεια την υπομονην εν δε τη υπομονη την ευσεβειαν εν δε τη ευσεβεια την φιλαδελφιαν, εν δε τη φιλαδελφια την αγαπην.—2 *Pet. i. 5-7.*

Derivationes.

31. Ab ὁμοίως, similiter, et τελευτων, finitum. 32. Α κλino, acclino.

Iisdem plura facit *Synonymia* nomina rebus. 33

Figuræ ad Ratiocinationem.

Quærit *Erotesis* poterat quod dicere recte. 34

EXEMPLA.

Subministrate in fide vestra virtutem, in autem virtute cognitionem, in autem cognitione temperantiam, in autem temperantia tolerantiam, in autem tolerantia pietatem, in autem pietate amorem fraternitatis, in autem amore fraternitatis charitatem.

33. Vultus denique totus, qui sermo quidam tacitus mentis est, hic in errorem homines impulit: hic eos, quibus erat ignotus, *decepit fefellit, in fraudem induxit.*—*Cic. in L. Pis.*

Quem si fata virum servant, si vescitur aura

Ætherea, neque adhuc crudelibus occubat umbris.—*Virg.*

Quicunque ubique sunt, qui fuere, quique futuri sunt posthac, stulti, stolidi, fatui, fungi, bardi, blenni, bucones, solus ego omnes longe anteeo stultitiâ et indoctis moribus.—*Mart.*

34. Et procul: O miseri, quæ tanta insania cives?

Creditis avectos hostes? aut ulla putatis

Dona carere dolis Danaûm? sic notus Ulysses?—*Virg.*

Ἡ βελεσθε, εἶπε μοι, περὶ οὖτοις αὐτῶν πυνθανεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν, λέγεται τι καινόν; γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν τι καινότερον, ἢ Μακεδῶν ἀνῆς Ἀθηναίως καταπολεμῶν, καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων διοικῶν; τέθνηκε Φίλιππος; ἢ μὰ Δι', ἀλλ' ἀσθενεῖ. Τιδ' ὑμῖν διαφερεῖ;

Derivationes.

33. Α συν, con, et ὄνομα, nomen.

34. Αβ ἐρωτῶν, interrogo.

Anticipat, quæ quis valet objecisse, *Prolepsis*. 35

Plane, aut dissimulans, permittit *Epitrope* factum. 36

EXEMPLA.

καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἑτος τι παθῇ, ταχέως ὑμεῖς ἕτερον Φιλιππον ποιήσετε.
Demost. Philip. i.

Num vultis, dic mihi, circumcursitantes alius alium percontari in foro, diciturne aliquid novi? Quid enim magis novum fieri potest, quam hominem Macedonem Atheniensis bello subigere, Græciæque pro suo libitu res administrare? Mortuusne est Philippus? Non per Jovem: atqui ægrotat. Quid vero hoc vestra interest? Etsi enim moriatur ille, brevi vos alium Philippum vobis facietis.

35. Siquis vestrum, Judices, aut eorum qui adsunt, forte miratur, me, qui tot annos in causis judiciisque publicis ita sim versatus, ut defenderim multos læserim neminem subito nunc mutata voluntate ad acusandum descendere: is, si mei consilii causam rationemque cognoverit, una et id quod facio probabit, et in hac causa profecto neminem, præponendum esse mihi actorem putabit.—*Cic. in Cæcil.*

Ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις· Πῶς ἐγείρονται οἱ νεκροί; ποῖω δὲ σωματι ἐρχονται; Ἀφ᾽ ὧν, σὺ ὃ σπείρεις, ἔ ζωοποιεῖται, εἰ μὴ ἀποθάνῃ.—
1 *Cor. xv. 35, 36.*

Sed dicet aliquis; quomodo resurgunt mortui? quali autem corpore veniunt? insipiens, tu quod seminas, non vivificatur, si non moriatur.

36. Tribuo Græcis literas, do multarum artium disciplinam, ingeniorum acumen, dicendi copiam, denique

Derivationes.

35. Α προλαμβάνω, anticipo.

36. Ad επιτρέπω, permitto.

Consultat cum aliis *Anacænosis* ubique. 37

EXEMPLA.

etiam siqua alia sibi sumunt, non rupugno: testimoni-
orum religionem et fidem nunquam ista natio coluit.—
Cic. pro Flac.

Sint sane, quoniam ita se mores habent, liberales ex
sociorum fortunis, sint misericordes in furibus ærarii:
ne illis sanguinem nostrum largiantur; et, dum paucis
sceleratis parcunt, bonos omnes perditum eant.—*Sall.*

Εξεις 8ν. Εξεκλασθησαν οι κλαδοι, ἵνα εγω εγχεντρισθω. Καλως
τη απιστια εξεκλασθησαν, 8ν δε τη πιστει εστηκας· μη ὑψηλοφρονει,
αλλα φοβ8.—*Rom. xi. 19, 20.*

Dices ergo: Defracti sunt rami, ut ergo insererer.
Pulchre; incredulitate defracti sunt, tu autem fide
stas; ne efferaris animo, sed time.

37. Quæro, si te hodie domum tuam redeuntem co-
acti homines, et armati, non modo limine, tectoque
ædium tuarum, sed primo aditu, vestibuloque prohibue-
rint, quid acturus sis?—*Cic.*

Tu denique, Labiene, quid faceres tali in re ac tem-
pore? cum ignaviæ ratio te in fugam, atque in latebras
impelleret: improbitas et furor Lucii Saturnini in Capi-
tolium arcesseret: consules ad patriæ salutem ac liber-
tatem vocarent: quam tandem auctoritatem, quam
vocem, cujus sectam sequi, cujus imperio parere potis-
simum velles?—*Cic. pro Rul.*

Quin denique, quid censetis? cedo, si vos in eo loco
essetis, quid aliud fecissetis?—*Cic.*

Derivatio.

37. Ab *ανακοινωω*, communico.

Oppositum *Antithesis* sensum librare paratur, 38
Oxymoron erit quasi contradictio vera. 39

EXEMPLA.

38. Odit populus Romanus privatam luxuriam, publicam munificentiam diligit.—*Cic.*

Ex hac parte pudor pugnat, illi ne petulantia.—*Id.*

Cæsar beneficiis ac munificentîâ magnus habebatur, integritate vitæ Cato, &c.—*Sall.*

Egentes in locupletes, perdit in bonos, servi in dominos, armabantur.—*Cic.*

Τα γὰρ οὐλώνια τῆς ἀμαγτίας, θάνατος· το δε χάρισμα τῆ Θεῆς, ζωῆ αἰώνιος ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ Κυρίῳ ἡμῶν.—*Rom. vi. 23.*

Nam stipendia peccati mors; at donatio Dei, vita æterna in Christo Jesu Domino nostro.

39. De te autem, Catilina, cum quiescunt, probant; cum patiuntur, decernunt: cum *tacent, clamant*.—*Cic. in Cat.*

Et, consanguineas ut sanguine leniat umbras,
Impietate pia est.—*Ov.*

Nunquam se minus otiosum esse quam otiosum, nec minus solus quam cum solus esset.

Id aliquid nihil est.—*Ter. And.* Ut cum ratione insanias.—*Ter. Eun.* Tu pol, si sapis, quod scis, nescias.—*Ter. Heaut.*

—Concordia discors.—*Ov.*

Amici absentes adsunt, &c.—*Cic.*

Ἡ δε σπαταλώσα ζωσα, τεθνήκε.—1 *Tim. v. 6.*

At deliciosa vivens, mortua est.

Derivationes.

38. Ab *αντι*, contra, et *τιθεμι*, pono. 39. Ab *οξύς*, acutus, et *μωρός*, stultus.

Consulit, addubitans quit agat dicatve, *Aporia*. 40

Figure ad Affectuum Concitationem.

Concitat *Ecphonesis* et Exclamatio mentem. 41

EXEMPLA.

40. Quo me miser conferam? quo vertam? in capitolium? at fratris sanguine redundat: an domum? matremne ut miseram, lamentantem que videam, et abjectam?—*Cic. de Grac.*

—quid igitur faciam miser?

Quidve incipiam? ecce autem video rure redeuntem senem.

Dicam huic, an non?—*Ter. Eun.*

Eloquar an sileam?—*Virg.*

Quid faciam? roger, anne urogem? quid deinde rogabo?—*Ov.*

Εἰπε δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ οἰκονομος· Τί ποιήσω ὅτι ὁ κυριος μὲ ἀφαιρεῖται τὴν οἰκονομίαν ἀπ' ἐμῆς; σκαπτεῖν ἔκ ισχύω, ἐπαιτεῖν αἰσχυνομαι.—*Luc. xvi. 3.*

Ait autem in seipso dispensator; quid faciam, quia dominus meus aufert dispensationem a me? fodere non valeo mendicare erubesco.

41. O audaciam immanem! tu etiam ingredi illam domum ausus es? tu illud sanctissimum limen intrare? tu illarum ædium diis penetibus os importunissimum ostendere?—*Cic. in M. Ant.*

O clementiam admirabilem, atque omni laude, prædicatione, literis, monumentisque decorandam!—*Cic. pro Lig.*

O scelus! O pestis! O labes!—*Cic. in Pis.*

O Cælum! O terra! O maria Neptuni!—*Ter. Adolph.*

Derivationes.

40. Ab ἀπωξέω, addubito.

41. Ab ἐκφώνεω, exclamo.

Librat in *Antithetis* contraria *Enantiosis*. 42

Aposiopesis sensa imperfecta relinquit. 43

EXEMPLA.

Heu pietas! heu prisca fides! invictoquo bello
Dextra!—*Virg.*

Θεε μὲν, Θεε μὲν, ἵνατι με εγκατελίπες.—*Matth.* xxvii. 46.

Deus meus, Deus meus, ut quid me dereliquisti!

42. Conferte *hanc pacem* cum *illo bello*; *hujus* prætoris *adventum*, cum *illius* imperatoris *victoria*; *hujus cohortem impuram* cum *illius exercitu invicto*; *hujus libidines* cum *illius continentia*; ab illo qui cepit *conditas*; ab hoc, qui constitutas accepit, *captas* dicetis Syracusas.—*Cic. in Ver.*

Plura bella gessit, quam cæteri legerunt; plures provincias confecit, quam alii concupiverunt: cujus adolescentia ad scientiam rei militaris non alienis præceptis, sed suis imperiis: non offensionibus belli, sed victoriis: non stipendiis, sed triumphis est erudita.—*Cic. pro Leg. Man.*

Alba ligustra cadunt, *vaccinia nigra* leguntur.—*Virg.*

43. —Quem quidem ego si sensero—

Sed quid opus est verbis.—*Ter. And.*

Quos ego—sed præstat motos componere fluctus.—*Virg.*

Cantando tu illum? aut unquam tibi fistulâ cerâ

Juncta fuit?—*Id.*

—Ego te, furcifer,

Si vivo.—*Ter. Eun.*

Λεγων· ὅτι εἰ ἐγνώσῃ καὶ σὺ, καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ σὺ ταύτῃ, τὰ πρὸς εἰσηγὴν σὺ νῦν δὲ ἐκρύβῃ ἀπὸ ὀφθαλμῶν σου.—*Luc.* xix. 42.

Derivationes.

42. Ab *εναντιος*, oppositus.

43. Ab *αποσιππᾶν*, obticeo.

Rem negat *Apophasis*, quam transgreditur *Paraleipsis*. 44

Verba *Epanorthosis* revocans addensque reformat. 45

EXEMPLA.

Dicens: quia si cognovisses et tu, et quidem in die tua hac, quæ ad pacem tuam; nunc autem abscondita sunt ab oculis tuis.

Εἰποτε δ' αὐτε

Χρεια εμεῖο γενηται αεικεα λοιγον αμυναι

Τοις αλλοις—η γαρ 'ογ' ολονσι φρεσι θυει.—*Hom.*

Sin vero unquam posthac opus me fuerit ad indignam pestem arcendam ab aliis:—certe enim ille perniciosus consiliis furit.

44. Mitto illam primam libidinis injuriam, mitto nefarias generi nuptias, mitto cupiditate matris expulsam matrimonio filiam.—*Cic. pro Cluent.*

Non referam ignaviam, et alia magis scelestas, quorum poenitere oportet: taceo, omitto homicidia, furta, et alia tua crimina: nec ea dico, quæ si dicam, tamen infirmare non possis.—*Cic. in Ver.*

Εγω Παυλος εγραφα τη εμη χειρι, εγω αποτισω· ινα μη λεγω σοι οτι και σεαυτον μοι προσοφειλεις.—*Phil.* 19.

Ego Paulus scripsi mea manu, ego dependam; ut non dicam tibi quod et teipsum mihi addebes.

45. An vero ignoratis, neque in hoc pervagato civitatis sermone versantur, quas ille legis, (si leges nominandæ sunt, ac non fascis urbis et pestes reipublicæ) fuerit impositurus nobis omnibus, atque inustus?—*Cic. pro Mil.*

Derivationes.

44. Ab απο, ab, et φαν, dico: a ταξαλειπω, prætermitto.

45. Ab επανερθω, corrigo.

Digna præire, solet postponere *Anastrophe* verba. 46

Dialyton tollit juncturam, et *Asyndeton* æque. 47

EXEMPLA.

—Filiū unicū adolescentulū

Habeo : ah ! quid dixi habere me ? imo habui, Chreme :

Nunc habeam, nec ne, incertum est.—*Ter. Heaut.*

O clementia! clementia, dixi? potius patientia mira.
—*Cic. in Ver.*

Ἀλλὰ περισσοτέρων αὐτῶν πάντων ἐκοπίασα· ἔκ ἐγὼ δε, ἀλλ' ἡ
χαρὶς τῆς Θεοῦ ἡ σὺν ἐμοί.—1 Cor. xv. 10.

Sed abundantius illis omnibus laboravi; non ego autem sed gratia Dei quæ cum me.

46. Pastorum Musam, Damonis et Alphesibœi,
Immemor herbarum quos est mirata juvenca
Certantes; quorum stupefactæ carmina lynces;
Et mutata suos requierunt flumina cursus
Damonis Musam dicemus et Alphesibœi.—*Virg.*

Quid deinde? quid censis? furtum fortasse aut prædam aliquam?—*Cic. in Ver. Deinde, (inquit Quintilianus,) cum diu suspendisset iudicum animos, subiecit quod multo esset improbius.*

47. Ite,
Ferte citi flammas, date vela, impellite remos.—*Virg.*

Cæteros ruerem, agerem, raperem, tunderem, prosternerem.—*Ter.*

Tum spectaculum horribile in campus patentibus:
sequi, fugere, occidi, capi.—*Sall.*

Abiit, excessit, evasit, erupit.—*Cic. in Cat.*

Veni, vidi, vici.—*Cæsar.*

Derivaciones.

46. Ab ἀναστρεφω, retro verto.

47. A διαλυω, dissolvo : ab a, privat. et συνδεω, conjungo.

Conjunctura frequens vocum *Polysyndeton* esto. 48

Periphrasis verbis rem pluribus explicat unam. 49

EXEMPLA.

Και συμβαλοντες τας ασπιδας, εωθοντο, εμαχοντο, απεχτεινον, απεθνησκει.—*Xenoph.*

Et configentes clypeos impellebantur, pugnabant, cædebant, moriebantur. De istiusmodi constructione, vide *Hom. Il.*, lib. i. 105; iii. 23; iv. 89, 327; v. 276, 840; vi. 392, 517; vii. 23; xi. 196; xii. 365; xv. 239.

48. Me præ cæteris et colit et observat, et diligit.—*Cic. in Epist.*

Et somnus, et vinum, et epulæ, et scorta, et Balneæ, corpora atque animos enervant.—*Liv.*

tectumque, laremque,

Armaque, Amyclæumque canem, Cressamque, pharetram.—*Virg.*

Πεπεισμαι γαρ ὅτι εἴτε θάνατος, εἴτε ζωὴ, εἴτε ἀγγελοὶ, εἴτε ἀρχαὶ, εἴτε δυνάμεις, εἴτε ἐνεστώτα, εἴτε μέλλοντα, εἴτε ὑψώματα, εἴτε βάθος, εἴτε τίς τις κτίσις ἑτέρα δύνασται ἡμᾶς χωρῖσαι ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγάπης τοῦ Θεοῦ, τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ Κυρίῳ ἡμῶν.—*Rom. viii. 38, 39.*

Persuasus sum enim, quia neque mors, neque vita, neque angeli, neque principatus, neque potestates, neque instantia, neque futura, neque altitudo, neque profunditas, neque aliqua creatura alia poterit nos separare a charitate Dei, quæ in Christo Jesu Domino nostro.

49. Fecerunt id servi Milonis, neque imperante, neque sciente, neque præsentem domino, quod suos quisque servos in tali re facere voluisset, (sc. *interfecerunt Clodium*.)—*Cic. pro Mil.*

Derivationes.

48. Α πολυς, multus, et συνδew, conjungo.

49. Α περιφραζω, circumloquor.

Exprimit, atque oculis quasi subjicit *Hypotyposis*. 50
 Res, loca, personas, affectus, tempora, gestus.
 Narratum claudit, vel *Epiphonema* probatum. 51

EXEMPLA.

Trojani belli scriptor, sc. Homerus.—*Hor.*

Et jam summa procul villarum culmina fumant,
 Majoresque cadunt altis de montibus umbræ.—*Virg.*

Ὁ μαθητὴς ἐκεῖνος, ὃν ἠγάπα ὁ Ἰησοῦς.—*Joan* xxi. 7.

Discipulus ille, quem diligebat Jesus.

50. Videor enim mihi hanc urbem videre, lucem orbis terrarum, atque arcem omnium gentium, subito uno incendio concidentem: cerno animo sepulta in patria miseros, atque insepultos acervos civium: versatur mihi ante oculos aspectus Cethegi, et furor in vestrâ cæde bacchantis.—*Cic. in Cat.*

Obstupui, steteruntque comæ, et vox faucibus hæsit.—*Virg.*

Οἱ μοι, κτανεῖ με· ποῖ φύγω.—*Eurip. Iphig. Taur.*

Hei mihi! interficiet me: quo fugiam?

51. Musa, mihi causas memora: quo numine læso

Quidve dolens regina Deûm, tot volvere casus

Insignem pietate virum, tot adire labores

Impulerit. *Tantæne animis cælestibus iræ.*—*Virg.*

Tantæ molis erat Romanam condere gentem!—*Id.*

Quam ut adipiscantur omnes optant, eandem accusant adepti: *Tanta est stultitia et perversitas!*—*Cic. de Senect.*

Τότε εἶπεν ὁ βασιλεὺς τοῖς διακονοῖς· Δησαντὲς αὐτὸς ποδας, καὶ χεῖρας, αἶψατε αὐτὸν, καὶ ἐκβαλετέ εἰς τὸ σκοτος τὸ ἐξώτερον· ἐκεῖ

Derivationes.

50. ὑποτυπῶν, represento.

51. Ab ἐπιφωνεῶ, acclamo.

Personam,⁵ numerum, commutat *Enallage*,² tempus 52
Cumque³ modo,⁴ genus et pariter: sic sæpe videbis.

EXEMPLA.

εσται ὁ κλαυθμος καὶ ὁ βρυγμος τῶν σδοντῶν. Πολλοὶ γὰρ εἰσι
κλητοὶ, ολίγοι δὲ ἐκλεκτοί.—*Matt.* xxii. 13, 14.

Tunc dixit rex ministris: ligantes ejus pedes et
manus tollite eum, et ejicite in tenebras exteriores; ibi
erit fletus et fremitus dentium: *multi enim sunt vocati
pauci vero electi.*

52. ¹ Ubi te ignaviæ tradideris, (pro tradiderint.)—
Sall.

Alta petunt: pelago credas innare revulsas
Cycladas, aut montes concurrere montibus altos.—*Virg.*

Φαίης κ' ἀκμητὰς καὶ ἀτειρεὰς ἀλλήλοισιν
Ἀντισθ' ἐν πολέμῳ ὥς ἐσσυμένως ἐμαχόντο.—*Hom.*

Diceres illos indefatigatos et indomitos sibi invicem
occurrere in pugnâ; adeo concitate pugnabant.

(Ubi, secunda persona utendo, Homerus lectorem
facit ut res ibi gestas non amplius legat, sed cernat; ut
denique non tam Poetæ quam pugnantium comes sit.)

² Hastam intorsit equo, ferrumque sub aure reliquit:
Quo sonipes ictu furit arduus, altaque jactat,
Vulneris impatiens, arrecto pectore crura:
Volvitur ille excussus humi.—*Virg.*

(Ubi, præsentî tempore utendo, Virgilius lectorem
facit et equi vulnus et bellatoris casum pene oculis
videre.)—*Sic.*

Ἐπετωκὼς δὲ τις, ὑπο τῷ Κυρῆ ἵππῳ, καὶ πατεμένος, παiei τη

Derivatio.

52. Ab ἐναλλαττω, permuto.

Est vocum inter se turbatus *Hyperbaton* ordo. 53

EXEMPLA.

μαχαιρα εις την γαστερα τον ἵππον· ὁ δε σφαδαζων αποσειεται τον Κυρον, ὁ δε πιπτει.—*Xenoph. de Cyropæd.*, lib. vii.

Cum cecidisset quidam subter equum Cyri et procul caretur, *ferit* equi ventrem gladio; ille autem ægre ferens *excutit* Cyrum, hic vero *decidit*.

³ Χαιρειν μετα χαιροντων, και κλαιειν μετα κλαιοντων.—*Rom.* xii. 15.

Gaudere cum gaudentibus, et flere cum flentibus.

⁴ De hac *generis* mutatione, frequens est apud Homerum usus; dicit enim κλυτος Ἴπποδαμεια, et τεκνον φιλε.

⁵ Singularis numerus positus vice pluralis vi et majestate orationem vestit.—*Sic*.

Επειθ' ἡ Πελοποννησος ἅπαντα διειστήκει.

Deinde omnis Peloponnesus in factiones discessit.

(Verba sunt Demosthenis in oratione pro Corona, ubi ἡ Πελοποννησος usurpatur pro οἱ Πελοποννησιοι.)

E contrá Pluralis pro Singulari sæpe ponitur: ut,

Ου γαρ Πελοπες, εδε Καδμοι, εδ' Αιγυπτοι τε και Δαναοι, εδ' αλλοι πολλοι φυνει βαρβαροι συνοικουσιν ἡμιν, αλλ' αυτοι Ἕλληνες, ε μιξοβαρβαροι, οικουμεν.—*Plat. in Menex.*

Neque enim *Pelopes*, neque *Cadmi*, neque *Ægyptii* et *Danai*, neque alii multi origine Barbari una nobiscum habitant; sed nos ipsi Hellenes, non cum Barbaris commixti, habitamus.

53. Vina, bonus quæ deinde cadis onerat Acestes,
Litore Trinacrio, dederatque abeuntibus heros.—*Virg.*

Derivatio.

53. Ab ὑπερβαίω, transgredior.

Sermonem a præsentī avertit *Apostrophe* rite. 54

Largitur linguam *Prosopopæia* mutis. 55

EXEMPLA.

(Ordo hic erat: Deinde heros dividit vina, quæ bonus Acestes, &c.)

—Αργεῖοι δὲ μεγ' ἰαχόν, ἀμφὶ δὲ νηὲς
Σμερδαλέον κονάβησαν, αὐσαντῶν ὑπ' Ἀχαιῶν,
Μυθὸν ἐπαινῆσαντες Ὀδυσσεὸς θεῖοιο.—*Hom.*
Argivi verò altum clamabant, circumcircaque naves
Terribiliter sonitum reddebant, clamitantibus Achivis,
Sermonem collaudantes Ulyssis divini.

(Ordo namque orationis est, Αργεῖοι δὲ μεγ' ἰαχόν,
Μυθὸν ἐπαινῆσαντες Ὀδυσσεὸς θεῖοιο.)

54. Et auro

Vi potitur. Quid non mortalia pectora cogis,
Auri sacra fames?—*Virg.*

Vos, vos appello, fortissimi viri, qui multum pro republicâ sanguinem effudistis.—*Cic. pro Mil.*

Vos enim, Albani tumuli, atque luci, vos, inquam, imploro atque obtestor, &c.—*Id.*

—Pereunt Hypanisque Dymasque
Confixi a sociis: nec te, tua plurima, Pantheu,
Labentem pietas, nec Apollinis infula texit!—*Virg.*

Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐστίν, οὐκ ἐστίν, ὅπως ἡμαρτετε ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν ὑπερ τῆς ἀπαντῶν ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας κινδύνον ἀγασμένοι. Οὐ μὰ τῆς ἐν Μαγαθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων, καὶ τῆς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς παρταξαμένους, καὶ τῆς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχησαντας, καὶ τῆς ἐπ' Ἀγτεμισίῳ, καὶ πολλοὺς ἑτέρους, τῆς ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις μνημασί κείμενους, ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρᾶς.—*Demost. Orat. pro Cor.*

55. Etenim si mecum patria, quæ mihi vita mea

Derivationes.

54. Ab ἀποστρέφω, avertō. 55. Α προσωπον, persona, et ποιῶ, facio.

Figuræ Minores.

Vocibus abundat *Pleonasmus*, et *emphasin* auget. 56
Dicitur *Ellipsis*, si ad sensum dictio desit. 57

EXEMPLA.

multo est carior, si cuncta Italia, si omnis respublica loquatur: M. Tulli, quid agis?—*Cic. in Cat.*

Patria tecum, Catilina, sic agit, et quodammodo tacita loquitur: Nullum jam tot annos facinus extitit, nisi per te.—*Id.*

Quamobrem si cruentum gladium tenens clamaret T. Annius, adeste, quæso, atque audite, cives P. Clodium interfeci: ejus furores, quos nullis jam legibus, nullis judiciis frenare poteramus, hoc ferro et hac dexterâ a cervicibus vestris repuli; per me, ut unum jus, æquitas, leges, libertas, pudor, pudicitia in civitate manerent; esset vero timendum, quonammodo id factum feret civitas; nunc enim quis est, qui non probet? qui non laudet?—*Cic. pro Mil.*

Aut *conjurato* descendens Dacus ab Istro.—*Virg.*

Virtus *sumit* aut *ponit* secures.—*Hor.*

Arbore nunc aquas *culpante*.—*Id.*

56. Satin' hoc certum? certum: *hisce oculis egomet vidi*.—*Ter. Adolph.*

Sic ore locuta est.—*Virg.*

Καλον δ' οὕτω εἶπὼν οὐπω ἰδὼν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν.—*Hom.*

Pulchrum autem adeo ego nondum *vidi oculis*.

Ἀλλ' ἄγετ', αἰκεν πῶς θωρηξομεν νῆας Ἀχαιῶν.—*Hom.*

Verum agite, si quo modo armemus *filios Achivorum*.

57. Triduo abs te nullas acceperam, (sc. *epistolas*).—*Cic.*

Derivationes.

56. Α πλεοιαζω, redundo.

57. Αβ ελλειπω, deficio.

Res specie varias *Synathræsmus* congerit unâ. 58

Hendiadi verbis res dicitur unica binis. 59

Quod meruit primum, vult *Hysteron* esse secundum. 60

Casu transposito submutat *Hypallage* verba. 61

EXEMPLA.

Rhodium volo, inde Athenas, (i. e. ire.)—*Id.*

Civica donatus, (i. e. coronâ.)—*Liv.* Dii meliora,
(i. e. faciant.)—*Cic.*

58. Grammaticus, Rhetor, Geometres, Pictor, Aliptes,
Augur, Schœnobates, Medicus, Magus, omnia novit.—*Juv.*

—faces in castra tulissem :

Implèssemque foros flammis : natumque patremque

Cum genere extinxem : memet super ipsa dedissem.—*Virg.*

Nihil ex ista laude Centurio, nihil Præfectus, nihil
Cohors, nihil Turma decerpit.—*Cic. pro Marcel.*

59. —hic fertilis uvæ,

Hic laticis ; qualem pateris libamus et auro,

(pro aureis pateris.)—*Virg.*

Nec mihi displiceat maculis insignis et albo,

(pro albis maculis.)—*Id.*

60. —moriatur, et in media arma ruamus.—*Id.*

Me, me : adsum qui feci ; in me convertite ferrum,

O Rutuli, mea fraus omnis.—*Id.*

Valet atque vivit.—*Ter. Heaut.*

61. In nova fert animus mutatas dicere formas

Corpora, (pro corpora mutata in novas formas.)—*Ov. Met.*

Necdum illis labra admovi, sed condita servo,

(pro illa labris.)—*Virg.*

—dare classibus austros,

(pro classes austris.)—*Id.*

Derivationes.

58. A συναθροίζω, congreco. 59. Ab ἐν, unum, et δια, per, et δύο, duo.

60. Ab ὕστιστον, posterius. 61. Ab ὑπο, in, et ἀλλαττω, muto.

Hellenismus erit phrasis aut constructio Græca. 62
 Propositum propriis probat *Ætiologia* causis. 63
 Voce interposita per *Tmesin* verbum scindas. 64
Antimeria solet pro parte apponere partem. 65
 Inversis vertit sensum *Antimetabole* verbis. 66

EXEMPLA.

62. Et quâ pauper aquæ Daunus agrestium

Regnavit populorum :

(pro regnator populorum.)—*Hor.*

Desine mollium querelarum.—*Id.* Desine clamorum.

63. Sperne voluptates; *nocet empty dolore voluptas.*

Μη πλανασθε· Θεος ἡ μνηστειζεται· ὁ γὰρ εἰς σπειρη ἀνθρώπος,
 τὸ καὶ ξερισσει.—*Gal.* vi. 7.

Ne errate? Deus non irridetur; quod enim semin-
 averit homo hoc et metet.

64. Quo nos *cunque* feret melior fortuna parente,

Ibimus, O socii comitesque.—*Hor.*

Quem fors dierum *cunque* dabit, lucro appone.—*Id.*

Quæ me *cunque* vocant terræ.—*Virg.*

Talis Hyperboreo *Septem* subjecta trioni

Gens effrena virum.—*Id.*

Αἴτο μὲν φίλα εἰμῶτα ΔΥΣΩ.—*Hom.*

65. Sole *recens* orto, aut noctem ducentibus astris,

(pro sole recenter orto, &c.)—*Virg.*

66. Poëma est *pictura loquens*, pictura est *mutum*
poema.

Etenim, cum sit artifex ejusmodi, ut solus dignus
 videatur esse, qui scenam introeat: tum vir ejusmodi

Derivationes.

62. Ab ἑλληνίζω, Græce loquor. 63. Ab αἰτιολογεω, rationem reddo.

64. Α τεμνω, vel τμαω, seco.

65. Ab αντι, pro, et μερος, pars.

66. Ab αντι, contra, et μεταβαλλω, inverto.

Explicat, oppositum addens, *Paradiastole* recte. 67
 Tota intervallis dat *Epimone* carmina certis. 68
Antiptosis amat pro casu ponere casum. 69

EXEMPLA.

est, ut solus videatur dignus, qui eo non accedat.—*Cic. pro Sext. Rosc.*

Οὐ γὰρ ὁ θελω, ποιῶ ἀγαθόν· ἀλλ' ὁ ε θελω κακὸν τὸτο πρᾶσσο.
Rom. vii. 19.

Non enim quod volo, facio bonum, sed quod non volo
 malum hoc ago.

67. Premitur virtus non opprimitur.

Non formosus erat, sed erat facundus Ulysses.—*Οὔ.*

Non enim furem, sed direptorem; non adulterum,
 sed expugnatorem pudicitiae.—*Cic. in Ver.*

Non sapiens, sed astutus.—

Εν παντὶ θλιβομενοι, ἀλλ' ε στενοχωρεμενοι· ἀπορεμενοι, ἀλλ' εκ
 ἐξαπορεμενοι· διωχομενοι, ἀλλ' εκ ἐγκαταλειπομενοι· καταβαλλομενοι,
 ἀλλ' εκ ἀπολλυμενοι.—2 *Cor. iv. 8, 9.*

In omni tribulati, sed non coarctati; hæsitantes, sed
 non prorsus hærentes; persequutionem passi, sed non
 deserti; dejecti, sed non perdit.

68. Incipe Mænalius mecum, mea tibia, versus.—*Virg.*

Ducite ab urbe domum, mea carmina, ducite Daphnin.—*Id.*

Ἀρχετὲ Βακχολικᾶς, Μῶσαι φίλαι, ἀρχετ' αοιδᾶς.—*Theoc. Idyl. 1.*

69. *Urbem* quam statuo, vestra est; subducite naves.

(pro *urbs* quam statuo, &c.)—*Virg.*

Derivationes.

67. Α παραδιαστολλῶ, disjungo.

68. Αβ ἐπιμένω, permaneo.

69. Αβ αἰτι, pro, et πτωσις, casus.

De Figuris Orthographiæ.

Prosthesis apponit capiti; sed *Aphæresis* aufert. 70, 71
Syncope de medio tollit; sed *Epenthesis* addit. 72, 73

EXEMPLA.

Nominativus etiam sæpe provocativo usurpatur, ut
 apud Homerum in *Iliad.* i. v. 596.

—Μηδὲ σε δαίμων

Ενταυθα τρεψείε, φίλος.

Et illud Ejusdem in *Odyss.* γ. 375.

Ω φίλος, ε σε εὐλπα κακὸν καὶ ἀναλκιν ἐσεσθαι.—*Hom.*

(Duobus his in locis, φίλος ponitur pro φίλε.)

70. Gnatum pro natum; ἐλδῶρ pro ἐλδῶρ

Gnatum exhortarer, ni mistus matre Sabella.—*Virg.*

—τοῦδε μοι κρηνην ἐλδῶρ.—*Hom.*

71. Mitte pro omitte; αἶα pro γαῖα; κείνω pro ἐκείνω,

Mitte, sectari, rosa quo locorum

Sera moretur.—*Hor.*

Ὡς φάτο· τοὺς δ' ἤδη κατέχευεν φύσιζος αἶα.—*Hom.*

Φη γὰρ οὔ' αἰζησεῖν Πρίαμου πόλιν ἡματι κείνω,

Νηπιός.—*Id.*

72. Periclis, pro periculis; πατρει, pro πατέρι.

Deseris; heu tantis nequidquam erepte *periclis*.—*Virg.*

Πρὶν γ' ἀπο πατρει φίλῳ δομεναὶ ἐλικωπίδα κουρην.—*Hom.*

73. Reliquias, pro reliquias; νεσον, pro ἰοσον; ξείνος, pro ξένος.

Troas *reliquias* Danaum atque immitis Achillei.—*Virg.*

Νεσον ἀνα στρατὸν ὥρσε κακὴν ὀλεκοῖτο δὲ λαοί.—*Hom.*

Ἦ ῥα νῦ μοι ξείνος, πατάριος ἐσσι παλαιός.—*Id.*

Derivationes.

70. Α προστιθῆμι, appono.

71. Αβ ἀφαιρέω, aufero.

72. Α συν, con, et κοπτῶ, scindo.

73. Αβ ἐπι, in, et ἐντιθῆμι, insero.

Abstrahit *Apocope* fini; sed dat *Paragoge*. 74, 75
Metathesis de sede movens elementâ reponit. 76
 Antistoichon et *Antithesis* elementa refingunt. 77

De Figuris Prosodiæ.

M vorat *Ecthlipsis*; sed vocalem *Synalæpha*. 78, 79

EXEMPLA.

74. Peculî, pro peculii; otî, pro otii; δω pro δωμα.
 Nec spes libertatis erat; nec cura peculî.—*Virg.*
 Illo Virgilium me tempore dulcis alebat
 Parthenope, studiis florentem ignobilis otî.—*Id.*
 Και τοτ' ἐπειτα τοι εἰμι Διὸς ποτὶ χαλκοῦατες δω.—*Hom.*
75. Immiscerier, pro immisceri; ἐβελησθα, pro ἐβελης.
 Sin maculæ incipient rutilo immiscerier igni.—*Virg.*
 Αλλα μαλ' ευκηλος τα φραζεαι, ασσ' ἐβελησθα.—*Hom.*
76. Thymbre, pro Thymber; καρτει, pro κρατει; κρηδην, pro κρηδην.
 Nam tibi *Thymbre*, caput Evandrius abstulit ensis.—*Virg.*
 —Ηνορῆη πισυνοι και καρτει χειρων.—*Hom.*
 Οιοῦαρες, κυνες ομματα' εχων κρηδην δ' ελαφοιο.—*Id.*
77. Olli, pro illi; volgus, pro vulgus; μελιτταν pro μελισσαν.
 Olli cœruleus supra caput adstitit imber.—*Virg.*
 Quod *volgus* servorum solet.—*Ter. And.*
 Εξως ποτ' εν ροδοισι
 Κοιμωμενην μελιτταν
 Ουκ ειδεν αλλ' ετρωθη.—*Anac.*
78. Italiam, Italiam primus conclamat Achates.—*Virg.*
 O curas hominum! O quantum est in rebus inane.—*Pers.*
79. Conticuere omnes, intentique ora tenebant.—*Virg.*
 Dardanidæ muris; spes addita suscitât iras.—*Id.*
 Ους κεν ευ γνοιην, και τενομα μυθησαιμεν.—*Hom.*

Derivationes.

74. Ab απο, ab, et κοπτω, scindo. 75. Α παρα, præter, et αγω, duco.
 76. Α μετα, trans, et τιθημι, pono. 77. Ab αντι, contra, et τιθημι, pono.
 78. Ab εκθλιβω, elido. 79. Α συναλειφω, conglutino.

Systole corripit, extenditque *Diastole* tempus. 80, 81
 Conficit ex binis contracta *Syncæresis* unam. 82
 Dividit in binas resoluta *Dicæresis* unam. 83

EXEMPLA.

80. Tulērunt, pro tulērunt; Βησομεν, pro Βησωμεν.

Matri longa decem tulērunt fastidia menses.—*Virg.*

—Αν δ' αὐτην Χρυσηίδα καλλιπαρην

Βησομεν.—*Hom.*

81. Priāmiden, pro Priāmiden; amōr, pro amōr.

Atque hic Priāmiden laniatum corpore toto.—*Virg.*

Considerant, si tantus amōr, et mœnia condant.—*Id.*

Ἰδὼν αἰσλὼν ὄφιν.—*Hom.*

82. Seu lento fuerint *alvearia* vimine texta.—*Virg.*

Unius ob noxam et furias Ajacis Oilei.—*Id.*

Ἄλλα πατρὸς οὐμὸς φρεσὶ μαινέται οὐκ ἀγαθῆσι.—*Hom.*

83. Aurai trissyllabum, pro auræ dissyllabo; siluæ pro silvæ.

Æthereum sensum, atque auræi simplicis ignem.—*Virg.*

Nivesque deducunt Jovem; nunc mare nunc siluæ.—*Hor.*

Derivationes.

80. A συστέλλω, contrahō.

81. A διαστέλλω, produco.

82. A συνείζω, connecto.

83. A διαιρέω, divido.

PART IV.

PRONUNCIATION.*

WHAT is Pronunciation?

A conformity of the voice and gesture to the subject.

* "Pronunciation," says Cicero to Herennius, "is a graceful management of the Voice, Countenance, and Gesture."

"Action," says Cicero, in his *Oratore*, "is the predominant power in eloquence. Without it the best speaker can have no name, and with it a middling one may obtain the highest."

"Pronunciation," says Quintilian, "is called by most authors Action; but the former name seems rather to agree with the Voice, and the latter with the Gesture."

Cicero and Quintilian relate, that Demosthenes, being asked what was the greatest excellency in oratory, gave the preference to Pronunciation, and assigned to it the second and third place, until no further question was put to him; by which it appeared that he judged it to be, not so much the principal as the only excellency.

Cicero, in his third book *de Oratore*, says: "For nature has given every passion its peculiar expression in the look, the voice, and the gesture; and the whole frame, the look and voice of a man are responsive to the passions of the mind, as the strings of a musical instrument are to the fingers that touch them."

Quintilian says: "Now as all action, as I said, is divided into two parts, Voice and Gesture; of which one strikes the eyes, the other the ears, through which two senses every passion has access to the mind, I shall speak first of the Voice, to which the Gesture is supposed to conform itself."

What is its object?

To transfuse into others our own ideas and emotions.

How is this to be accomplished?

By being moved ourselves with the passions we desire to excite in others.

Into how many parts is Pronunciation divided?

Two; Voice and Gesture.

What is Voice?

Voice is a kind of sound which influences the passions, either by raising or allaying them.*

* Cicero, in his third book de Oratore, chapter 60, says: "But the chief excellence to be admired in a good delivery, is a fine voice. If an orator possess not a good voice, it ought, such as it is, to be improved." And in the same chapter, he says: "Nothing tends more to acquire an agreeable voice in speaking than frequently to relax it, by passing from one strain to another, and nothing tends more to injure it than violent exertion unrelieved by modulation. What gives greater pleasure to our ears, and more charm to delivery, than judicious transitions, variety and change? Therefore, Catulus, you might have heard from Licinius, who is your client, a man of learning, and the secretary of Gracchus, that Gracchus made use of an ivory flute, which a man who stood privately behind him, while he was speaking, touched so skilfully, that he immediately struck the proper note when he wanted either to quicken or to soften the vehemence of his voice."

Emphatica, aliaque præcipuæ notæ verba, præsertim Antitheta, seu invicem respondentia, et tropi figuræque insigniores, paulo altiore vocis et tonum et sonum requirunt.—*Butler*.

Vox, quatenus ad orationis partes, sit in Exordio *verecunda*, in Narratione *aperta*, in Propositione *clarior*, in Confirmatione *fortis*, in Confutatione *severior*, in Conclusionem *excitata*, quasi parta victoria.—*Butler et Dugard*.

Vox, ratione affectuum seu passionum, sit in Commiseratione *flexibilis*, in Iracundia *incitata*, in Metu *demissa* in Voluptate *hilirata*, in Dolore *tristis*, in blandiendo, fatendo, satisfaciendo, rogando, et suadendo, *submissa*, in monendo et promittendo *fortis*, in consolando *blanda*, in laudando, gratias agendo, et similibus *læta*, *magnifica*, et *sublimis*.—*Id*.

What does voice comprise?

Accent, Emphasis, Tone, and Pause.

What is Accent?

Accent is the laying of a peculiar stress of the voice on a certain letter or syllable in a word, that it may be better heard than the rest, or distinguished from them.

What is meant by Emphasis?

A stronger and fuller sound of the voice, by which we distinguish some word or words on which we design to lay particular stress, and to show how they affect the rest of the sentence.

What relation exists between Accent and Emphasis?

Accent has the same relation to words that Emphasis has to sentences.

In what do tones consist?

In the modulation of the voice, the notes or variations of sound which we employ in public speaking.

What are Pauses?

Pauses, or rests in speaking, are a total cessation of the voice during a perceptible, and, in many cases, a measurable space of time.

What is Gesture?

The accommodation of the attitude to the several parts of a discourse:—"The suiting of the action to the word."*

* "But all these emotions," says Cicero, in his third book de Oratore, chapter 59, "ought to be accompanied with gesture; not theatrical gesture, limited to particular words, but extended to the whole discourse; aiding the sense, not by pointing, but by emphasis, a strong manly action, borrowed from the use of arms, or the school of arts, and not from stage performers. The hand ought not to saw the air, and the fingers in moving should follow the words, and not precede, as it were, to point them out. The arm should be stretched forward, as if to

How many kinds of Gesture are there ?

Two: Natural and Imitative.

What is Natural Gesture ?

When the actions and motions of the body as natu-

brandish the bolts of eloquence; and the stamping the foot ought to take place, either in the beginning or the end of a debate. But all depends upon the face, and all power of the face is centered in the eyes. This our old men are the best judges of; for they were not lavish of their applause, even to Roscius when he was in a mask. All action depends upon the passions, of which the face is the picture and the eyes the interpreters. For this is the only part of the body that can express all the passions; nor can any one who looks another way create the same emotions. Theophrastus used to apply to one Tauriscus, who averted his face from the audience when he was repeating his part, the epithet *Aversus*. Therefore, a great deal consists in the right management of the eyes; for the features of the face ought not to be altered too much, lest we become ridiculous or disgusting. It is by its vividness, or the languor of the eye, by a dejected or a cheerful look, that we express the emotions of the heart, and accommodate what we say to what we feel. Action is, as it were, the language of the body, and, therefore, ought to correspond to the thought." And in the same chapter, he says: "But nature has given a particular force to all the modifications of action; therefore we see it has great effect upon the ignorant, the vulgar, and the greatest upon foreigners who are unacquainted with our tongue. Words affect none but him who understands the language; and sentiments that are pointed often escape the undiscerning. But an action expressive of the passions of the mind, is a language universally understood: for the same expressions have the same effects in all circumstances, and all men know them in others by the same characters which express them in themselves."

The following extracts on Gesture are from Quintilian's *Institutes*, book xi. chapter iii.

"But the countenance is what is most powerful. By it we appear suppliant, menacing, mild, mournful, joyful, proud, submissive. From it men hang, as it were, on it they look, and even examine it before we speak."

"A moderate projection of the arm, the shoulders being kept still, and the fingers opening as the hand advances, is very becoming for

rally accompany our words as these do the impressions of our mind.

What is Imitative Gesture?

When the orator describes some action, or personates another speaking.

continued and smoothly running passages. But when something of greater elegance, or of finer fancy, is to be said, as 'the rocks and solitudes are responsive to the voice;' then it expatiates to the side, and the words come pouring out, as it were, with the gesture.

"But the hands, without which all gesture would be maimed and weak, have a greater variety of motions than can be well expressed; being emulous to express almost every word. Do we not desire with them, promise, call, dismiss, threaten, beseech, detest, fear, inquire, and deny? Do they not express joy, sorrow, doubt, confession, penitence, measure, abundance, number, and time? Do they not excite, restrain, prove, admire, and shame? Whence, among the great diversity of languages of all nations and people, the hands seem to me the common language of all mankind."

"The hand begins with great propriety on the left side, to rest on the right; but it should appear to be laid down, and not to strike; though in the end it sometimes falls, yet soon to return; and sometimes rebounds, in the action of denying or admiring.

"Hence, the ancient masters of art are correct in adding a precept, that the hand should begin and rest with the sense. Otherwise the gesture would be either before the voice or after it, which would be unseemly. Nor should the hand rise higher than the eyes, nor fall lower than the breast.

"The left hand never properly performs gesture alone, but frequently accompanies and conforms itself to the motions of the right, whether we digest our arguments on our fingers, or show aversion by turning out the palms of our hands to the left, or extending them forwards; or whether we stretch them out on both sides, either in an attitude of making satisfaction, or being suppliants.

"We must take care that the breast and belly do not project too far. The sides ought also to agree with the gesture; for the motion of the body is of some effect, and Cicero thinks it does more than the hands themselves, as appears by what he says in his Orator: 'Let there be no affected motions of the fingers, as of their joints falling in cadence;

How is the gesture of an orator to be regulated?

By an exact and easy imitation of the operations of nature.

rather let the orator's action proceed from the motion of his whole body, and a manly flexibility of his sides.'

"To strike the thigh, a gesture first supposed to be practised at Athens by Cleon, is customary, and becomes indignant emotions, and serves to excite the attention of the auditory. Cicero thus censures Callidius for omitting it: 'No smiting his forehead; no striking his thigh; no, not even a stamp of the foot, the least thing that might be naturally expected.'

"To stamp the foot may occasionally be seasonable, especially as Cicero says, in the beginning or end of contests; but, when used too often, it makes a man appear silly, and takes off from the party the attention and notice of the judge."

In Actione igitur summum studium duo summi oratores Demosthenes et Cicero posuere. Demosthenes speculum grande intuens composuit Actionem et gestus corporis, et Satyrum histrionem ad eas artes magistrum adhibuit. Cicero histrionibus, Roscio comædo, Æsopo tragædo, usus est. Ipsi etiam Socrates, Plato, et Quintilianus probarunt et colaudarunt.—*Butler*.

Actio semper sit non modo varia et decora, sed etiam nec nimia nec affectata, at naturæ congruens. Trunco igitur totius corporis orator seipsum moderetur; Actioque propria comitetur omnes Vocis flexiones atque animi motus.—*Id*.

Status corporis sit erectus. Humeri debent æqui esse et recti. Brachia modice projiciantur, et dextrum potius quam sinistrum faciat gestum. Supplisio pedum parce utatur. Pectus parce feriat, et femur in affectibus vehementioribus.—*Cic*.

THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLES OF SENTENCES, ORATIONS,
&c., ARE DESIGNED TO EXERCISE THE STUDENT
IN PRONUNCIATION.

I.

*Commiseration and Grief.**

Wretch that I am ! Whither shall I retreat ? Whither shall I turn me ? To the Capitol ? The Capitol streams with my brother's blood. To my family ? There must I see a wretched, a mournful, and afflicted mother !

(Cicero, extolling this passage of Gracchus, says : "It appears that those words were accompanied with such expression in his eyes, voice, and gesture, that even his enemies could not refrain from tears.")

* Horace, in his Art of Poetry, says : "Pathetic accents suit a melancholy countenance ; words full of menaces require an angry aspect ; wanton expressions, a sportive look ; and serious matter, an austere one."

And Cicero, in his third book de Oratore, says : "Anger has a peculiar pronunciation, which is quick, sharp, and broken. The tone of Pity and Grief is different ; it is full, moving, broken, and mournful. Fear is low, diffident, and humble. Vehemence demands a strain that is intense, strong, and majestically threatening. Pleasure is diffusive, soft, tender, cheerful, and gay. Uneasiness is of another sort ; it is oppressive without commiseration, and its tone is grave and uniform."

II.

Entreaty.

Fathers! Senators of Rome! the arbiters of the world! to you I fly for refuge from the murderous fury of Jugurtha. By your affection for your children; by your love for your country; by your own virtues; by the majesty of the Roman Commonwealth! by all that is sacred, and all that is dear to you—deliver a wretched prince from undeserved, unprovoked injury; and save the kingdom of Numidia, which is your own property, from being the prey of violence, usurpation, and cruelty.
—*Sall.*

III.

Anger.—Threatening.

Satan's Speech to Death stopping his passage through the gate of Hell;
with the answer.

Whence, and what art thou, execrable shape!	<i>Quest.</i>
That dar'st, tho' grim and terrible, advance	<i>with</i>
Thy miscreated front athwart my way	<i>anger.</i>
To yonder gates? through them I mean to pass,	<i>Resol.</i>
That be assur'd, without leave ask'd of thee:	<i>Contempt.</i>
Retire; or taste thy folly, and learn by proof,	<i>Threat-</i>
Hell-born! not to contend with sp'rits of Heav'n.	<i>ening.</i>
To whom the goblin, full of wrath, replied:	
Art thou that traitor angel, art thou he	<i>Anger.</i>
Who first broke peace in Heav'n, and faith, till then	

Unbroken, and in proud, rebellious arms,
 Drew after him the third part of Heav'n's sons
 Conjur'd against the Highest, for which both thou
 And they, outcast from God, art here condemn'd
 To waste eternal days in woe and pain?
 And reckon'st thou thyself with sp'rits of Heav'n, *Con-*
 Hell-doom'd! and breath'st defiance here and scorn, *tem't*
 Where I reign king, and, to enrage thee more, *with ang,*
 Thy king and lord? Back to thy punishment, *Pride.*
 False fugitive! and to thy speed add wings, *Threaten-*
 Lest, with a whip of scorpions, I pursue *ing.*
 Thy ling'ring, or with one stroke of this dart
 Strange horror seize thee, and pangs unfelt before.
Milt. Par. Lost, b. ii. 601,

IV.

Anxiety.—Resolution,

CATO'S SOLILOQUY.

Cato sitting in a thoughtful posture. In his hand Plato's book on the immortality of the soul. A drawn sword on the table by him. After a long pause, he lays down the book, and speaks.

It must be so—Plato, thou reason'st well! *Deep contmp,*
 Else whence this pleasing hope, this fond desire,^a *Comf.*
 This longing after immortality? *Desire.*
 Or whence this secret dread, and inward horror
 Of falling into nought? Why shrinks the soul *Fear,*

^a "This fond desire" may be spoken with the right hand laid on the breast.

Back on herself, and startles at destruction ?

'Tis the Divinity that stirs within us; *Awe.*

'Tis Heav'n itself that points out an hereafter,
And intimates eternity to man.

^bEternity! thou pleasing* dreadful† thought! *Satisfac.*

Through what variety of untried being, † *Apprehen.*

Through what new scenes and changes must we pass ?

The wide, th' unbounded prospect lies before me;

But shadows, clouds, and darkness, rest upon it. *Anx.*

‡ Here will I hold: § If there's a pow'r above us, ‡ *Cour.*

(And that there is, all nature cries aloud § *Ven.*

Through all her works,) He must delight in virtue,

And that which he delights in must be happy. *Satisfac.*

But when! or where!—|| This world was made for Cæsar.

I'm weary of conjectures.—¶ This must end them. || *Anx.*

(*Laying his hand on his sword.*) ¶ *Cour.*

Thus am I doubly armed;^c my death and life; *Firmness.*

My bane and antidote; are both before me:

This, in a moment, brings me to an end; *Appre.*

But this informs me I shall never die: *Comf.*

The soul,^d secur'd in her existence, smiles *Noble.*

At the drawn dagger, and defies its point. *Pride.*

The stars^e shall fade away, the sun himself *Triumph.*

^b "Eternity! thou pleasing," &c., requires an eye fixed, with profound thoughtfulness, on one point, throughout this line.

^c "My death and life," &c.; long pauses between, and pointing, or looking at the sword in pronouncing "my death," and at the book in pronouncing "and life," and so in "my bane and antidote," and in the two following lines.

^d "The soul," &c., may be pronounced with the right hand laid on the breast.

^e "The stars," &c., may be spoken with the eyes raised toward heaven, and the arms moderately spread.

Grow dim with age, and nature sink in years;
^fBut thou shalt flourish in immortal youth,
^gUnhurt amidst the war of elements,
^hThe wreck of matter and the crush of worlds.

Addison.

V.

Doubting.—Vexation.—Serious Reflection.

HAMLET'S SOLILOQUY.

To be—or not to be—that is the question: *Anxiety.*
 Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer
 The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune;
 Or to take arms against a host of troubles, *Cour.*
 And, by opposing, end them?—*But to die— **Deep*
 To sleep—No more?—And by a sleep to end *thoughtf'ness.*
 The heart-ache, and the thousand natural shocks *Vex.*
 That flesh is heir to—'tis a consummation *[fulness.*
 Devoutly to be wish'd—†To die—To sleep—†*Thought-*
 To sleep! ‡Perchance to dream—A startling thought—
 For in that sleep of death what dreams may come, ‡*Ap-*
 When we have shuffled off this mortal coil, *[preh.*
 Must give us pause.—There's the respect
 That makes calamity of so long life:
 For who would bear the whips and scorns of time, *Vex.*
 Th' oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely,

^f “But thou shalt flourish,” &c., the right hand upon the breast.

^g “Unhurt,” &c., the arms spread again as before.

^h “The crush,” &c., the hands brought together with force.

The pangs of love despised, the law's delay, *Anguish.*
 The insolence of office, and the spurns
 That patient merit of the unworthy takes; *Meek.*
 When he himself might his quietus make
 With a bare bodkin? who would bend to earth, *Cour.*
 And groan and sweat under a weary life, *Comp.*
 But that the dread of something after death *Fear.*
 (That undiscovered country, from whose bourn
 No traveller returns) puzzles the will,
 And makes us rather bear those ills we have,
 Than fly to others that we know not of.
 Thus conscience does make cowards of us all;
 And thus the native hue of resolution
 Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought;
 And enterprises of great pith and moment,
 With this regard their currents turn awry,
 And lose the name of action.

Shakspeare.

VI.

BRUTUS'S ORATION ON CÆSAR'S DEATH.

Romans, countrymen, and lovers!—Hear me for my
 cause; and be silent, that ye may hear! Believe me,
 for mine honor; and have respect to mine honor, that
 you may believe! Censure me in your wisdom; and
 awake your senses, that you may the better judge! If
 there be any in this assembly, any dear friend of
 Cæsar's—to him I say, that Brutus' love to Cæsar was
 no less than his. If, then, that friend demand why

Brutus rose against Cæsar, this is my answer: Not that I loved Cæsar less, but that I loved Rome more. Had you rather Cæsar were living, and die all slaves, than that Cæsar were dead and live all freemen?

As Cæsar loved me, I weep for him; as he was fortunate, I rejoice at it; as he was valiant, I honor him: but, as he was ambitious, I slew him. There are tears for his love, joy for his fortune, honor for his valor, and death for his ambition.

Who's here so base that would be a bondman? If any, speak; for him have I offended. Who's here so rude that would not be a Roman? If any, speak; for him have I offended. Who's here so vile that will not love his country? If any, speak; for him have I offended. I pause for a reply—Since none is made, then none have I offended.

I have done no more to Cæsar than you shall do to Brutus. The question of his death is enrolled in the Capitol: his glory not extenuated, wherein he was worthy; nor his offences enforced, for which he suffered death.

Here comes his body, mourned by Mark Antony: who, though he had no hand in his death, shall receive the benefit of his dying, a place in the commonwealth; as which of you shall not? With this I depart; that, as I slew my best lover for the good of Rome, I have the same dagger for myself when it shall please my country to need my death.

Shakspeare, Jul. Cæs., Act iii.

VII.

PHOCIAS' SOLILOQUY.

Farewell, and think of death!—Was it not so?
Do murderers, then, preach morality?
But, how to think of, what the living know not,
And the dead cannot, or else may not, tell?—
What art thou, O thou great mysterious terror!
The way to thee we know; diseases, famine,
Sword, fire, and all thy ever open gates,
Which day and night stand ready to receive us.
But, what's beyond them?—Who will draw that veil?
Yet death's not there:—No, 'tis a point of time;
The verge 'twixt mortal and immortal being:
It mocks our thought!—On this side all is life;
And when we've reach'd it, in that very instant
'Tis past the thinking of!—O! if it be
The pangs, the throes, the agonizing struggle,
When soul and body part, sure I have felt it,
And there's no more to fear.

VIII.

DOUGLAS' ACCOUNT OF HIMSELF.

My name is Norval. On the Grampian hills
My father feeds his flocks; a frugal swain,
Whose constant cares were to increase his store,
And keep his only son, myself, at home:
For I had heard of battles, and I long'd

To follow to the field some warlike lord;
And heav'n soon granted what my sire denied.
This moon, which rose last night, round as my shield,
Had not yet fill'd her horns, when, by her light,
A band of fierce barbarians, from the hills,
Rush'd, like a torrent, down upon the vale,
Sweeping our flocks and herds. The shepherds fled
For safety and for succor. I alone,
With bended bow, and quiver full of arrows,
Hover'd about the enemy, and mark'd
The road they took, then hasted to my friends;
Whom, with a troop of fifty chosen men,
I met advancing. The pursuit I led,
Till we o'ertook the spoil-encumber'd foe.
We fought—and conquered. Ere a sword was drawn,
An arrow from my bow had pierc'd their chief,
Who wore that day the arms which now I wear.
Returning home in triumph, I disdain'd
The shepherd's slothful life; and, having heard
That our good king had summon'd his bold peers
To lead their warriors to the Carron side,
I left my father's house, and took with me
A chosen servant to conduct my steps:
Yon trembling coward, who forsook his master.
Journeying with this intent I pass'd these towers;
And, Heav'n-directed, came this day to do
The happy deed that gilds my humble name.

IX.

CATO'S SENATE.

Sem. Rome still survives in this assembled senate !
Let us remember we are Cato's friends,
And act like men who claim that glorious title.

Luc. Cato will soon be here, and open to us
Th' occasion of our meeting. Hark, he comes !
(*A sound of trumpets.*)
May all the guardian gods of Rome direct him !

Enter Cato.

Cato. Fathers, we once again are met in council;
Cæsar's approach has summon'd us together,
And Rome attends her fate from our resolves.
How shall we treat this bold, aspiring man ?
Success still follows him, and backs his crimes ;
Pharsalia gave him Rome ; Egypt has since
Receiv'd his yoke, and the whole Nile is Cæsar's.
Why should I mention Juba's overthrow,
And Scipio's death ? Numidia's burning sands
Still smoke with blood. 'Tis time we should decree
What course to take. Our foe advances on us,
And envies us even Libya's sultry deserts.
Fathers, pronounce your thoughts: are they still fix'd
To hold it out, and fight it to the last ?
Or are your hearts subdued at length, and wrought,
By time and ill success, to a submission ?
Sempronius, speak.

Sem. My voice is still for war.
Gods ! can a Roman senate long debate

Which of the two to choose—slav'ry or death?
No; let us rise at once, gird on our swords,
And, at the head of our remaining troops,
Attack the foe, break through the thick array
Of his throng'd legions, and charge home upon him.
Perhaps some arm, more lucky than the rest,
May reach his heart, and free the world from bondage.
Rise, fathers, rise! 'tis Rome demands your help;
Rise, and revenge her slaughter'd citizens,
Or share their fate! The corpse of half her senate
Manure the fields of Thessaly, while we
Sit here deliberating in cold debates,
If we should sacrifice our lives to honor,
Or wear them out in servitude and chains.
Rouse up, for shame! Our brothers of Pharsalia
Point at their wounds, and cry aloud—To battle!
Great Pompey's shade complains that we are slow;
And Scipio's ghost walks unrevenged among us.

Cato. Let not a torrent of impetuous zeal
Transport thee thus beyond the bounds of reason:
True fortitude is seen in great exploits
That justice warrants, and that wisdom guides;
All else is tow'ring frenzy and distraction.
Are not the lives of those who draw the sword
In Rome's defence, entrusted to our care?
Should we thus lead them to a field of slaughter,
Might not th' impartial world with reason say,
We lavish'd at our death the blood of thousands,
To grace our fall and make our ruin glorious?
Lucius, we next would know what's your opinion.

Luc. My thoughts, I must confess, are turn'd on
peace.

Already have our quarrels fill'd the world
With widows and with orphans: Scythia mourns
Our guilty wars, and earth's remotest regions
Lie half unpeopled by the feuds of Rome:
'Tis time to sheathe the sword, and spare mankind.
It is not Cæsar, but the gods, my fathers,
The gods declare against us, and repel
Our vain attempts. To urge the foe to battle
(Prompted by blind revenge and wild despair),
Were to refuse the awards of Providence,
And not to rest in Heav'n's determination.
Already have we shown our love to Rome,
Now let us show submission to the gods.
We took up arms, not to revenge ourselves,
But free the commonwealth; when this end fails,
Arms have no further use. Our country's cause,
That drew our swords, now wrests 'em from our hands,
And bids us not delight in Roman blood,
Unprofitably shed. What men could do,
Is done already: heav'n and earth will witness,
If Rome must fall, that we are innocent.

Sem. This smooth discourse, and mild behavior, oft
Conceal a traitor. Something whispers me
All is not right.—Cato, beware of Lucius.

(*Aside to Cato.*)

Cato. Let us appear not rash nor diffident;
Immod'rate valor swells into a fault;
And fear, admitted into public councils,
Betrays like treason. Let us shun them both.
Fathers, I cannot see that our affairs
Are grown thus desp'rate; we have bulwarks round us;
Within our walls are troops inur'd to toil

In Afric's heats, and season'd to the sun;
Numidia's spacious kingdom lies behind us,
Ready to rise at its young prince's call.
While there is hope, do not distrust the gods:
But wait, at least, till Cæsar's near approach
Force us to yield. 'Twill never be too late
To sue for chains and own a conqueror.
Why should Rome fall a moment ere her time?
No: let us draw her term of freedom out
In its full length, and spin it to the last;
So shall we gain still one day's liberty:
And let me perish, but in Cato's judgment,
A day, an hour, of virtuous liberty
Is worth a whole eternity in bondage.

Enter Marcus.

Mar. Fathers, this moment, as I watch'd the gate,
Lodg'd on my post, a herald is arriv'd
From Cæsar's camp, and with him comes old Decius,
The Roman knight; he carries in his looks
Impatience, and demands to speak with Cato.

Cato. By your permission, fathers——bid him enter.

(Exit Marcus.)

Decius was once my friend; but other prospects
Have loos'd those ties, and bound them fast to Cæsar.
His message may determine our resolves.

Enter Decius.

Dec. Cæsar sends health to Cato——

Cato. Could he send it

To Cato's slaughter'd friends, it would be welcome.
Are not your orders to address the senate?

Dec. My business is with Cato; Cæsar sees
The straits to which you're driven; and, as he knows
Cato's high worth, is anxious for your life.

Cato. My life is grafted on the fate of Rome.
Would he save Cato? Bid him spare his country.
Tell your dictator this; and tell him, Cato
Disdains a life which he has pow'r to offer.

Dec. Rome and her senators submit to Cæsar;
Her gen'als and her consuls are no more,
Who check'd his conquests and denied his triumphs.
Why will not Cato be this Cæsar's friend?

Cato. Those very reasons thou hast urg'd, forbid it.

Dec. Cato, I've orders to expostulate,
And reason with you as from friend to friend:
Think on the storm that gathers o'er your head,
And threatens ev'ry hour to burst upon it.
Still may you stand high in your country's honors:
Do but comply, and make your peace with Cæsar.
Rome will rejoice and cast its eyes on Cato
As on the second of mankind.

Cato. No more:
I must not think of life on such conditions.

Dec. Cæsar is well acquainted with your virtues,
And therefore sets this value on your life.
Let him but know the price of Cato's friendship,
And name your terms.

Cato. Bid him disband his legions,
Restore the commonwealth to liberty,
Submit his actions to the public censure,
And stand the judgment of a Roman senate.
Bid him do this, and Cato is his friend.

Dec. Cato, the world talks loudly of your wisdom——

Cato. Nay, more—though Cato's voice was ne'er employ'd

To clear the guilty, and to varnish crimes,
Myself will mount the rostrum in his favor,
And strive to gain his pardon from the people.

Dec. A style like this becomes a conqueror.

Cato. Decius, a style like this becomes a Roman.

Dec. What is a Roman that is Cæsar's foe?

Cato. Greater than Cæsar: he's a friend to virtue.

Dec. Consider, Cato, you're in Utica,
And at the head of your own little senate;
You don't now thunder in the Capitol,
With all the mouths of Rome to second you.

Cato. Let him consider that, who drives us hither.
'Tis Cæsar's sword has made Rome's senate little,
And thinn'd its ranks. Alas! thy dazzled eye
Beholds this man in a false glaring light,
Which conquest and success have thrown upon him;
Didst thou but view him right, thou'dst see him black
With murder, treason, sacrilege, and crimes
That strike my soul with horror but to name 'em.
I know thou look'st on me as on a wretch
Beset with ills, and cover'd with misfortunes;
But, by the gods I swear, millions of worlds
Should never buy me to be like that Cæsar.

Dec. Does Cato send this answer back to Cæsar,
For all his generous cares and proffer'd friendship?

Cato. His cares for me are insolent and vain:
Presumptuous man! the gods take care of Cato.
Would Cæsar show the greatness of his soul?
Bid him employ his care for these my friends,
And make good use of his ill-gotten pow'er

By shelt'ring men much better than himself.

Dec. Your high unconquered heart makes you forget
You are a man. You rush on your destruction.
But I have done. When I relate hereafter
The tale of this unhappy embassy,
All Rome will be in tears.

X.

BRUTUS AND CASSIUS.

Cas. That you have wrong'd me doth appear in this:
You have condemn'd and noted Lucius Pella
For taking bribes here of the Sardians;
Wherein my letter (praying on his side,
Because I knew the man) was slighted off.

Bru. You wrong'd yourself to write in such a case.

Cas. In such a time as this, it is not meet
That ev'ry nice offence should bear its comment.

Bru. Let me tell you, Cassius, you yourself
Are much condemn'd to have an itching palm,
To sell and mart your offices for gold,
To undeservers.

Cas. I an itching palm?
You know that you are Brutus that speak this,
Or, by the gods, this speech were else your last.

Bru. The name of Cassius honors this corruption,
And chastisement doth therefore hide its head.

Cas. Chastisement!

Bru. Remember March, the ides of March remem-
ber!

Did not great Julius bleed for justice sake?
What villain touch'd his body, that did stab,
And not for justice? What, shall one of us,
That struck the foremost man of all this world,
But for supporting robbers; shall we now
Contaminate our fingers with base bribes?
And sell the mighty space of our large honors
For so much trash as may be grasped thus?—
I had rather be a dog, and bay the moon,
Than such a Roman.

Cas. Brutus, bay not me.
I'll not endure it: you forget yourself,
To hedge me in; I am a soldier, I,
Older in practice, abler than yourself
To make conditions.

Bru. Go to; you're not, Cassius.

Cas. I am.

Bru. I say you are not.

Cas. Urge me no more; I shall forget myself—
Have mind upon your health: tempt me no further!

Bru. Away, slight man!

Cas. Is't possible?

Bru. Hear me, for I will speak.
Must I give way and room to your rash choler?
Shall I be frightened when a madman stares?

Cas. O gods! ye gods! Must I endure all this?

Bru. All this? aye, more. Fret till your proud
heart break;

Go, show your slaves how choleric you are,
And make your bondmen tremble. Must I budge?
Must I observe you? Must I stand and crouch
Under your testy humor? By the gods,

You shall digest the venom of your spleen,
Though it do split you: for, from this day forth,
I'll use you for my mirth, yea, for my laughter,
When you are waspish.

Cas. Is it come to this?

Bru. You say you are a better soldier:
Let it appear so; make your vaunting true,
And it shall please me well: for mine own part,
I shall be glad to learn of noble men.

Cas. You wrong me every way; you wrong me,
Brutus:

I said an older soldier, not a better;
Did I say better?

Bru. If you did, I care not.

Cas. When Cæsar liv'd he durst not thus have mov'd
me.

Bru. Peace, peace, you durst not so have tempted
him.

Cas. I durst not!

Bru. No.

Cas. What? Durst not tempt him!

Bru. For your life you durst not.

Cas. Do not presume too much upon my love;
I may do that I shall be sorry for.

Bru. You have done that you should be sorry for.
There is no terror, Cassius, in your threats;
For I am arm'd so strong in honesty,
That they pass by me as the idle wind,
Which I respect not. I did send to you
For certain sums of gold, which you denied me:
For I can raise no money by vile means:
By heaven, I had rather coin my heart,

And drop my blood for drachmas, than to wring
From the hard hands of peasants their vile trash,
By any indirection. I did send
To you for gold to pay my legions,
Which you denied me: was that done like Cassius?
Should I have answer'd Caius Cassius so?
When Marcus Brutus grows so covetous,
To lock such rascal counters from his friends,
Be ready, gods, with all your thunderbolts!
Dash him to pieces!

Cas. I denied you not.

Bru. You did.

Cas. I did not:—he was but a fool
That brought my answer back.—Brutus hath riv'd my
heart;

A friend should bear a friend's infirmities,
But Brutus makes mine greater than they are.

Bru. I do not; still you practise them on me.

Cas. You love me not.

Bru. I do not like your faults.

Cas. A friendly eye could never see such faults.

Bru. A flatterer's would not, though they do appear
As huge as high Olympus.

Cas. Come, Antony, and young Octavius, come!
Revenge yourselves alone on Cassius,
For Cassius is a-weary of the world:
Hated by one he loves: brav'd by his brother:
Check'd like a bondman: all his faults observ'd,
Set in a note-book, learn'd and conn'd by rote,
To cast them in my teeth. O, I could weep
My spirit from mine eyes!—There is my dagger,
And here my naked breast—within, a heart

Dearer than Plutus' mine, richer than gold:
If that thou need'st a Roman's, take it forth:
I, that denied thee gold, will give my heart:
Strike, as thou didst at Cæsar; for, I know
When thou didst hate him worst, thou lov'dst him better
Than ever thou lov'dst Cassius.

Bru. Sheath your dagger.

Be angry when you will, it shall have scope:
Do what you will, dishonor shall be humor.
O Cassius, you are yoked with a lamb
That carries anger as the flint bears fire;
Who, much enforced, shows a hasty spark,
And straight is cold again.

Cas.

Hath Cassius liv'd

To be but mirth and laughter to his Brutus,
When grief, and blood ill-temper'd vexeth him?

Bru. When I spoke that I was ill temper'd too.

Cas. Do you confess so much? Give me your hand.

Bru. And my heart too.

Cas.

O Brutus?—

Bru.

What's the matter?

Cas. Have you not love enough to bear with me,
When that rash humor, which my mother gave me,
Makes me forgetful?

Bru. Yes, Cassius; and from henceforth,
When you are over-earnest with your Brutus,
He'll think your mother chides, and leave you so.

XI.

THE PARTING OF BRUTUS AND CASSIUS.

Bru. No, Cassius, no: think not, thou noble Roman,
That ever Brutus will go bound to Rome:
He bears too great a mind. But this same day
Must end that work the ides of March begun;
And whether we shall meet again I know not.
Therefore our everlasting farewell take:—
Forever, and forever, farewell, Cassius!
If we do meet again, why we shall smile;
If not, why then this parting was well made.

Cas. Forever, and forever, farewell, Brutus!
If we do meet again, we'll smile indeed;
If not, 'tis true, this parting was well made.

Bru. Why, then, lead on.—O, that a man might
know
The end of this day's business ere it come!
But it sufficeth that the day will end,
And then the end is known.

XII.

SOLILOQUY OF DICK THE APPRENTICE.

Thus far we run before the wind.—An apothecary!
Make an apothecary of me!—What, cramp my genius
over a pestle and mortar; or mew me up in a shop,
with an alligator stuffed, and a beggarly account of
empty boxes! To be culling simples, and constantly

adding to the bills of mortality!—No! no! It will be much better to be pasted up in capitals, *The part of Romeo by a young gentleman who never appeared on any stage before!* My ambition fires at the thought.—But hold; mayn't I run some chance of failing in my attempt? Hissed—pelted—laughed at—not admitted into the green room;—that will never do—down, busy devil, down, down; try it again—loved by the women—envied by the men—applauded by the pit, clapped by the gallery, admired by the boxes. “Dear colonel, isn't he a charming creature? My lord, don't you like him of all things?—Makes love like an angel?—What an eye he has!—Fine legs!—I shall certainly go to his benefit.”—Celestial sounds!—And then I'll get in with all the painters, and have myself put up in every print shop—in the character of Macbeth! “This is a sorry sight.” (*Stands an attitude.*) In the character of Richard: “Give me another horse! Bind up my wounds.” These will do rarely—And then I have a chance of getting well married.—O glorious thought! I will enjoy it, though but in fancy. But what's o'clock?—it must be almost nine. I'll away at once; this is club-night—the spouters are all met—little think they I'm in town—they'll be surprised to see me; off I go; and then for my assignation with my master Gargle's daughter.

Limbs, do your office, and support me well;

Bear me but to her, then fail me if you can.

BOOK II.

THE
ELEMENTS OF ORATORY,

METHODICALLY ARRANGED:

CHIEFLY FROM THE ANCIENT GREEK AND
ROMAN RHETORICAL WRITERS:

FROM THE STUDENT'S ENTRANCE INTO THE
SCHOOL OF ORATORY

TO HIS ADMISSION TO THE
FORUM, THE SENATE, AND THE ASSEMBLIES
OF THE PEOPLE.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Greeks attributed the invention of Rhetoric to Mercury; and hence they designated him Ἑρμῆς, which radically signifies *to speak*. And the inhabitants of Lystra, in consequence of the cure of the impotent man by Barnabas and Paul, called the former Jupiter, and the latter Mercury, "*because he was the chief speaker.*"

But to pass over the legendary fictions of Pagan theology, no satisfactory account can be given to whom the origin of this art is to be ascribed. Its first lineaments, as Aristotle justly observes, were, no doubt, extremely rude and imperfect. Pausanias, in his description of Greece, says that Pittheus, the uncle of Theseus, who flourished about twelve hundred years before the Christian era, taught it at Træzene, a city of Peloponnesus. Be this, however, as it may, it was certainly held in high estimation at the time of the Trojan war; otherwise Homer would never have given such unbounded applause to the eloquent speeches of Ulysses and Nestor. And in addition to this circumstance, the principal *tropes* and *figures* which are now used may be found in that sublime and distinguished writer.

Of the orators who flourished from the Trojan down to the Peloponnesian war, no particular mention is made in history. But as eloquence then became the means by which the most obscure and indigent individual might rise to the highest post of honor and influence, a multitude of orators arose about that period. Of these Corax and Tisias,* of Sicily, laid down rules for the methodical arrangement of a discourse, and the artificial adjustment of its particular parts. Gorgias,† of Leontium, the pupil of Empedocles, succeeded these. Diodorus Siculus says that he was the first who used studied figures of speech and labored antithesis of equal length and the same termination. Thrasyarchus, of Chalcedon, Protagoras, of Abdera, Prodicus of Cea, and Theodorus of Byzantium, as also Antiphon‡ and Polycrates, were his contemporaries; and all contributed to the improvement of this art. Quintilian says, that Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, and Thrasyarchus, were the first who treated

* "This he confirmed by the example of *Corax* and *Tisias*, who appear to have been the inventors of, and leading men in this art."—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. i. cap. 20.

Corax and Tisias were cotemporary with Hiero of Syracuse, 475 years before Christ.

† Gorgias was a Sicilian, and father of the Sophists. He was held in such esteem throughout Greece, that a statue was erected to his honor in the temple of Apollo at Delphos, of solid gold. Gorgias was at the head of the embassy which the Leontines sent to Athens to solicit assistance against the Syracusans. In the first audience he had of the Athenians his eloquence so enchanted that people that they were unfortunately prevailed upon to engage in the Sicilian war.

‡ Antiphon, the Athenian, who composed the *first judicial oration*, wrote rules for this new manner of composition, and had the reputation of pleading extremely well in his own defence.—*Quint.*, lib. iii. cap. 1.

of *common-places*, and exhibited their use for the invention of arguments upon every subject.

Posterior to these arose Isocrates, the scholar of Gorgias. The style of Gorgias was formed into short sentences, composed generally of two members balanced against each other. The style of Isocrates,* on the contrary, was swelling and full; and he is said to have been the first who introduced the method of composing in regular periods, which had a studied music and harmonious cadence. It was the celebrity of Isocrates which induced the far-famed Aristotle to write his "Institutions of Rhetoric:" a work universally admitted to be the best and most complete of any on the same subject in the Greek language. Quintilian says, that Aristotle was often heard to repeat a verse of the tragedy of Philoctetes, intimating that "it was a shame to be silent and suffer Isocrates to speak."†

Lysias and Isæus belong to this age. Lysias was

* Twenty-one of his orations are extant. He was engaged ten years in composing his oration entitled the "*Panegyric*."

† "Aristotle, seeing the success of Isocrates by having his school full of men of quality, whereas he had transferred his lectures from civil causes and public disputes to an empty elegance of expression, suddenly changed his form of teaching, and pronounced, with a little variation, a line relating to Philoctetes, where it is said, *that it was a shame to be silent and hear BARBARIANS speak*; Aristotle said, *and hear ISOCRATES speak*."—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. iii. cap. 35.

Αἰσχροὺν σιωπᾶν καὶ Ἰσοκράτην ἔαν λεγέιν.

Most commentators are mistaken in supposing this verse to be in the Philoctetes of Sophocles. In that tragedy, whoever was the author, Philoctetes says: "It was shameful for him to be silent, and let barbarians speak;" Αἰσχροὺν σιωπᾶν, βαρβάρους δ' ἔαν λεγέιν. Aristotle applied it to Isocrates, but in another sense.

the model of that style which the ancient rhetoricians called “*γλαφυρον λογον*,” the *polished* style; and hence Cicero designates him *venustissimum oratorem*.* Isæus was the pupil of Lysias, and the first who applied eloquence to political or state affairs, in which he was followed by his celebrated scholar Demosthenes.

In this age Grecian eloquence appeared in its meridian. Demosthenes, by indefatigable industry, by a surprising genius, and a patriotic love for his country, became one of the greatest orators that ever existed—an orator who was an honor to humanity, and whose name shall descend with imperishable lustre to the latest posterity. The style of this prince of Grecian eloquence is concise, nervous, and vehement. “Our Demosthenes,” says Longinus, “uttering every sentence with such force, precipitation, strength, and vehemence, that it seems to be all fire, and bears down everything before it, may be justly compared to a thunderbolt, or a hurricane.”†

Subsequent to the time of Demosthenes, the manly and sensible eloquence of the Greeks degenerated into subtilty and sophistry. Demetrius Phalereus, the pupil of Theophrastus, who lived in the time of Alexander the Great, was an orator of considerable eminence, but Cicero describes him as a flowery rather than a natural persuasive writer.

From this period down to the Christian era, Quintilian enumerates several rhetoricians; among whom

* Plutarch says, that four hundred and twenty-five orations were formerly exhibited under the name of Lysias; of these only thirty-four are now extant.

† Sixty-one orations are extant under the name of Demosthenes.

were Hermagoras, Athenæus, and afterwards Apollonius Molo, the preceptor of Cæsar and Cicero, Cæcilius, and the far-famed Dionysius of Halicarnassus. But the most celebrated, and noted for the greatest number of scholars, were Apollodorus of Pergamus, the preceptor of Augustus Cæsar at Apollonia; and Theodorus, of Gadara, who called himself a Rhodian, whose lectures Tiberias Cæsar is reported to have attended diligently during his retreat in that island. Since the days of Dionysius, the only Greek orators of celebrity were Hermogenes, and Longinus, the author of a Treatise on the Sublime; a writer of such pre-eminent merit that his cotemporaries appointed him judge of all the ancient authors: and whatever inferior critics blamed, or whatever they commended, was received or rejected by the public only as it met with the approbation of Longinus, or was confirmed and ratified by his sovereign decision.

The Romans, for several ages, were almost continually engaged in military affairs; and as they supposed that the cultivation of oratory would have a tendency to allure their minds from martial achievements to an indolent and effeminate manner of life, they therefore manifested an inveterate prejudice against its introduction. For in the year of their city 592, when, through the medium of the Greeks, the liberal arts were introduced into Italy, the senate passed a decree, directing all philosophers and rhetoricians to depart from Rome. But on the arrival of the Athenian ambassadors, Carneades the Academic, Critolaus the Peripatetic, and Diogenes the Stoic, a few years subsequent to the pro-

mulgation of this decree, the Roman youths were so charmed with the eloquence of their harangues, that it was found impracticable, any longer, to counteract its dissemination. The era of Roman eloquence may, therefore, be dated from the subjugation of Greece by Mummius, the consul, about a hundred and forty-six years before Christ.

*Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit, et artes
Intulit agresti Latio.**

Seneca says, that Lucius Plotinus, a Gaul, was the first who taught rhetoric, in Latin, at Rome, and that Blandus, of the equestrian order, was the first Roman who engaged in this profession. Quintilian says that Cato, the censor, was the first writer on oratory among the Romans; and although Cicero, in his work "*De claris Oratoribus*," represents them as having been possessed of considerable eloquence, yet he admits that it was "*Asperum et horridum genus dicendi*," a rude and harsh strain of speech.

Subsequent to the time of Cato arose Crassus and Antonius. It was owing to the latter of these, says Cicero, that Rome might boast herself a rival even to Greece in the art of eloquence. And in his three books "*De Oratore*," and other rhetorical productions, he attributes the highest commendation to these distinguished orators.

In the same age, though somewhat later than the orators above mentioned, flourished the celebrated

* *Hor.*, lib. ii. epist. 1.

Cicero. In fame and reputation he far surpassed all his cotemporaries. His inventive genius, his artful and methodical arrangement of arguments, his melodious structure, and disposition of periods, his peculiar success in moving the soft and tender passions, and his splendor and morality of sentiment, all contribute to render his works the standard of popular oratory.*

The last rhetorical writer of distinguished reputation among the Romans was Quintilian. His *Institutions* exhibit a very great degree of accurate and refined taste, and are composed with such exactness and judgment, that they are generally admitted to be the most useful and the most instructive production on the subject now extant. He has arranged all the ancient ideas concerning rhetoric in so comprehensive a manner, as to render his writings an invaluable acquisition to every student of oratory.

After the days of Cicero and Quintilian, the Romans experienced the most oppressive form of arbitrary and tyrannical government. Luxury and effeminacy were

* Cicero's first oration at the bar, was the defence of Sextus Roscius. Roscius had been prosecuted by Sylla, the dictator, and hence, the oldest and most distinguished advocates were afraid to appear in his behalf. Cicero, to his great honor, gained the cause; being then twenty-six years of age.

Besides Cicero's *two books of Invention*, which Quintilian calls his *books of Rhetoric*, there are extant his *three books of an Orator*; one of *Famous Orators*; and another, which is called the *Orator*; as also his *Topics*, a preface concerning the best sort of *Orators*; and a treatise of the *parts of Oratory*. The *four books to Herennius*, which are published among Cicero's works, appear, with good reason, to be attributed to Cornificius.

introduced; their taste became corrupt, and their genius discouraged; and that ornamental and diffusive eloquence which had existed in its most splendid and illustrious form, soon degenerated into quaintness and affectation, into tumid declamation and servile flattery.

PRELIMINARY EXPLANATIONS.

RHETORIC.—ORATORY.—ELOQUENCE.—RHETORICIAN AND ORATOR.

RHETORIC, according to Quintilian, is the science of speaking well. It attempts to produce conviction concerning some particular object, that it may influence the will to a corresponding determination. It seeks either to arouse the mind to action, or to dissuade it from acting upon the resolutions already taken, or such as are in contemplation. Its immediate employment is not to search after truth, but to render acknowledged and supposed truths influential. It leaves to logic the province of cool investigation, and of drawing legitimate conclusions from admitted premises, without any regard to motives. The rhetorician is solicitous to effect some particular purpose, and calls in the art of reason merely as an auxiliary. He attempts to influence the will by reasoning with the affections; knowing that if they be gained over, the will is ready to follow. He therefore artfully conceals, or slightly passes over every circumstance which is not favorable to his views, and brings forward, and largely expatiates upon those

which are. He suggests motives of pleasure, utility, safety, honor, and pity, as the subject admits. He not only presupposes the object in view to be of primary importance, but he employs every method to implant this conviction in the minds of those whom he endeavors to persuade. These attempts become most successful by a close imitation of that train of ideas, and those modes of expression which any particular passion or affection is prone to suggest. If the design be to excite anger and resentment, rhetoric imitates the language of anger. It places the supposed offence in the strongest point of view, and describes it in the most vivid colors. It assiduously collects, and expatiates upon every circumstance which contributes to the aggravation of the crime. Should compassion be the object, it enlarges upon the wretched state of the sufferer; his fears, his apprehensions, and his penitence. It palliates his faults, extols his good qualities, and thus collects, in one point of view, all his claims on commiseration. The species of argument which persons under the influence of passion and strong affections perpetually adopt, is rendered more efficacious by appropriate language. The rhetorician, therefore, studies and imitates the particular language of each passion, either in its energy, vivacity, or diffuseness. Hence, he liberally employs all those tropes and figures of speech which nature suggests and art has classified.

Oratory may be defined *oral* eloquence; or the art of communicating, by the immediate action of the vocal and expressive organs, to popular assemblies, the dictates of our reason, or our will, and the workings of our passions,

our feelings, and our imaginations. Oratory includes the idea of eloquence: for no man can be an orator who does not possess an affluence of thought and language. But eloquence does not necessarily include the idea of oratory; since a man may be rich in all the stores of language and of thought without possessing the advantages of a graceful and impressive delivery. Oratory is, therefore, the name of a more complex idea; and includes, besides the general notion of eloquence, the practical part of *elocution*. Eloquence may be considered as the soul, or animating principle of discourse; and is dependent on intellectual energy and intellectual attainments. Elocution is the embodying form, or representative power; dependent on exterior accomplishment and cultivation of the organs. Oratory is the complicated and vital existence resulting from the perfect harmony and combination of the two.

Oratory adapts the manner of delivery to the nature of the subject; it takes the characteristic signs of each emotion for its model, as far as it can safely imitate without the imputation of mimicry. It enters into the attitudes, gestures, tones of voice, accents, emphasis, expressions of circumstance, influenced by the particular emotion, in such a manner that not an idea is suffered to lose its proper effect; and thus it enjoys every advantage to be derived from the power of sympathy.

Eloquence may be defined, the art of expressing our thoughts and feelings with precision, force, and elegance; and of heightening the impressions of reason by the colorings of imagination. It is applicable, therefore, to the whole faculty of verbal discourse, either oral or written. It addresses itself by the pen, to the

eye, as well as by the living organs to the ear. Thus we speak, with admitted accuracy, of an eloquent book, as freely as of an eloquent oration; of the eloquent Buffon, alluding to his celebrated work on Natural History; and of the eloquent writings as well as the eloquent speeches of Edmund Burke. The apostrophe to the Queen of France is as genuine a piece of eloquence as if it had been delivered in the House of Commons.

Eloquence, according to its modern acceptation, appears to be the medium between the *impetuosity* which oratory admits, and which was highly characteristic of ancient oratory, and the studied artifice of the professed rhetorician. The term is sometimes applied to *composition*, and sometimes to *delivery*. When applied to both, it comprehends a certain degree of eloquence, both of diction and manner. The want of that energy which approaches to violence is compensated by pertinency of language, fluency of utterance, and guarded chastity of address. In a word, its excellency consists in a pleasing adaptation of language to the subject, and of manner to both. It refuses too close an imitation of the turbid emotions, but delights in beautiful and animated description. It appears best adapted to the pathetic; and the elegance and graces which it loves, harmonize most easily and successfully with the softest and finest feelings of our nature.

The Rhetoricians (Ῥήτορες) among the Athenians were originally *ten* in number, elected by lots to plead public causes in the senate-house or assembly; and for every cause in which they were retained, they received a drachm out of the public exchequer. They were sometimes called Συνηγόροι, and their fee το συνηγορικόν.

According to the Scholiast upon Aristophanes, no man was admitted to this office till he was forty years of age. Nor were they elected until their valor in war, piety to their parents, prudence in the management of affairs, and their frugality and temperance had been examined. The rule, however, with regard to age, was abrogated about the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war. In process of time these orators were elevated above the Archons, and armed with a virtual control over the legislative department of the state, as we learn from the eighth section of the second Olynthiac oration of Demosthenes. They were frequently promoted to some regular official rank, as presidents over the exchequer, and ambassadors to foreign powers.

Orators (or *Σύνδικοι*) were certain officers, *ten* in number, created after the expulsion of the thirty tyrants. From an oration of Lysias in behalf of Nicias, it appears that they were invested with power to take cognizance of all complaints relative to the confiscation of property. They had also to defend the ancient laws in the name of the people, by whom they were appointed; and to plead in support of any law which was to be abrogated or enacted. These men, though differing from the *ἑταροεῖς* and *σύνηγοροι*, were sometimes designated by the same names. And lest this office, which was created for the benefit of the commonwealth, should be abused to the private advantage of particular men, a law was enacted (*Demost. in Leptin.*), by which the people were prohibited from conferring it twice upon the same person.

With regard to the words *Rhetorician* and *Orator*, it

may be remarked, that the Greeks subsequently used the former to express both those who taught the art, and such as practised it, yet the Romans afterwards, when they adopted that word into their language, confined it to the *teachers* of the art, and called the rest *orators*.

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ELEMENTS OF ORATORY.

CHAPTER I.

Of the Education of the Future Orator.

- I. Nature is not so much wanting to children as care. II. What kind of persons nurses, parents, tutors, and boys, with whom the future orator is to be educated, ought to be. III. The Greek language to be first learned. IV. Boys can learn before they are seven years of age. V. Of reading and writing.

I. AT the birth of a son, let a father conceive the best hopes respecting him; and, therefore, he will be more careful *from the beginning*.* For it is a false complaint, that few are endowed with the power of comprehending those things in which they are instructed; and that most children waste away their time and application through dullness of apprehension. On the contrary, you may find many of *quick invention*,† and prompt to learn.‡ Such is the picture of man's nature. And as the destination of birds is for flying, of horses

* *A principiis*, from the first elements.

† *Faciles in excogitando*, easy in collecting or devising thought.

‡ *Ad discendum promptos*, ready to learn.

for the swiftness of course, of wild beasts for a ferocious propensity, so, from the agency and acute reflections of the mind, being properly adapted to rational beings, we infer that the origin of the soul is celestial. But the dull,* and they who cannot learn,† are no more produced according to the order of human nature, than preternatural bodies. Very few examples, however, of this sort occur. And from the sprightliness we perceive in their tender years, which is suffered to decay, it is manifest, that care is more wanting to children than nature. I admit that the intellectual powers of one are superior to those of another;‡ but culture effects more or less; and no one can be found, but has acquired something by study. Let, therefore, the parent, who is persuaded of this, use all his diligence to forward the hopes of a future orator.

II. The selection of nurses,§ characterized by purity and propriety of language, should be a primary consideration. These Chrysippus|| desired, if practicable,

* *Hebetes*, dull, in the Latin text, is opposed to *faciles in excogitando*, and

† *Indociles*, who cannot learn, to *ad discendum promptos*.

‡ *Præstat tamen ingenio alius alium, concedo*, I admit that the genius of one excels that of another.

§ Quintilian, (or Tacitus,) in the dialogue *de Oratoribus*, says: "A nurse or matron was selected whose life and manners rendered her worthy of that office; and to whom the children were committed. She not only superintended their instruction, but, with an equal modesty and gravity, regulated their very amusements and recreations. Thus Cornelia, Amelia, and Attica, mothers to the Gracchi, Julius Cæsar, and Augustus are reported to have employed themselves in the education of noblemen's children."

|| *Chrysippus*, a celebrated Stoic philosopher and scholar of Zeno. He was a native of Tarsus, a city of Cilicia, and is reported to have written

to be learned, or at least, as far as circumstances would permit, of an irreproachable character. Their morals are first to be examined; and next, the proper pronunciation of their words; for these are the first the child hears, and it is their words his imitation will strive to form. We are naturally most tenacious of those things which we have acquired in our tender years: new vessels retain the odor of their first ingredients; and the dye by which wool loses its primitive whiteness, can never be *defaced*.* The more vicious the propensities are, the more stubbornly do they adhere. Good is easily changed into bad, but how can you convert vice into goodness? Let not, therefore, the child, even while an infant, accustom himself to a manner of speech which he must subsequently unlearn.

Parental erudition will also facilitate the progress of the future orator. Nor do I speak of fathers only; for we know that Cornelia,† the mother of the Gracchi, from the profound learning contained in her letters, contributed greatly to their eloquence. The daughter

more than seven hundred volumes. He died in the 143d Olympiad, and had a monument erected to his memory among those of the illustrious Athenians. See *Horace*, lib. i. Sat. 3, v. 127; *nec non* lib. ii. Sat. 3, v. 44; *Laërt.*, lib. vii.; *Cic. Acad. Quæst.*, lib. iv.

* *Elui*, be washed out.

† This was the noble Roman matron who was once visited by a lady, who, having displayed her own jewels, requested to see Cornelia's. The request was evaded until the return of her children, when, presenting them, she feelingly exclaimed, "*These are my jewels!*"

Cicero says that the Gracchi were educated *non tam in gremio quam in sermone matris*.

See also Cicero, *in Brutum*, concerning Cornelia, and the daughter of Lælius, 211.

of Lælius is also reported, in her usual conversation, to have copied the elegance of her father's style; and the speech of the daughter of Quintus Hortensius,* before the Triumviri,† was not only honorable to her own sex, but creditable even to ours. Those, however, who are unlearned, ought not, on this account, to manifest less care for their children's instruction; but, on the contrary, should exhibit greater diligence with regard to every particular part.

The same observations concerning nurses are equally applicable to those boys in whose company the future orator shall be educated.

The chief care must be in the selection either of skilful *tutors*,‡ or of such as are conscious that their abilities are inconsiderable. For nothing is more despicable than the infatuation of those who, having advanced a little beyond the first elements, consider themselves learned. They think it derogatory to yield to the experienced, and, inflated with an idea of authority, the common failing of their kind, they become violent and imperious, and, under this influence, utter

* "When a heavy tax was imposed on the Order of Matrons by the Roman senate, and no one could be found who would advocate their cause, Hortensia appeared before the Triumviri, and pleaded with so much eloquence in behalf of her sex, that a large part of the tribute was remitted."—*Valerius Maximus*, lib. viii. cap. 3.

† Cæsar Octavius, Mark Antony, and Lepidus.

‡ *De pædagogis*. Among the Romans, such as were free of the city were distinguished into *Ingenui*, *Libertini*, and *Liberti*. The *Ingenui* were such as had been born free, and of parents that had been always free. The *Libertini* were the children of such as had been made free. And the *Liberti* such as had been actually made free themselves. Now pedagogues were generally selected from the *Liberti*; and their duty was *originally*, as the word imports, (*ex παῖσι*, puer, et ἄγω, duco,) to

their habitual folly. Their exceptionable course is no less prejudicial to morals; for, according to the testimony of the Babylonian Diogenes,* Leonidas, the tutor of Alexander, imbued his mind in childhood with certain vices, from which that great and powerful king could not entirely extricate himself in more advanced years.

If I appear to any one to require too much, let him consider how arduous a matter it is to form an orator; for even if none of those things to which I have alluded were wanting to his formation, still more difficult things remain. Constant study, the most experienced masters, and frequent instructions, are indispensably necessary. Let him, therefore, be instructed in the best things, and if any one shall consider this an embarrassment, the fault must not be attributed to the method, but to the instructor.

Now should the children and nurses happen not to be such as I would desire, at least let a teacher, well versed in language, be in constant attendance, and instantly correct those words which may be improperly pronounced by them, in his pupil's presence, in order that he may not be suffered to contract such a habit. But that which I previously stated must be understood to be good, and this a remedy.

accompany the children of the *Ingenui* to school and to their exercises; to superintend their behavior, and protect them from injury. And hence Plautus: "*Servum unà mittit, qui olim à puero parvulo mihi pædagogus fuerat.*"

* The Babylonian Diogenes here mentioned was a Stoic philosopher, and associated with Carneades and Critolaus in their famous embassy to Rome. He succeeded Zeno in his school.

III. I would advise the pupil to begin with the study of Greek: because he will necessarily acquire the Latin, which is in common use: and as our accidence has been derived from the Greeks, he should be first instructed in theirs. This, however, ought not to be so strictly observed as that (according to the custom of many) he should speak or learn nothing for a considerable time except Greek: for, by foreign sounds, improper accents and a corrupt manner of speech will ensue; and a long practice of a Greek idiom* cannot be laid aside, even in speaking a different language. The Latin, therefore, must soon follow, and both in a short time proceed together: so that when we equally improve in both languages, *the one will not be hurtful to the other.*†

IV. Some writers were of opinion that children under seven years of age should not be induced to learn; because that age can neither conceive the meaning of methods, nor endure the labor of study. Many authors report, who lived before the time of Aristophanes,‡ the grammarian, that Hesiod§ was of this opinion. For he was the first who denied that the

* By a *Greek figure*, in the Latin text, (*Græcae figuræ*,) is understood a manner and form of speaking peculiar to the Greeks, and not adapted to the Latin idiom.

† *Neutra alteri officiat.*

‡ A grammarian of Byzantium, and scholar of Callimachus. He is described by Suidas.

§ Hesiod was a native of Ascra in Bæotia, and hence he is called by the poets *Ascraeus*, and *Ascraeus senex*. Two only of his poems, which are reputed genuine, have reached our times; the one entitled *Works and Days*, and the other *The Theogony, or Birth of the Gods*.

ὑποθήκας,* in which book this precept was found, was the production of this poet. Eratosthenes,† among others, inculcated a similar maxim. But I concur with Chrysippus and those who desire that no time ought to be exempted from its fostering care: for, although he has assigned three years to nurses, yet he decides that even the infantile mind may be moulded by their excellent instructions. And why may not years, in which manners are formed, be improved also by learning? Nor am I ignorant that one year afterwards may contribute as much as all the time of which I speak will scarcely be able to effect: nevertheless, those who agree with me, seem, in this respect, not so much to have spared the learner as the teacher. What better can they do, as soon as they are able to speak? For they must necessarily do something, and why should we despise this gain, however little, until seven years are expired? For, although the advantage of the first years may be inconsiderable, a boy will, nevertheless, learn greater matters that very year in which he has learned less. These yearly advances will at length amount to something considerable; and the time improved in infancy will be an acquisition to youth. The same precepts may be applicable to the following years, in order that whatever should be learned may not be learned too late. Let us, therefore, not lose this first time; and

* ὑποθήκας, *Precepts*.

† *Eratosthenes*, a native of Cyrene. He was a philosopher, poet, historian, and astronomer, and scholar of Aristo and Callimachus, the poet. He was predecessor to Apollonius in Ptolemy's library at Alexandria. Longinus on the Sublime, section xxxiii., says: "Is Eratosthenes, whose little poem of Erigone is faultless throughout, to be deemed superior to Archilochus?"—See *Stobæus*, serm. 44.

more especially because the elements of learning depend chiefly upon memory, which in children is very retentive.

Nor am I so inexperienced with regard to the management of tender years, as to think that a rigid discipline ought to be exercised over children, and that a prescribed task should be exacted. For great care must be taken that the child, who is not yet able to love study, should not hate it; and that the aversion which he had once entertained may not deter him in more advanced years. To him study ought to be made an amusement: let the master ask him questions, and praise him; and let him be induced to take pleasure in his own little acquirements. Should he sometimes refuse to learn, teach another before him, whom he may rival. Let them contend, in the meantime, with each other, and let him fancy that he has frequently the advantage on his side. Let him also be allured by rewards, which are a very prevailing argument with children.

Instructions on subjects so inconsiderable may appear to depreciate our grand design of forming the orator; but all studies have their infancy; and as the bringing up of the strongest bodies takes a beginning from milk and a cradle, so he who may hereafter be most distinguished for eloquence experienced a period of imbecility. His first articulations were a jargon of half-formed words, and the figures of the alphabet struck him with amazement. And because the learning of a trivial matter is perhaps of no great consequence, shall it therefore be said that it is not necessary? And if no one censures a father for not neglecting the

least trifles with regard to his son's education, shall it be considered exceptionable if any one should publish the good regulations of his family to benefit others by his example? Add, moreover, that these little matters are better adapted to children's capacities, and as bodies cannot be formed to certain flexures of the joints except when young, so the mind, unless made pliable in tender years, becomes so callous with age as to be subsequently unfit for many things. Would Philip, king of the Macedons, have his son Alexander* instructed in the first elements of learning by Aristotle,† the greatest philosopher of the age? Or would he (Aristotle) have undertaken that office had he not considered it a matter of the greatest importance to have the first principles of studies conducted by the most accomplished instructor? Let us therefore suppose that Alexander, a child deserving so much care, (although every one's child is equally dear to him,) is placed under my superintendence, should I be ashamed, even in the first rudiments, to point out some short methods of teaching?

I do not approve that course which is generally

* "Alexander was placed under the tuition of Aristotle at the age of thirteen."—*Gillies*.

† "Aristotle, a native of Stagira, came to Athens in his eighteenth year, 367 A. C. There he continued twenty years as the scholar of Plato, who died 348 A. C. Aristotle left Athens upon the death of his master, and spent three years at Atarnæus, and two at Mitylene. From thence he went to Macedon, in the forty-third year of his age, and 343 A. C. He was employed eight years in the education of Alexander. He returned to Athens 335 A. C.; taught twelve years in the Lyceum, and died the next year at Chalcis, at the age of sixty-three, A. C. 323, and a year after the death of Alexander."—*Dionys. of Hal. ad Ammæum*.

adopted by masters, of teaching children the names and order of letters before they are acquainted with their forms. For, by running over them by heart, and not applying the mind to their figures, their recognition is retarded. Teachers, on this account, when they have arranged the letters long enough, in their proper order in which they are usually first written, should have them all passed over backwards, and variously changed and shifted, until those who are instructed shall know them at first sight, and not by their order. In this manner they will be most accurately learned, and as exactly distinguished as different men by their different dress and names. But this precaution with regard to letters is not applicable to syllables. I exclude not also the custom of exciting children to learn by giving them ivory figures of letters for play; or any other invention more fascinating to that age, which may be amusing to handle, behold, or name.

When the alphabet shall have been learned in different positions,* it will be highly advantageous to have the letters accurately engraved on a plate, that the stylus† may be drawn through the furrows made in them. By this means no mistake will take place as in waxen tablets, (both sides having margins and deter-

* "Those who taught children to read and write were called *Literatores*, or *Γραμματισται*: to these they were committed about the age of six or seven years."—*Dacier in Horat.*, lib. i. sat. i.

† *Stylus*, a kind of pen, of wood or ivory, used by the ancients for writing most commonly on waxen tablets. With one end they wrote, and expunged with the other. It appears from this passage, that it was customary with the ancients to teach their children first to know the letters accurately, and immediately afterwards to write them. The same may be said of syllables and words.

minate bounds which cannot be passed;) and the child, by quickly and frequently following the impressed track, will strengthen the joints of his fingers, and not require the aid of a hand placed over his to direct him. The care of writing well and swiftly is no inconsiderable matter, though commonly neglected by the higher ranks. It is a great acquisition to study, and a good method will facilitate and accelerate its progress; whereas, to write slowly, is a hindrance and delay to thought. Misshaped and confused writing can neither be well read nor understood; and hence follows the additional labor of dictating the necessary corrections. He, therefore, who contracts the habit of a fair and well-proportioned hand, will, in many respects, experience its beneficial results; but more especially in transacting private business, and conducting his correspondence with his friends and acquaintances.

There is no compendious method for teaching syllables: they must all be learned perfectly;* and the most difficult, as is commonly done, should not be reserved for another time, that they may be known when children come to write words. They ought not to be committed to memory indiscriminately; frequent repetition will fix them in the mind to greater advantage; and the reading of them should not be rapid, unless when a plain and easy connection of the letters with each other shows that this can be effected without a delay of thought. Let the formation of words from syllables, and sentences from words, follow next. It is incredible how much haste retards reading: for those who attempt more than they are able, fall into doubts,

* *Syllabis nullum compendium est: perdiscendæ omnes.*

stammerings, and repetitions; and when they mistake, they are diffident even of those things which they know. Let, therefore, the first reading be distinct; the next connected, and slow for some time, until practice facilitates an exact readiness. For, to look to the right side is not only a method generally prescribed, but also used; and he who keeps in view what follows, must read, at the same time, what goes before; and what is most difficult, must divide the attention of the mind between his voice and eyes.*

Another thing requiring our care is this: when a boy begins, as is customary, to write words, he should not lose his labor in copying a vulgar and frivolous vocabulary. Because he may then learn, while otherwise employed, the interpretation of abstruse words, which the Greeks call γλωσσαι,† and with his first rudiments attain the knowledge of a thing which should afterwards require its own time.

And since we are still engaged in the discussion of inconsiderable matters, I would recommend copy-lines to consist not of idle sentences, but to inculcate some virtuous precept. The recollection will continue to old age, and the impression on a tender mind may prove conducive to moral life. The sayings, also, of illustrious men, and select passages from poets, (things very agreeable to children,) may be learned for amusement.‡

* *Intentio animi dividenda, ut aliud voce, aliud oculis agatur.*

† Quintilian himself, in the fifth chapter of this book, calls *Glossemata* words not in common use.

‡ Cicero tells Atticus, in his second book *de Legibus*, "that when they were boys they used to learn the famous laws of the Twelve Tables by heart, in the same manner as they did an excellent poem."

Memory, of which I shall speak in its proper place, is extremely necessary to an orator: it is chiefly strengthened and nourished by exercise; and in those years of which we now speak, which can produce nothing of themselves, it is almost the only thing which can be assisted by the care of *teachers*.*

But, in order that children may have their organs of speech adapted for a just pronunciation, it will not be improper to make them repeat, with the greatest celebrity, certain words and verses of an affected difficulty, chained together by a jumble and jingle of many harsh, hoarse, and jarring syllables.† They are called χαλεποί‡ in Greek. This may be called a matter of little significance, yet, through its omission, many faults in pronunciation, unless prevented in early life, *will ever after remain incorrigible*.§

* *Docentium.*

† As *perterricrepus*. Aristophanes uses the words σφαγιδονυχαργεκομητας and κομποφακελοῖζήμονα.

So also the old verse:

Fraxinè fixa ferox infesta infunditur ossis.—Cam.

‡ Χαλεποί, *difficult*.

§ *Incendabili in posterum pravitate durantur.*

CHAPTER II.

Is Public or Private Tuition for Children to be preferred?

- I. He refutes what is commonly objected against public schools, and is of opinion, 1. That they are not prejudicial to morals:—and here passes a severe censure on the pernicious indulgence of parents 2. That they are not hurtful to study. II. He demonstrates, by many arguments, the utility of schools.

As the boy grows up he must be insensibly allured from all infantile indulgence, and begin to learn in earnest. Here, therefore, is the place for discussing a question:—*Is a public or private education to be preferred? and which has the greater advantages?*

I. To the public, the greatest legislators and most eminent authors have given the preference. It must not, however, be concealed, that there are some, who, for certain particular motives, dissent from this almost universally received custom. These produce two principal reasons in support of their opinion. The first is, because they exhibit a greater care for morals by avoiding an association with those of the same age who may be ardently addicted to vice; and whose corrupt examples are the causes of all the irregularity we perceive in the conduct of others. I wish this complaint was false! The second, that a master can bestow more

time upon one than when divided among many. The first reason is entitled to great consideration; for if schools are profitable for learning, but prejudicial to morals, I should rather recommend the instruction of a child in upright life than in speaking eloquently. But these two particulars are intimately connected together: for I assert, that no one can be an orator except the good man;* and even if he could, it should not be with my permission. Let us, therefore, first examine this point.

1. These writers consider schools to be a nursery of vice: they are so sometimes, and a parent's house is equally the same: there are many examples of innocence lost and preserved in both places. Nature and education are the only particulars that constitute a difference between persons. Should a boy be inclined to vicious courses; should his tutors be negligent in forming his tender heart by virtuous sentiments, and watching carefully over all his actions, the most recluse life would not secure him from vice. His private tutor may be a man of depraved morals, and the conversation of wicked domestics may be as contagious as that of immodest *companions*.† But if his natural disposition is good, if his parents are not lulled into a blind indolence, *they may select for him a preceptor of un-*

* "This was a favorite position among the ancient rhetoricians:—*'Non posse oratorem esse nisi virum bonum.'* To find any such connection between virtue and one of the highest liberal arts, must give pleasure; and it can, I think, be clearly shown, that this is not a mere topic of declamation, but that the connection here alleged is undoubtedly founded in truth and reason."—*Blair*, lect. xxxiv.

† *Ingenuos.*

blemished integrity,* (which ought to be the principal care of prudent persons,) they may inure him to the strictest discipline; and they may likewise set over him some grave governor of mild persuasion, or some *faithful freedman*,† who shall constantly wait upon him, and whose presence will inspire with respect, and even improve in goodness, those whose company may have been suspected.

It would be easy, in this respect, to remedy our apprehensions. I wish we were not ourselves the corruptors of our children's morals. We first spoil their infant years with delicacies; and that soft education, which we call indulgence, enervates all the vigor of mind and body. What will not a grown-up child desire who walks softly in purple? He can scarcely articulate a few words, and yet exhibits a taste for *dress*,‡ and all the *refinements of the pleasures of the table*.§ The gratifications of their palates are more consulted than their morals. They grow up accustomed to the ease of litters and sedans; and when they alight they are upheld on both sides by the arms of officious attendants. We express pleasure at their enunciation of language of too licentious a character; and words which should not be permitted even at the

* *Et præceptorem eligere sanctissimum quemque.* It was customary with the Romans, particularly among those of distinguished rank, after their children were admitted to the grammar schools, and "after reason had displayed her faculties and established her command, to keep with them in the house some eminent preceptor or professor, to cultivate and adorn the advantages of nature."—*Ken. Rom. Antiq.*

† *Fidelem libertum.*

‡ *Coccus*, cochineal, is that granular insect with which scarlet is dyed.

§ *Conchylium poscit.*

Alexandrian festivals,* we receive with laughter and hisses. No wonder: we have taught, and they have heard from us. * * * * * The miserable children learn vice before they know it to be such; and thus dissolute and depraved, they rather introduce the infection into schools than receive it from them.

2. But, according to the second reason, a tutor who has only one pupil will bestow more time on his instruction. There is nothing, however, to prevent him who is educated in schools from having one. But if this could not be accomplished, I should prefer the broad day of a virtuous assembly to the obscurity and solitude of private families. For every distinguished *master*† desires to see himself surrounded by a large number of pupils, and thinks himself worthy of a more spacious theatre for the exertion of his abilities: whereas, those of an inferior character, from a consciousness of their insufficiency, attach themselves to one, and consider it not derogatory to assume the function of pedagogues. But should a person by interest, friendship, or money, employ at his house a master of the highest qualifications, can he spend the whole day upon one? Or can the application of his pupil be so unremitting as not to admit of fatigue, as it happens to the eyes long intent upon viewing an object? Add, moreover, that study

* Quintilian here alludes to the infamous sacrifices of Serapis, which were solemnized near Alexandria.

Serapis first taught the Egyptians to sow corn and plant vines: after his death they worshiped him in the form of an ox, a symbol of husbandry.

† *Præceptor*. The duties of *Præceptors* are thus defined by Dr. Patrick:—" *Præceptoribus artes et scientias docentibus.*" "The *Præceptors* teaching the arts and sciences."

requires solitude; for the master does not assist a child while he learns his lesson, writes, and meditates; the least interruption serving only to embarrass him. Nor does he, in every lesson, require the aid of reading and expounding: for when would the knowledge of so many authors be acquired? A short time is only required in order to prescribe his task for the whole day; and, therefore, the instructions which are imparted to one may be imparted to many; the nature of most things being such as to admit a communication to all by the same voice. I say nothing of rhetorical themes and declamations,* the whole of which, let the number be ever so great, each may take away with him. For the voice of a master, and a feast, are not similar cases. The feast diminishes in proportion to the greater number of guests; but the master's voice is like the sun, distributing equally its light and heat to all. Should a grammarian make dissertations on the nature of a language, should he solve the intricacies of a question, or clear up passages in poets or historians, will not as many learn as hear him?

But one master, it is said, cannot thoroughly examine a number of scholars, nor correct their compositions. I admit the difficulty, (for what subject is without difficulties?) but we shall soon compare this with its advantages.

I should not, however, advise a child to be sent to a

* *Taceo de partitionibus et declamationibus rhetorum.* The *Partitio* comprised the principal heads, or parts of a theme, composed and dictated by the master, as a subject for declamation, divided into its parts. *Declamatio* was the subject-matter, which the master having diligently prepared at home, either pronounced or dictated in school.

For *Themes*, see "Elements of Oratory," page 93.

school where he would be neglected. Nor ought a good master to burden himself with a greater number of pupils than he is able to teach: particular care ought also to be taken that this master may be a bosom friend,* and that his instruction proceed rather from the secret emotions of his affection than a sense of duty. By this means our children will never be confounded in an undistinguished crowd; and there is no master, however slightly imbued with learning, who will not, for his own credit, peculiarly cherish him in whom he perceives both application and genius. But if crowded schools should be avoided, (to which thing I do not assent, when the reputation of the master is the cause of the resort,) it does not follow that all schools must be avoided: for there is a wide difference between avoiding entirely and making a judicious selection.

II. Having refuted what is commonly objected against public schools, I shall now proceed to explain my own sentiments upon the subject. Above all, let the future orator, who must appear in the most solemn assemblies, and have the eyes of a whole republic fixed upon him, early accustom himself not to be abashed at facing a numerous audience; the reverse of

* Among the ancient Romans an extraordinary attachment existed between master and pupil. This feeling is beautifully portrayed by Persius, in his first Satire, to his instructor, Cornutus, the Stoic.

Juvenal also breaks out into that elegant rapture, Satire VII.:

Eternal springs and rising flowers adorn
The relics of each venerable urn:
Who pious reverence to their tutors paid,
As parents honored, and as gods obeyed.

which is a natural consequence of a recluse and sedentary life. His mind must be excited and kept in a state of constant elevation; otherwise, his mind will languish in solitude, and *contract a certain rust*,* as it were, in the shade: or, on the contrary, become puffed up with vanity; for he who compares himself to no one, must necessarily attribute too much to himself. And when he is afterwards obliged to make an exhibition of his acquirements, he is blind in daylight; everything is new to him; because he has learned in private what was to be transacted before the eyes of the world.

I make no mention of the firm and sincere friendships contracted at schools, and religiously preserved even to old age. Nothing is held so sacred; and to be fellow-students, is as much as to be initiated in the same mysteries. Where shall he learn what we call “common sense,”† when he sequesters himself from the society which is natural not only to men, but to the inferior animals. Add to this, that at home he can only learn those things in which he is instructed; but in schools he can learn what is imparted to others. He will daily hear his master approve one thing, correct another; reprimand the idleness of one, commend the diligence of another; the love of praise will excite his emulation; to yield to his equals will be a dishonor; to surpass his superiors, a glory. All these are incentives to young minds, and although ambition be a vice, it is often the cause of virtue.

* *Ducit situm.*

† Quintilian understands by “*sensus communis*,” a kind of knowledge and experience we insensibly acquire by our intercourse with men. Cicero calls it *common prudence*.

I recollect an excellent custom observed *by my masters*.^{*} They distributed the scholars into classes, and every one declaimed in his place, which was more advanced, according as he had excelled others, and made a greater progress. As judgment was to be passed on the performances, the contention was great for the respective degree of excellence; but to be the first of the class was esteemed by far the most honorable. Nor was this decision to continue always; for every thirtieth day renewed the contest, and gave the vanquished an opportunity to enter the lists again. He who had the superiority did not remit his care; and he who had been vanquished was full of hopes to wipe away disgrace. I am persuaded, that this furnished us with a more ardent desire, and a greater passion for learning, than all the advice of masters, *care of tutors*,[†] and wishes of parents.

But as nothing is so conducive for making a progress in learning as emulation, so beginners and children ought rather to rival their school-fellows than masters, their imitation, as easier, being more agreeable to them. For it is impossible that a child, who is in his first elements, should expect, all at once, to aspire to the eloquence of a man whom he reputes to have talents far superior to himself. He will, therefore, proportion himself to what is within his reach: as vines, planted close to trees, first catch and twine around the lower branches, and at last shoot up to the top. This truth may also be applicable to such masters as are more influenced by a desire of proving useful,

^{*} *A præceptoribus meis.*

[†] *Pædagogorum custodiam.*

than making a show of their talents; for in teaching children they ought not to overburden their weakness; but by intentionally lessening their own knowledge, adapt it to their intellects. Pour water quickly into a vessel of a narrow neck, little enters; pour it gradually, and by small quantities, it is filled; so we must see, with regard to children, how much they are able to receive. For things too elevated cannot have admission into minds not yet sufficiently open to receive them. It is therefore necessary that they should have objects of imitation until they are in a condition to excel, and thus we may hope that they will insensibly make a greater progress. To what has been said on this head I shall add this reflection.

A master who has only one pupil to instruct, can never infuse into his words that energy, spirit, and fire which he would if animated by a number of students. The force of eloquence has its seat in the soul: the soul must, then, be affected in a very lively manner; she must figure to herself the images of things; and she must transform herself, as it were, into the very nature of the subjects of which we speak. Now, the more noble and exalted the soul is, the more magnificent the object ought to be which should move her; her efforts give her a new supply of strength, and she seems to exult in great attempts. There is a secret disdain felt in lavishing upon one the powers of eloquence, acquired by so much labor: there is a shame attached to the elevation of a discourse above what is ordinary. And, indeed, let us conceive a man in the act of making a speech; his air, his voice, his gait, his pronunciation, his action, his transports, his fatigue,

and all for the instruction of a single person: would not his behavior seem in a great degree allied to madness? Undoubtedly, eloquence would never have existed if men had confined themselves to speak for one.

CHAPTER III.

I. By what signs the genius of children is discerned. II. How the learner's disposition is to be treated and managed. III. Of the amusements of children. IV. That children should not be whipped.

I. A SKILLFUL master,* who has a child placed under his care, must begin by investigating the character of his genius and natural disposition. Memory is the principal sign of a genius in children. Its qualities are twofold; an *easy conception and faithful retention*.† Next comes imitation, which indicates, in like manner, a docile nature, and ought to be so directed as not to affect the air, the garb, the gait, and the exceptionable ways of others; but rather to express and represent exactly those things which it learns. I can, indeed, entertain but faint hopes of the powers of that child's mind, who, for the desire of imitation, should strive to render himself ridiculous. For the truly ingenious can be no other than the virtuous; and the

* *Peritus docendi.*

† *Facile percipere, et fideliter continere.*

slow genius is, in my opinion, a degree above the vicious. But the virtuous will stand at a very great distance from the dull and groveling. The child of whom I form to myself an idea, will easily learn all that is imparted to him: sometimes he may ask little questions, but will rather follow than run before. That sort of talent which seems precocious seldom arrives at perfection. Those who possess it are prompt at executing little things; and, with an air of decision, show all their knowledge at once. This is perceptible when they are learning to read; for, without hesitation, and not deterred by the shame of their mistakes, they join words together and confound the sense. Their promptness, however, is not of much consequence; because they have no real strength to invigorate them, nor sufficiently deep roots to be a support and nurture to their growth. Such is the sudden sprouting of seeds cast upon the surface of the ground; or blades of corn which grow yellow before the harvest with only empty ears. These superficial acquirements, compared with children's years, may be applauded; but our admiration diminishes at beholding this proficiency suddenly at a stand.

II. When the master shall have made these observations upon a child, the next thing which falls under consideration is the management of his disposition. Some are indolent unless urged on, others refuse subjection; some are restrained by fear, others are discouraged: assiduity improves some, others learn by "*fits and starts*."* But let the boy be entrusted to my

* *In aliis plus impetus facit.*

care whom praise excites, who is delighted with glory, and who weeps when vanquished. He will be influenced by these noble sentiments: a reproach will sting him to the quick; a sense of honor will arouse him: in him sloth need never be dreaded.

III. Children, however, must be allowed some relaxation, not only because there is nothing capable of enduring continued labor, which is verified even in bodies without sense and life, which cannot preserve their force unless recruited by alternate rest; but also, because the desire of learning is placed in the will, which cannot bear constraint. When, therefore, they have refreshed themselves by recreation, they return with new vigor to their studies, and their minds, which, under other circumstances, would spurn the yoke of compulsion, become more tractable, and have clearer conceptions. I am not displeased at play in children: it is a sign of their vivacity; but the boy whom I observe to be always gloomy and downcast, affords no great expectations of a sprightly disposition for study, because he is insensible to that ardor for play which is so natural to those of his age. There must, however, be proper bounds to their sports: deny them play they hate study; allow them too much, they acquire a habit of idleness. There are some useful amusements for sharpening the mental powers of children; such as proposing little questions, which they eagerly endeavor to solve. Play also discovers more easily their moral character; and hence it may appear that there is no age, though ever so infirm, but is capable of receiving the impression of good and evil; and that more espe-

cially, at that period, attention should be directed to its culture, while unacquainted with the arts of dissimulation, and pliable in the hands of a teacher. It is easier to break than to amend what is hardened in depravity. A child, therefore, cannot be too soon admonished to restrain his passions, to abandon his pernicious practices, and to unlearn his capricious humor of acting inconsiderately; and they who have the care of him should always keep in mind this sentence of Virgil:*

—*Adeo teneris consuescere multum est.*

Such is the force of custom in tender years.

IV. Whipping children is a thing I greatly dislike, though authorized by custom and approved by Chrysippus. First, because this mode of punishment appears to be mean, servile, and, as all will admit, a flagrant insult on more advanced years. Secondly, should a child be of so abject a disposition as not to correct himself when reprimanded, he will be as hardened against stripes as the vilest slave. And lastly, should a master exact from his pupil an account of his study, there would be no necessity to have recourse to this extremity. It is his neglect which most commonly causes the scholar's punishment, who is not obliged to comply with his duty, and for not having done so, must be chastised. Now should there be no other way of correcting a child except whipping, what shall be done when, a grown up youth, he is under no apprehension of such punishment, and must learn greater and more

* *Georg.*, ii. v. 272.

difficult things? * * * * * I shall enlarge no farther upon this subject: it is too much that I am understood. Let this, however, be sufficient to announce, that no one should be permitted to lean too heavily on an age, so infirm, and so exposed to injuries.

I shall now begin to speak of the arts in which the future orator should be instructed, and of those things which are requisite for him to do and learn in every stage of life.

CHAPTER IV.

*Of Grammar.**

I. Eulogium on grammar. II. Speech, to be perfect, ought to be correct, clear, and elegant. III. It is founded on reason, antiquity, authority, and custom. IV. Of orthography.

I. As soon as a boy is instructed to read and write, he should be sent to the grammar school. It is a

* "Almost all the principles which are now reduced into arts were formerly dispersed and dissipated. Thus in grammar; *the reading of poets, an acquaintance with history, the import of words, and a certain manner of articulation*; all these were formerly unknown, or they seemed too widely dissipated to be reduced into a system."—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. i. cap. 42.

From this passage of Cicero, and others interspersed throughout the Classics, it appears that the ancients, by the study of grammar, understood the study of what we designate the *Belles lettres*.

matter of little consequence whether he begins with Greek or Latin, although I prefer the former; but the way that leads to the one leads also to the other. Grammar, divided into two parts, comprises “the art of *speaking correctly*, and the *interpretation of poets*.” By this division more is to be understood than is expressed; for the *art of writing* is properly joined with that of speaking; *a correct method of reading* precedes the interpretation of poets, and with all these is blended *Criticism*.* In this last respect the ancient grammarians have acted so severely as to stigmatize some passages in poets as extremely faulty, and to treat books which seemed falsely ascribed to certain authors, as spurious children in a family, who had no right of inheritance with the legitimate. Some other writers they reduced into a better form; while others they entirely excluded from their number.

It is not sufficient to be well versed in the poets; every sort of writers should be examined, not only on account of the incidents of history which occur, but also for the purpose of furnishing ourselves with a variety of expressions which frequently receive authority from their authors. Grammar, likewise, cannot be perfect without music, since it must describe measures and numbers,† nor can any one understand the poets without a knowledge of astronomy; who, to

* *Judicium*. The object of criticism is to judge what is beautiful, and what is faulty in every performance. The Greeks designated this *art κριτικὴν*.

† *Measure* consists, in Quintilian’s sense, in a proportion of time, and certain order of feet. *Number*, in a proportion of time, but not in the order of feet.

specify the vicissitudes of times and seasons, so frequently mention the rising and setting of constellations. Nor should he be ignorant of philosophy; an acquaintance with which is necessary for explaining many passages in all such poems as enter into an elaborate discussion of some very abstruse natural questions. Empedocles among the Greeks, and Varro and Lucretius among the Latins, who wrote philosophical systems in verse, contribute essentially to make this science necessary. Eloquence crowns the work, and assists us to illustrate whatever has been demonstrated, with a propriety and copiousness of diction. It is, therefore, manifest, that no regard should be paid to those who cavil at this art, and consider it *as poor and trifling*.* It is the sure foundation of an orator, and, without it, any superstructure will unavoidably fall to the ground. It is necessary to youth, pleasant to more advanced years, the sweet companion of private hours, and the only one of all our studies which possesses more solidity than ostentation. * * * *

II. Now, as every speech should possess these three qualifications, of being *correct, clear, and elegant*, (because a *justness of expression*, the chief beauty of discourse, is comprehended under elegance,) so there are many opposite imperfections, into which the rule of correct speaking, the first part of grammar, must examine. * * * *

III. To speak and to write well require different rules. *Speaking* is founded on reason, antiquity, au-

* *Ut tenuem ac jejunam.*

thority, and use. *Reason* depends chiefly on *analogy*, and sometimes on *etymology*. A certain majesty, and, as I may say, religion, recommends *antiquity*. *Authority* is founded on orators and historians; for the necessity of measure excuses poets, unless when two words are equally adapted to the harmony of the verse, they prefer one to the other. Several examples occur in Virgil:* as,—*Imo de stirpe recisum:—Ærice quo congestère palumbes:†—Silice in nudâ connixa reliquit.‡* Their imitation, however, may not be improper; because the judgment of men of distinguished eloquence stands for a sufficient reason, and to go astray with such excellent guides, is honorable. *Use* or *custom*, however, is the best teacher of language; and, as money, to be current, requires to be struck from the die of the state, so language, to be received, requires the consent of the learned. * * * *

Ancient words§ have not only zealous advocates, but they also confer a certain majesty and delight upon discourse; for, together with the authority of antiquity, they charm, from being disused, by an air of novelty. We must, however, be very cautious how we use them; for often adopted, they become too remarkable; and nothing is more odious than affectation. Nor would I have them drawn from the remotest periods, and now entirely obliterated from our minds: such are *Topper*,|| and *antigerio*,¶ and *exanclare*, and *prosapia*, and the poems of the Salii, which are scarcely understood by their own priests. Religion has prohibited their alteration, and we must use them as consecrated things.

* *Æn.*, xii. 208.

§ *Verba a vetustate repetita.*

† *Ecl.*, iii. 69.

|| *Cũo.*

‡ *Ibid.*, i. 15.

¶ *Valde.*

But how faulty will a discourse be whose chief qualification is perspicuity, should it want an interpreter? Therefore, as the best of new words are such as have already been used by the learned, so the best of the ancient are those which have the beauty of novelty.

A similar course may be adopted with regard to *authority*; for, although it is not improper to use the manner of expression of illustrious authors, yet we should consider not so much what they have said, as what they have persuaded. For who among us could bear *tuburchinabundum* and *lurchinabundum*, though Cato's authority may be cited for their use. A similar judgment may be passed on the *hos lodices* of Pollio, the *gladiola* of Messala, the *parricidatum* of Cælius, and the *collos* of Calvus: all which expressions these authors, if now existing, would reject.

Use or custom remains to be examined. And here it appears somewhat ridiculous that any persons should prefer the ancient to the modern manner of speech. This *ancient manner of speech*, what is it but the ancient custom of speaking? But it must be judged and determined what is to be understood by the word *custom*. If the appellation is received from what is accomplished by many, it will be productive of very dangerous consequences, not only to language, but (what is a more important consideration) to the conduct of life. What is it that adds to our happiness? Is it not to behold the world improved in goodness? If pernicious examples now prevail,* if the taste of the city is for adopt-

* *Igitur ut velli*. By *velli*, in the Latin text, is understood an effeminate practice among the Romans, of plucking out the hair in order to make their skin smooth.—See *Juvenal and Persius*.

ing the effeminacy of adjusting the hair into ringlets,* shall these, and similar vices, be reputed the custom, though they may universally prevail? No, not one of them is free from reprehension. But to bathe, to shave, to participate of the pleasures of the table in virtuous company is a custom; and so with regard to language; follow the general manner, and your language will be corrupt; you will discover a thousand improprieties in the mouths of the vulgar and the ignorant; the theatres,† and all the public places‡ in the city ring with barbarisms. I shall, therefore, call the

* *Et comam in gradus frangere.*

† *Tota sæpe theatra.* Theatres, so called from the Greek *θεατρον*, to see, owe their original to Bacchus. They were usual in several parts of Greece; and were afterwards, as other institutions, borrowed by the Romans. In the first ages of the commonwealth they were only temporary, and composed of wood, which, according to Pliny, sometimes tumbled down with great destruction. The most celebrated of these temporary theatres was that of M. Scaurus, the *cavea* of which had seats for 80,000 men.

Pompey the Great was the first who raised a fixed theatre. Some remains of this theatre are still to be seen at Rome, as also those of Marcellus, Statilius Taurus, Tiberius, and Titus.—*Vide Fabricii Rom.*, cap. 12; *Plin.*, lib. 36, cap. 15.

‡ *Et omnem circi turbam.* The Circi were places set apart for the cultivation of several sorts of games. They were generally oblong, or almost in the shape of a bow, having a wall quite around, with ranges of seats for the convenience of the spectators.

There were several of these Circi at Rome, as those of Flaminius, Nero, Caracalla, and Severus; but the most remarkable was *Circus Maximus*, built by Tarquinius Priscus, with seats for 150,000 men. It was extremely beautiful, and adorned by succeeding princes, particularly by Julius Cæsar, Augustus, Caligula, Domitian, Trajan, and Helio-gabalus; and enlarged to such an extent, as to be able to contain, in their proper seats, 260,000 spectators.—See *Plin.*, lib. 36; *Liv.*, et *Dionys. Hal.*

genuine custom of speaking the consent of the learned; as that of living, the approbation of the good.

Now, since we have described the rule of speaking, we shall add a few words on that of writing. The Greeks call it orthography, and we the science of writing correctly. Unless custom should direct otherwise, I would have every word written as pronounced: for the use and object of letters are to preserve sounds, and to exhibit them faithfully to the eyes of the reader, as a pledge committed to his charge. They ought, therefore, to express what we have to say.

These are chiefly the two parts of grammar, which treat of speaking and writing correctly: I deprive not grammarians of the other two, adapted for speaking with force and elegance; but shall reserve them for a greater part of this work, in which I intend to explain the functions of a rhetorician.

But some may consider what I have hitherto said, as too trifling, and an obstacle to my greater design. I do not, indeed, believe that the orator should descend to all the insignificant niceties of grammar; for their study would embarrass the conceptions of his mind, and dull the vivacity of his genius. But nothing of grammar can be injurious, except its superfluities. Was Marcus Tullius less the orator for his exact observance of the precepts of this art? And did he not charge his son (as appears from his Epistles) to be rigidly instructed in the propriety of language? Did Cæsar's books of *Analogy* weaken his manly thought and expression? Or is Messala *less elegant** because he com-

* *Minus nitidus.*

posed whole volumes, not only on words, but even letters? This knowledge is only prejudicial to those who make it a particular study; but not to him who cursorily considers it with a view to other acquirements.

CHAPTER V.

What books are proper for children to read, and the method of teaching them to read.

I NOW proceed to reading, which cannot be properly directed by any determinate rules: experience being the only method for informing a child where he is to draw breath, where he must divide the verse, where the sense begins and ends; when the voice is to be raised and lowered, and when it is to be changed and bent into a quick or slow, vehement or gentle tone. There is one thing, however, I recommend in this respect; and this is, that the child may be made to understand what he reads. Let, therefore, his reading be manly, tempered with a mixture of gravity and sweetness; not indeed, in the tone of prose, as it is a poem, and poets show that they observe harmonic proportion: still it should not retain (as now generally practised) the mo-

dulation of an air of music; nor should it be thrilled* into effeminate softness. These affected strains in reading were censured by Cæsar while *very young*:† “If you sing,” said he, “you sing badly; if you read you sing.”‡ Nor do I desire Prosopopœias§ to be pronounced, according to some, in a theatrical manner; there should, however, be a slight inflection of the voice, in order to distinguish between what the poet says, and what he makes others say.

There are other things which require precaution; and chiefly, that the tender and untutored minds of children, as yet susceptible of deep impressions, should be imbued, not only with what is beautiful and eloquent, but in a greater degree with what is good and honest. The reading, therefore, of Homer and Virgil first, was wisely instituted, although to understand their beauties, is the work of a more mature judgment: but there will be time enough to accomplish this object,

* *Plasma*, in the Latin text, is interpreted by some, a potion to remove hoarseness, and mellow the voice: *Liquido cum plasmate guttur mobile collueris.*—*Pers.*, sat. i. 17. Others suppose it means an affected softness and delicacy of voice:

Vocem eliquat, et tenero supplantat verba palato.—*Pers.*

† *Adhuc prætextatum.* The *Toga Prætexta* was a white robe reaching down to the ankles, with a border of purple around the edges, in allusion to which the Greeks call it *περιπρόφυγον*. Dacier on Horace, lib. v. ode 5, says: “The boys, till they were thirteen years old, wore a sort of vest with sleeves, which they called *Alicata Chlamys*, and then left off that to put on the *Prætexta*, which they did not change till they had reached the age of puberty, or the seventeenth year. Persius, in his fifth Satire, calls it *custos purpura*.

‡ *Si cantas, male cantas; si legis cantas.*

§ Speeches put into the mouths of the different characters in a poem.

as they will be read frequently. The majesty of heroic poetry will, in the meantime, give them an elevation of thought; the magnitude of the subject will inspire them with noble conceptions; and their hearts will be improved by the best precepts.

*Tragedy** and *Lyric*† poetry are also conducive to

* *Utiles Tragædiæ.* Tragedy, (from *τράγος*, a goat, joined to *ὠδή*, a song,) the song of the goat, and Comedy, (from *κώμη*, a village, and *ὠδή*, a song,) the song of the village, sufficiently indicate the humility of their first original. A goat, as the particular enemy of the vine, was very properly sacrificed to Bacchus, whose praises composed the song. They originated amidst the sacrifices and joyous festivities of the vintage; and during the entertainments of a season peculiarly dedicated to recreation and pleasure, the susceptible minds of the Greeks naturally yielded to two propensities congenial to men in such circumstances, a desire to *exercise their sensibility*, and a disposition to *amuse their fancy*. Availing himself of the former, the sublime genius of Æschylus, the father of tragedy, improved the song of the goat into a regular dramatic poem, agreeing with the Iliad and Odyssey in those unalterable rules of design and execution which are essential to the perfection of every literary performance.

As tragedy was introduced in imitation of the more serious spectacles of the Dionysian festival, so *Comedy*, which soon followed, was owing to the more light and ludicrous parts of that solemnity. Tragedy is the imitation of an important and serious action, adapted to affect the sensibility of the spectators, and to gratify their natural propensity to fear, to weep, and to wonder. Terror and pity have, in all ages, been regarded as the mainsprings of tragedy; because the laws of sensibility, founded solely in nature, are always the same.

Comedy is the imitation of a light and ludicrous action, adapted to amuse the fancy and to gratify the natural disposition of men to laughter and merriment.—*Gillies' Greece*, chap. xiii.

† *Alunt et Lyrici.* Lyric poetry, or the *Ode*, imports that the verses are accompanied by a lyre, or musical instrument. This distinction was not, at first, peculiar to any one species of poetry; for music and poetry were coeval, and were originally always joined together. But after their separation, such poems as were designed to be still joined with music, or song, were, by way of eminence, called Odes. And their dis-

nurture the minds of children; but of the latter, some select parts only ought to be read, because Greek lyrics are often written too licentiously, and Horace, in some places, I should be unwilling to explain. As to Elegies which treat of love, and *Hendecas syllables*,* in which are scraps of *Sotadean verses*,† (for Sotadean verses should not even be mentioned,) let them, if practicable, be entirely excluded; if not, let them be reserved, at least, for years of wiser reflection. I shall speak, in its place, of the advantages of comedy, which may greatly contribute to the improvement of eloquence, by reason of its assumed prerogative for painting the manners, and characters, and passions, of mankind. For when morals are safe, it may be a principal study. I speak of Menander‡ not to exclude

tinguishing characteristic was, *that they were sung by a chorus, who accompanied the various inflections of the voice with suitable attitudes and movements of the body*. The lyric poetry of the Greeks thus united the pleasures of the ear, of the eye, and of the understanding.

There is no distinction of subject incident to lyric poetry, except that other poems are often employed in the recital of *actions*, whereas *sentiments* of one kind or other, form, almost always, the subject of the Ode. But it is chiefly the spirit and manner of its execution that characterize it; and hence the fire, the animation, the enthusiasm which accompany it. Hence that neglect of regularity, those digressions, and that wild disorder which it is supposed to admit.

Pindar was prince of Grecian lyric poets; and among the Latins, for correctness, harmony, and happy expression, none can equal Horace.—See *Gillies' Greece*, chap. vi.; *Blair*, lect. xxxix.

* *Hendecasyllabic*, lines or verses consisting of eleven syllables.

† *Sotadeorum*. Sotadean verses have frequent cæsuras or falls; and their signification is different, as read either backward or forward. Sotades, a poet of Crete, was their author. Their tendency was generally to immorality.

‡ Menander was a celebrated comic poet of Athens. Terence imi-

others: and even the Latins are not without their utility. But boys should be induced to read such books as enlarge their minds, and strengthen their genius: and other subjects, which pertain to erudition, can be acquired in more advanced years.

Although more genius than art appears in the writings of the old Latin poets, they may, nevertheless, be of singular advantage, on account of their energy of expression. Majesty may be found in their tragedies, elegance in their comedies, and a kind of Attic taste. The arrangement of their pieces is also better conducted than most of the moderns, who consider striking thoughts to be the perfection of all good writing. It is unquestionably in the works of the ancients that we must seek for those noble sentiments, and that manly character of writing which have been obliterated from among us, since delicacy and refinement in every species of pleasure have vitiated our style with our manners. Finally, we may rely upon the authority of the greatest orators, who have quoted the verses of ancient poets, either as proofs of their pleadings, or an ornament to their eloquence. Cicero, Asinius, and their cotemporaries interspersed their discourses with the verses of Ennius, Accius, Pacuvius, Lucilius, Terence, Cæcilius,* and other poets, which adorned them

tated him so nearly, that Cicero said he only translated him, and Cæsar called him *dimidiatum Menandrum*. The kings of Egypt and Macedon sent ambassadors to invite him to their courts; but Menander preferred the free enjoyment of his studies to the promised favors of the great. Only four of his numerous comedies are preserved.

* The greatest number of eminent poets, especially dramatic writers, flourished between the end of the first and the third Punic wars; or from the year of the city 512 to 607. The most considerable were Li-

not only with the highest graces of erudition, but of pleasure; since they proved a source of pleasure to the auditory, whose ears, disgusted with the clamorous contentions of the bar, were refreshed with the variety of poetical numbers. Add to this the great advantage on the orator's side when he confirms the matter in debate with the illustrious testimony of some striking thought of these great men. What I first inculcated has reference to children; the last reflections are designed for more mature years, in order that the study of grammar and love of reading may not be terminated by the time we spend at school, but rather extended to the last period of our lives.

When a grammarian first explains a poet, he should make his pupil acquainted with some little matters, such as the construction of words, by interrupting the order of the verse; as also the properties of the feet, which ought to be so well known in poetry as to be required in reading prose; and besides these, he should point out all barbarisms, improprieties of speech, and words arranged contrary to the rules of speaking. Poets, however, should not be censured on these accounts; because the allowances for measure are so considerable, that we even disguise their faults under the titles of figurative* expressions, and give the praise of virtue to necessity. But the grammarian will give notice of such words as are peculiar to the poetical

vius Andronicus, Nævius, *Ennius*, *Pacuvius*, *Accius*, *Cæcilius*, Plautus, *Afranius*, *Terence*, and *Lucilius*."—*Ken. Rom. Antiq.*

* *Metaplasmos*. Metaplasmus is a figure, when some letter in a word is changed upon the account of verse, ornament, or necessity.

art, and wherever children meet them, their memory will suggest what they ought to call them.

It will also be useful, in the first rudiments, to teach the different significations of words as they occur; and to explain those which are not in much use, is not the least duty of his profession. But a more important one consists in teaching all *tropes*,* which add such extraordinary beauties both to verse and prose; and with these the *figures*† of thoughts‡ and words:§ both of these I shall discuss when I come to speak of the ornaments of discourse.

But a master will impress upon the mind of the pupil the advantages which accrue from a regular arrangement of any composition; the decorum which is to be observed in things; what is suitable to each character; in what the beauty of sentiments and force of expression consist; where a copious style may be pleasing, and where conciseness is requisite.

Next follows the interpretation of history, in which youth should be well versed; but not to such exactness as to load their memories with its superfluous parts. It is enough to expound what is commonly received, or at least to make them acquainted with the incidents recorded by the most eminent authors. For it will be either exceedingly troublesome, or a piece of vain boasting, to want to know what every insignificant

* *A trope* (from *τρεπω*, to turn) is the *turning* a word from its native and *proper* to a relative improved sense.

† *A figure* (from *figo*, to fashion) is the *fashioning* and *dress* of *speech*: or, it is that language which is suggested either by the imagination or the passions.

‡ *διανοίας*.

§ *λεξέως*.

writer may have said, which must retard and bewilder the mind that can attend with more utility to other matters. He who examines every page unfit for reading, may as well apply himself to old women's tales. The commentaries of grammarians are full of these embarrassing remarks, which are scarcely known to those who composed them. For it is recorded, that when Didymus,* the greatest compiler of books that ever existed, treated as fabulous a piece of history, one of his own books was produced which contained the passage. Hence we see the ridiculous pretensions of romance, which gives license to every impudent fellow of fabricating any visionary story, (presuming he may deceive with safety,) and quoting in its support books and authors which never existed. But in matters of greater notoriety they are most frequently detected by the learned.† I shall, therefore, account it among the accomplishments of a grammarian to be *ignorant of many things which require no particular notice.*‡

* A celebrated grammarian of Alexandria, who lived in the age of Augustus Cæsar, and is said to have written *three thousand five hundred volumes*.

† *A curiosis.*

‡ *Aliqua nescire.*

CHAPTER VI.

Of the first exercises in the grammar school.

I HAVE discussed the two parts of grammar which comprehend the *rules for speaking*, and the *interpretation of authors*: grammarians call the first of these Methodical, the other Historical. We must also commit to their care the first exercises of children, which may keep them employed until they are of a proper age to be sent to the school of oratory. Æsop's fables may naturally follow those of their nurses. Then let them learn to relate these fables in plain words, without any elevated turn; next, to divest them of their plain dress, and to express them in a more elegant style. This is effected by first breaking the verses, then explaining them in other words; and lastly, by giving them a bolder turn in a free paraphrase; by which they are permitted, provided they keep to the sense of the poet, to abridge some places, and embellish the whole with little ornaments. This is a difficult work for the most accomplished masters; and the boy who can acquit himself well in this respect, will be capable of attempting to learn anything. *Sentences*,* *Chrias*, and *Ethologies*, which are remarkable words

* *Sentences*, called by the Greeks γνώμαι, and *Chrias*, (which are short moral sentences for exercises in rhetoric,) are explained in "*The Elements of Oratory*," page 248.

spoken with the reasons annexed, should likewise make a part of the grammarian's function, because they occur in reading authors, from which they are extracted. They are all constructed by the same art, but different in form. The Sentence is a term of universal acceptation: Ethology is restricted to persons. There are many kinds of Chrias. The first is, like the sentence, conceived in a few words: as, "dixit ille," aut "dicere solebat;" "he said," or "was accustomed to say." The second, by way of answer: "Interrogatus ille:" vel, "cum hoc ei dictum esset, respondit:" "being asked," or "when this was said to him, he answered." The third is not unlike the preceding, as when one has not spoken, but done something: for Chrias are supposed to extend also to facts: as, "Crates cum indoctum puerum vidisset, pædagogum ejus percussit:" "Crates, observing a boy who had learned nothing, struck his master." There is another nearly similar to this; yet none dare call it so, but only a sort of Chria;* as, "Milo, quem vitulum assueverat ferre, taurum ferebat:" "The beast that Milo accustomed himself to carry," etc. In all these† the same case is used, and a reason is given for each fact and saying. As to little narratives recorded by poets, I think that to understand them is sufficient for children, without explaining them according to the rules of elo-

* Χρησιῶδες.

† All these Chrias retain commonly the same form, and the same cases in the beginning. But grammarians observe the cases to be thus restricted:—"M. P. Cato dixit literarum radices amaras esse, fructus jucundiores. M. P. Catonis dictum fertur, &c. M. P. Catonem dixisse ferunt," &c.

quence. There are other things of greater consequence transferred by our Latin rhetoricians to grammarians: but the Greeks are more exact in distinguishing and adhering to the respective duties of teaching.

CHAPTER VII.

Children should be instructed in several arts before they commence the study of oratory. Are these arts necessary to the future orator?

I HAVE now discussed, as succinctly as I could, the subject of grammar; not that I pretend to have exhausted the subject, which is infinite, but only to have exhibited those things which were considered essentially necessary. I shall now briefly subjoin a few remarks on those other arts in which youth should be instructed before they are sent to the school of rhetoric, in order to form that circle of sciences which the Greeks call *εγκυκλοπαιδειαν*.^{*} As there are many sciences, the study of which ought to begin almost at the same time, a question may here arise: are these sciences necessary to this work?[†] As arts, oratory cannot be perfect without them; nor are they capable,

^{*} *Encyclopædia*, (ex *ἐν* in, *κύκλος* circulus, et *παιδεία* doctrina,) a circle of sciences.

[†] "In my opinion, no man can deserve the name of an accomplished orator without a perfect knowledge of all the arts."—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. i. cap. 6.

taken separately, of constituting an orator. But to plead a cause, or deliver an opinion, where is the necessity, say our opponents, of knowing that, upon a given line, we can form an Isosceles triangle? Or, does the defence of a client, or the enforcement of counsel by persuasive arguments, require the skill of distinguishing by names and intervals the different tones of an instrument of music? They may also enumerate how many orators have rendered themselves illustrious at the bar who never heard of geometry, or understood music, except by the pleasure of the ears, which is common to all.

To these objections I reply, according to what Cicero often declares, in his book of illustrious orators,* to Brutus, that we form not an orator on the model of those who are, or have been; but that we have conceived in our mind the image of that perfect orator to whom nothing is wanting. The Stoics,† to form their perfect sage, and, as they say, a god, though subject to mortality, think that he must be versed, not only in the knowledge of all divine and human things, but they also lead him through all intricate ambiguities, things inconsiderable in themselves: not because captious‡ and

* *Orat.* 7.

† Zeno was the founder of this sect. He placed the *Summum bonum* in virtue. He taught at Athens in the “*Στοα Ποικίλη*,” “*the Painted Portico*,” and hence his disciples derived the appellation of Stoics. And the portico itself is usually put for that sect of philosophers, as when Athenæus calls Zeno *τῆς Στοᾶς κτιστὴν*, the founder of the Stoics. For their doctrines see *Cic. de finibus*, *Anian*, and *Seneca*.

‡ *Ceratinæ*. Dilemmas, called by logicians *Argumenta Cornuta*, for striking with two horns, in which, whatever you grant to your opponent, tends to your own disadvantage. “*You have the horns* (κέρατα); *you*

sophistical* arguments constitute a sage, but that they would have him incapable of being deceived, even in the smallest matters. In like manner, it is not geometry, nor music, nor any other art, which I can designate, that will make an orator, (who must likewise be a sage,) but these arts will contribute to his perfection. Are not antidotes, and other medicines prescribed for diseases and wounds, compounded of many ingredients, which separately produce contrary effects; but mixed, become, as it were, a specific, extracting healing virtues from all the constituent parts without resembling any one of them? Do not bees sip their honey from a variety of flowers and juices, the taste of which is inimitable by human invention? Shall we then be surprised if eloquence, the most excellent gift Providence has imparted to mankind, should require the assistance of many arts, which, though they may not manifest themselves in the orator, yet have an occult force, operating imperceptibly, and tacitly giving warning of their presence. “Such were good speakers without these arts;” *but I will have an orator.*† “They do not add much;” *but I must have a complete whole:* and to make this whole nothing must be wanting; for so it

did not lose: you did not lose any; therefore you have horns.—Aul. Gell., lib. 16.

* *Crocodilinæ.* These are problems which cannot be satisfactorily solved. “A crocodile, when he had promised a woman that he would restore her son if she told him truth; she said, you will not restore him.”—Lucian, ἐν βίῳν περὶ αἰσῶν.

† *Fuit aliquis sine his disertus; at ego oratorem volo, etc.* “Without these a man may be eloquent, but I wish to form an orator; and none can be said to have all these requisites while the smallest thing is wanting.”

must be admitted to be perfect. However elevated its sphere may be above us, it is our intention to give all necessary precepts for making the nearest possible approaches. But why should we despair? Nature is no obstacle to the perfect orator: and despair is base when a thing is practicable.

CHAPTER VIII.

Of music, and its advantages.

I COULD rest satisfied, upon this subject, with the testimony of the ancients. For who is ignorant, that music was not only a study of the earliest times,* but was even held in such a degree of veneration, that musicians were honored as sages, and as men divinely inspired? Were not Orpheus† and Linus‡ (to name no more) believed to be descended of the gods? And Orpheus, because he polished the manners of an ignorant and rustic people, and astonished their minds with the harmony of his music, was reported, as we learn from tradition, not only to have drawn after him wild

* "While detraction referred the discovery of music to strangers, vanity referred it to the gods; and both accounts concur to prove the great antiquity of the art."—*Plutarch. de Musica.*

† See *Plat. de Repub.*, lib. x.; *Hor.*, art. Poet, 392; *Virg. Ecl.*, iv. 55.

‡ *Linus* was preceptor to Orpheus. See *Virg. Ecl.*, iv. 56, and vi. 67.

beasts, but also rocks and woods. Timagenes* relates, that music is the most ancient of all the arts: and, in this opinion the most celebrated poets concur, who, at the royal banquets, introduce musicians tuning to their lyre the praises of gods and heroes. Does not Virgil's Sopas sing—*The wandering moon and labors of the sun?* By which that admirable poet openly avows, that music is joined with the knowledge of divine things. Should this be admitted, it must likewise be granted that it is necessary to an orator: because this part, neglected by orators, and taken possession of by philosophers, we have a right to reclaim: and without a knowledge of all the arts, eloquence cannot be perfect.

No one can doubt but that those men who distinguished themselves for wisdom, were ardently devoted to the study of music. Pythagoras and his followers published the opinion, which, no doubt, they received from more ancient times, that the world was the effect of harmonical proportion, the modulations of which were afterwards imitated by the lyre. And not content with the harmony perceived to be propagated amidst contraries, they also attributed musical tones to the celestial spheres. For Plato, in some of his writings, especially in his *Timæus*,† cannot be understood,

* *Timagenes*, a rhetorician and historian of Alexandria, brought captive to Rome by Galbinus, and redeemed by Faustus, the son of Sylla. Having been discarded by Augustus he destroyed his history of that emperor.—See *Hor.*, lib. i. epist. xix. v. 15.

† *Timæus*, a Pythagorean philosopher of Locris, by whose name Plato entitled one of his *Dialogues*, and whose order Aristotle followed in the arrangement of his *Physics*.

“*Timæus* lived later than these, (*Xenophon* and *Calisthenes*,) but, so

except by those who are thoroughly acquainted with this art. Why do I speak of philosophers, whose fountain,* Socrates himself, did not blush, even in old age, to learn to play upon the lyre? History reports that the greatest generals† played upon pipes and lutes; and that the Lacedemonians‡ were fired to battle by musical strains. For what other use are clarions and trumpets in our legions? Whose sounds, by how much the more vehement they are, by so much does the Roman glory exceed that of all others. Plato§ therefore believed, not without reason, that music was necessary to those in civil life to whom the administra-

far as I can judge, he was by far the most learned, the best furnished with the richness of materials, and variety of sentiments; and by no means unskilful in the composition of style."—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. ii. cap. xiv.

"Timæus, a writer, it is true, sufficiently skilled in other points, and who sometimes reaches the genuine sublime."—*Long.*, sect. iv.

* Quintilian calls Socrates *the Fountain*, and Cicero designates him *the Prince of philosophers*. He was preceptor to Plato and Xenophon.

† Cornelius Nepos says, that Epaminondas well understood the art of playing upon the harp and flute.

‡ The Lacedemonians were particularly remarkable for beginning their battles with a concert of flutes.—See *Xenophon*, *Maximus*, the *Syrian*, *Thucydides* (lib. v.), *Val. Maximus* (lib. ii. cap. 6), and *Lucian*.

Plutarch says: "The army being drawn up in battle array, and the enemy near, the soldiers were commanded to adorn their heads with garlands, and the *Fluters* to play *καρτορειον μελος*, the tune of *Castor's hymn*. The general then advancing began a hymn to Mars, called *παιαν ἐμξατήριος*, or *alarm*; so that it was at once a delightful and terrible sight to see them march on, keeping pace to the tune of their flutes, without ever troubling their order, or confounding their ranks, their music leading them into danger cheerful and unconcerned."

§ "Even the philosophers dare not maintain that geometry and music are the qualities of philosophers, because it is admitted that Plato was, in the highest degree, master of those arts."—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. i. cap. 50.

tion of republics might be entrusted. And the authors of that sect, which appears so very severe to some, and so rigid to others, were of opinion, that some of their sages might apply themselves to this study. And Lycurgus, that inflexible Spartan lawgiver, recommended the use of music. Nature herself seems to have conferred it as a gift upon us, for mitigating our labors. Does not music invigorate those who are toiling at the oar? This appears not only in painful operations, where many unite their efforts by the signal of some pleasing voice; but even each person has some favorite air for allaying fatigue.

But I seem rather to eulogize this most beautiful art than to show how it may be applicable to the orator. I may, therefore, omit what is said of music and grammar being formerly joined together; although Archytas* and Aristoxenus† were of opinion that grammar was comprehended under music, and that both were taught by the same masters; adopting the opinion of Sophron,‡ a comic writer, whom Plato so much esteemed that his books, it is said, were found under his head on his death bed. Eupolis§ affirms the same thing with

* *Archytas*, a Pythagorean philosopher of Tarentum, Plato's master in geometry.—See *Hor.*, lib. i. *Od.* 28; *Cic. de Senect.*, cap. xii.; *Tusc. Quæst.*, lib. v. 22.

† *Aristoxenus*, a philosopher and musician of Tarentum, and pupil of Xenophilus and Aristotle.

‡ *Sophron*, a Sicilian mimographer and comic poet.—See *Valerius Maximus*, lib. viii. cap. 7.

§ An Athenian comic poet. He used the freedom of the ancient comedy to lash the vices of the people; and having lost his life in a sea fight between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, his death was so lamented that a statute was enacted, which decreed that no poet should afterwards bear arms.

regard to Prodamus, whom he designates as a teacher of music and grammar; and Hyperbolus, whom he calls by derision Maricas, confesses *that he knows nothing of music except grammar*. Aristophanes also assures us, in more than one place, that this was the ancient method of instructing youth. And Menander, in his comedy called *Hyperbolimæum*, introduces a father taking his son out of a boarding-school, before whom an old governor of the school sums up what he had expended upon his son's education, and gives him a bill, in which was so much paid to a master of geometry, and so much to a music master. Hence originated the custom of handing about a lyre at the end of an entertainment; and because Themistocles,* when that instrument was presented to him, declared he knew not how to play, to use Cicero's own words, he was reckoned a person of no polite education. It was the custom of the ancient Romans to procure the amusement of pipes and lutes at their banquets. And as these institutions proceed from King Numa,† it is

Longinus on the Sublime, in sect. xvi., quotes these lines of Eupolis:

"No, by my laurels earned at Marathon,
They shall not glory in my discontent."

See *Hor.*, lib. i. *Sat.* 4; lib. ii. *Sat.* 3, v. 12.

* Themistocles, cum in epulis recusaret lyram, habitus est indoctor."

—*Tusc. Quæst.*, lib. i. 2.

"Nor doth his skilful hand refuse
Acquaintance with the tuneful muse,
When round the mirthful board the harp is borne."

Pindar, Ode I.

† "Through them (Harmony and Sounds) we rise, we kindle, then sink and languish; they often put us in a cheerful, and often in a

manifest, that though the thoughts of the ancient Romans were turned to warlike exploits, they did not neglect the study of music in as great a degree as could be expected from those who lived in so rude an age. It has, therefore, passed into a proverb with the Greeks, that the illiterate must have no intercourse with the muses and graces. But let us explain in what respects this art may belong to the future orator.

Music has two numbers; the one in the voice, the other in the body. Each of these requires a certain regulation. Aristoxenus, the musician, divides what regards the voice into Rhythms* and measured Melodies. By rhythms he understands the structure of words, and by measured melodies the airs and sounds. Do not all these require the orator's notice? Must not his body be formed to regular gesture? Must he not, in composition, place his words in proper order? Must he not, in pronouncing, use certain inflections of the voice? All these are unquestionably necessary qualifications for an orator, unless we think that a certain structure of words, amusing the ear agreeably, should be entirely restricted to songs and verses, and therefore useless in oratory: or that the orator was not to diversify his composition and pronunciation according

melancholy mood; their wonderful magic is best adapted to verses and odes; and there I imagine our learned prince, Numa, and our ancestors were sensible of this, as appears by the musical instruments introduced in the solemn banquets, and the verses of the Salii."—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. iii. cap. 51.

* "The grandeur of the Doric, the polished elegance of the Ionic, and the soothing sweetness of the Eolic mode, must have resulted from the *Rhythm*, or measure, which, governing the movement of the verse, thereby determined its expression."—*Lucian Harmon. sub initio.*

to the nature of the things of which he speaks, as well as the musician, whose compositions, according to their respective qualities, must be expressed and sung differently. For the grand and sublime are best represented by loud and strong tones,* pleasant by sweet, and gentle by soft: the beauty of the musical art depending entirely upon entering into the passions, and making them a lively picture of what is expressed. The orator, in like manner, according to the elevation, depression, or change of voice, will differently excite the passions of the audience. By such an order of words, by such a tone of voice, he arouses the indignation of the judges, and by another he bends their hearts to pity. Who can now doubt of the power of words, when even musical instruments, which cannot form the articulate sounds of speech, affect us so many different ways?

A graceful and proper motion of the body, which is called *Eurythmia*, is also necessary, and cannot be otherwise derived than from this art; but as it constitutes an important part of action, we shall speak of it in another place. And, indeed, if an orator shall

* "Every species of verse (and of verse there were above a hundred different kinds) occasioned a change of musical measure, and introduced what, in musical language, may be called a different time. A slow succession of lengthened tones expressed moderation and firmness; a rapid inequality of verse betrayed disorderly and ignoble passions; the mind was transported by sudden transitions, and roused by impetuous reiterations of sounds; a gradual ascent of notes accorded with all those affections which warm and expand the heart; and the contrary movement naturally coincided with such sentiments as depress the spirits, and extinguish the generous ardor of the soul."—*Gillies*, chap. v.

exhibit due attention to his voice, what can be so essential to him as music? But as I must speak of the voice elsewhere, I shall here content myself with one example. Caius Gracchus,* the greatest orator of his time, whenever he harangued the public, kept a musician always behind him to guide by the sounds of a flute the different changes of his voice. This custom, either dreaded by, or dreading the nobility, he strictly observed in all his speeches, which were generally attended by the greatest multitudes that ever assembled upon such occasions.

But for the advantage of those who are inexperienced in this matter, I shall endeavor to remove all doubt of its utility. It will be granted that poets should be read by the future orator: but are poets destitute of music?† If any one is so devoid of understanding as to doubt concerning some, it must, at least, be admitted, that verses composed for the lyre cannot be read without emotion.‡ I should discuss this subject at greater length if I introduced a new study; but as this accomplishment has been recommended from

* "Therefore, Catulus, you might have heard from Licinius, who is your client, a man of learning, and the secretary of Gracchus, that Gracchus made use of an ivory flute, which a man, who stood privately behind him while he was speaking, touched so skillfully that he immediately struck the proper note when he wanted either to quicken or to soften the vehemence of his voice."—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. iii. cap. 60.

† "Music, in ancient times, was closely connected with poetry; and hence the same words signified a song and a poem, a musician and a poet: *ὄδαι, ἀσματα; ὄδοι, ὀδοίκοι, αὐδοί.*"—*Hesychius*.

‡ "One of the chief difficulties in composing odes arises from that enthusiasm which is understood to be a characteristic of lyric poetry."—*Elair*, lect. xxxix.

the remote times of Chiron* and Achilles† down to *this period*,‡ with the approbation of all lovers of a good education, a longer defence might raise a doubt of its utility.

It may clearly appear, from the above examples, how much I esteem music, and what kind of music I approve. I must, however, openly declare, that I in nowise recommend the music which now prevails in our theatrical exhibitions,§ and of which those soft and voluptuous airs have, in a great measure, extinguished all the manly virtue which remained among us. The music to which I allude is that by which the brave sung the praises of the brave. Nor do I approve those

* "Most of the heroes of the Trojan war were the pupils of Chiron, the wise centaur. He was descended of the most illustrious ancestors and entitled to the first rank among the Thessalian princes. But he preferred to the enjoyment of power the cultivation of poetry, and retired, with his favorite muses, to a solitary cavern at the foot of Mount Pelion, which was soon rendered, by the fame of his abilities, the most celebrated school of antiquity."—*Xenoph. de Venat.* Chiron instructed Æsculapius in physic, Hercules in astronomy, and Achilles in music.

† Achilles sung to his lyre the praises of heroes:

—*ἄειδε δ' ἄρα κλέα ἀνδρῶν.*—*Hom. Il.*, lib. ix. v. 189.

‡ In the second century before Christ Polybius ascribes the most extraordinary effects to the Grecian music.—*Polyb.*, lib. iv. c. 20.

§ "Every kind of music is good for something; that of the theatres is necessary for the amusement of the mob, being well suited to the perversion of their minds and manners, and let them enjoy it."—*Arist. de Republ.*, lib. viii. Plato, Aristoxenus, and Plutarch, bitterly complain of the corruption of music, as the chief source of vice and immorality. That art, which had anciently been used as the vehicle of religious and moral instruction, was employed in the theatres to excite every voluptuous and dissolute passion.—*Plato de Legibus*, lib. iii.; *Aristoxenus*, lib. xiv., and *Plutarch de Musica*.

*instruments of music** which, by languishing sounds, enervate the soul of all its vigor. The only music is that engaging melody which touches the heart and moves and soothes the passions, according to the dictates of reason. * * * * Must it not, therefore, be admitted, even by those who are prejudiced against us, that music is of great advantage to our design of forming the future orator ?

CHAPTER IX.

Of Geometry.

THERE are some parts in geometry generally admitted to be useful to children: for by these the mind is exercised, the judgment sharpened, and a quicker conception procured. But it is said that the use of geometry is not so extensive as the other arts, being only advantageous during the time we learn it, and no longer. This is the vulgar opinion, but without foundation; because the greatest men have exhibited an assiduous application to the study of this science.

Geometry is divided into two parts, Numbers and Dimensions. A knowledge of numbers is not only

* *Psalterium*, a musical instrument with ten strings, resembling a harp. *Spadix*, an instrument of music used among the Phœnicians, like a dulcimer.

necessary to him who is superficially acquainted with letters; but more especially to the orator, who must very frequently state an account. For should he hesitate, at the bar, in summing up an exact total, or should he make a motion with his fingers which disagrees with his calculation, all would judge him unskillful. The second part, consisting of lines and dimensions, is not less necessary in pleading causes; for many lawsuits originate concerning measures and boundaries. But this science has a more intimate connection with the art of oratory.

First, order is essential to geometry: is it not also to eloquence? Geometry lays down principles, draws conclusions from them, and proves uncertainties by certainties. Does not oratory accomplish the same? Does not geometry reduce its proofs into a syllogistic form, and, therefore, many think that it partakes more of the nature of logic than rhetoric? But because the orator seldom proves logically, shall it be said that he never does so? When the subject requires it, he will use the syllogism, or at least the Enthymeme, which is the true rhetorical syllogism. Upon the whole, the strongest proofs are those which are designated geometrical demonstrations:* and as the object of geometry is to prove evidently, can eloquence have any other end?

Geometry likewise discovers by reason a falsehood in verisimilitudes. It shows, in numbers, the errors of some calculations which they call Pseudographia,† with which boys were accustomed to amuse themselves. But there are other things of greater consequence. For

* γεαμμικαὶ ἀποδείξεις.

† ψευδογραφίας.

who would not assent to this proposition: "All places of equal circumferences have equal spaces." This, however, is false; for we must know the figure of this circumference; and, therefore, historians are justly censured by geometricians, for determining the extent of islands by the circuit of navigators. Now, the more exact a figure is, the greater will be the space it contains. If, therefore, the circumference makes a circle, which is the most exact figure in planes, it will comprehend a greater space than if it formed a square of equal circumference. Again, squares will contain a greater space than triangles; and triangles with equal sides a greater than triangles with unequal. I could adduce other examples, but as they are, perhaps, involved in greater obscurity, shall present an experiment adapted to every one's capacity. Almost every person knows that an acre contains two hundred and forty feet in length, and the half of this number of feet in breadth; and, therefore, it is easy to determine its circumference and surface. Now, let us suppose a square, of which the sides are a hundred and eighty feet each. The circumference of this square will be exactly equal to that of the acre, yet its area makes a greater space; which, if any one should be unwilling to compute, it may be easily perceived in a less number. A square, whose sides are each ten feet, has forty in circumference, and the surface will be a hundred feet square. Add fifteen feet in length to five in breadth, and the circumference will be the same, but the space will be less by one fourth. A parallelogram of nineteen feet in length, and one foot in breadth, will make a circumference of forty feet, as

well as an exact square, whose surface is a hundred feet square; but it will contain only in surface as many feet square as it has feet in length. Whatever, therefore, you subtract from the figure of an exact square, will diminish the surface; and, consequently, a less space may be contained in a greater circumference. I speak of level surfaces; for it is evident that mountains and valleys have a greater extent of surface than there is of corresponding sky or air.

But geometry soars to the knowledge of more sublime matters: it lays the world open to our view, and displays all the wonders of nature. From the precision of its calculations we learn that the courses of the celestial bodies are regulated by a constant and never failing equability of motion, with which they have been impressed: an incontestable argument, that chance was not the cause of all this order and symmetry. This surely is a subject worthy of an orator, and he must sometimes have an occasion to treat it with becoming dignity. When Pericles explained to the terrified Athenians the natural causes of an eclipse of the sun; or when Sulpicius Gallus, in the army of Lucius Paulus, predicted an eclipse of the moon, to prevent the soldiery from being affrighted, as by a prodigy sent from heaven, did not both acquit themselves of the function of an orator? Had Nicias possessed their knowledge, he would not, seized by a similar panic, have surrendered a most splendid army of the Athenians in Sicily. When Dion came to overthrow the government of Dionysius he was not deterred by a like occurrence. Warriors may avail themselves of

such examples; but what shall I say of Archimedes,* who, alone by his geometrical skill, protracted to so great a length the siege of Syracuse. To conclude: there are very many questions which we are at a loss to solve, unless we adopt the linear demonstrations, with which this science furnishes us: so that if it be incumbent on the orator, as we shall show in the following book, to discourse indiscriminately upon all subjects, we may naturally suppose that this cannot be effected without the aid of geometry.

* *Archimedes*, a celebrated geometrician, born at Syracuse, in Sicily, and related to Hiero, king of Syracuse. His character is described in Livy, (lib. xxiv. cap. 34.) Cicero, in his *Tusculan questions*, (lib. i. cap. 26,) says that he first invented globes to show the motions of the heavens. He possessed such an astonishing invention in mechanics, that he assured Hiero, that if he had another earth upon which to plant his machines, he could move this which we inhabit. Archimedes became very famous by his curious contrivances, by which the city was so long defended when besieged by Marcellus. Against the vessels which came up close to the walls, he contrived a kind of crow, projected above the wall, with an iron grapple fastened to a strong chain. This was let down upon the prow of a ship, and, by means of the weight of a heavy counterpoise of lead, raised up the prow, and set the vessel in an upright position; then dropping it suddenly, as if it had fallen from the walls, the vessel sunk so far into the sea, that a great quantity of water was admitted, even when the ship fell upon the keel. But, notwithstanding all his art, Syracuse was taken by Marcellus, who gave a special charge to save Archimedes. But being too busily engaged in study to answer to his name, he was slain by a common soldier, to the great regret of the Roman general.

CHAPTER X.

I. Pronunciation is to be formed by that of comedians. II. And gesture and attitude copied from the Palæstra.

I. THE future orator who desires a knowledge of pronunciation, should receive some instruction from comedians. But I do not wish that a youth, destined for these hopes, should assume in mimic form the small voice of a woman, or the tremulous accents of an old man. Nor should he personate the drunkard, or be imbued with the scurrility of a slave; much less should he learn the passions of love, avarice, and superstition. All these are unnecessary to the orator; and, as the imitation of what is vicious generally grows into a habit, so tender minds seldom fail to be tinged with the infection.

All sorts of gestures and motions must not be borrowed from comedians; for, although an orator ought, in some respects, to excel in both of these, he should not affect a theatrical air. His action, his gait, his countenance, should be quite different. And if there is any art in these particulars, I think the orator's greatest art would be to conceal it.

But what is the duty of a master with these? To correct all faults of pronunciation; to take care that words be exactly expressed, and that every letter should have its proper sound. The sound of some

letters is vitiated by mincing; others we pronounce too thick or broad; harsh letters we exchange for others not unlike them, but of a more obtuse sound. For the letter ς ,* which Demosthenes had some difficulty to pronounce, the λ takes the place, the powers of both are also the same in Latin. C and t are softened by g and d . The affectation of sounding the s † ought not to be suffered: nor ought speaking in the throat, or with a gaping mouth, or with a twist of the mouth, to give the word a fuller sound, be permitted. The Greeks call this *καταπεπλασμενον*: and the same term is also used by them to signify a way of playing upon flutes, when, by stopping all the holes that cause the louder tones, only one passage is left for producing a base.

A master also should be careful that the last syllables in a word be not lost; that the pronunciation be consistent with itself; that in exclamations the effort proceed rather from the lungs than the head; that the gesture correspond with the voice, and the countenance with the gesture. He must also observe that the face of the speaker be in a straight position; that the lips be not distorted; that immoderate gaping distend not the jaws; that the visage be not tossed

* "For having such an impediment in his speech that he (Demosthenes) could not pronounce the R' , which is the first letter of the art he was studying, he grew so perfect by practising beforehand, that he was thought to pronounce it as well as any man of his time."—*Cic. de Orat.*, lib. i. 40.

† This verse of Euripides' *Medea*,

ἔσῳσα σ' ὧρ ἰσάζειν Ἑλλήνων ὄσοι,

has been ridiculed by comic poets, and sometimes excited great laughter among the Athenians when that tragedy was represented.

upwards; that the eyes be not downcast, and the neck inclined to either side. The forehead errs in many ways. I have seen some who, at every effort of the voice raise their eyebrows; others knit them; while others keep one up, and the other so far down, as almost to press upon the eye. All these particulars are of the greatest consequence, as we shall show hereafter; for nothing can please but what is becoming.

A comedian should likewise teach how a narrative is to be pronounced, what degree of authority is necessary to persuade; what tone of voice is best adapted to anger,* and what to pity;† and in order to accomplish this successfully, he may select such passages from plays as most nearly resemble pleadings at the bar. These will contribute essentially, not only for forming the pronunciation, but for improving in eloquence. These remarks are applicable to our orator's tender years: but when he shall be able to read the speeches of orators and appreciate their beauties; then let a studious and skillful master assist him in acquiring a taste for reading, and compel him to commit to memory the most prominent parts, and, lastly, induce him to declaim as if he were actually pleading at the bar. In

* "*Anger* has a peculiar pronunciation, which is quick, sharp, and broken :

"Ah! mark you this, quick! bind him."—*Cic. de Orat.*, l. iii. 58.

† "The tone of *pity* and grief is different; it is full, moving, broken, and mournful :

"O my father! O my country! O the house of Priam!"—*Id.*

this manner his voice and memory will be exercised by pronunciation.

II. I would not censure those who sometimes resort to schools of palestric exercises.* I speak not of those places where people waste away one part of their lives in suppling their joints with oil, and another part by drowning their senses with wine. These I would keep at the remotest distance from our orator. But I allude to the places (for the Latin word signifies both) where young persons are taught a graceful mo-

* "The Palé, or exercise of wrestling, is reported by Pausanias to have been reduced into a science by Theseus. It was chiefly remarkable on account of the oil and sand, or, as Burette says, of oil, wax, and dust, called *Ceroma*, with which they rubbed their bodies, in order to supple their joints, to prevent excessive perspiration, and to elude the grasp of their antagonists. The wrestlers were matched by the judges or presidents of the games by lot, and the prize adjudged to him who thrice threw his adversary on the ground; or, as Seneca says: "*Luctator ter abjectus perdidit palmam.*" The wrestlers who had been anointed were always, before they engaged, sprinkled with dust or sand, kept in a place called *κονιστήριον*. And to say that a wrestler gained a victory, (*ἀκονιστήριον*;) or without being sprinkled, was equivalent to say he gained a victory without an engagement. This sometimes happened when, from the reputation of the champion, no one appeared to encounter him. Thus Milo, of Crotona, who had gained six Olympic, and as many Pythian crowns, challenged the whole assembly, and finding no competitor, he claimed the crown. But as he was about to receive it he unfortunately fell, and the people cried out that he had forfeited the prize. Then Milo (Anthologia, lib. i. cap. i. epigram 11)

Arose, and standing in the midst, thus cried:
Do not *three falls* the victory decide?
Fortune, indeed, hath given me one, but who
Will undertake to throw me th' *other two*?"

tion and carriage of the body. To this may belong the manner of keeping the arms in a straight position; refraining from an awkward and clownish use of the hands; standing in a graceful attitude; walking with a noble air; and making no motions with the head and eyes which may disagree with the other motions of the body.

All these are accessions to grace pronunciation, a thing so essentially necessary to an orator. Why, then, should what is requisite be neglected? We find that the rules for gesture* originated from the times of heroes; that they were approved by the greatest men of Greece, even by Socrates himself; that Plato gave them a place among the civil virtues; and that Chrysippus did not omit them in his precepts for the education of youth. We learn also from history that the Lacedemonians had among their exercises a sort of dance, which their youth were made to learn as a useful accomplishment for war. Nor was a similar practice considered disreputable by the ancient Romans: and dancing is still retained by some of our priests in the solemnities of their religious ceremonies.†

* *Chironomia*, or *lex gestus*, in the Latin text, is the gesture of gesticulating dancing. It is also the rule of gesture and motion, which originated from regulating the hands; because the chief part of gesture consists in the propriety of their motions.

† Quintilian probably alludes, in this place, to an order of priests instituted by Numa, called *Salii*, (*a saliendo*,) upon account of the extraordinary noise and shaking they made in their dances. In the month of March, the time of their great feast, they marched in procession about the city, says Plutarch, with a nimble motion, keeping just measures with their feet, and demonstrating great strength and agility by the various and handsome turns of their body. They sung all along a

And Cicero makes Crassus use these words in the third book of his "Orator:" "An orator must have something noble and manly in his whole action; and he must form it, not on the model of stage players and buffoons, but on that of a man inured to the camp, or a proficient in the (*palæstra*) school of exercises." This manner of discipline has descended to our days without censure; but, in my opinion, should not extend beyond our younger years, and even then be not long continued; for it is an orator I form, and not a dancer. This advantage, however, will accrue from these youthful exercises, that, without thinking, a secret grace will imperceptibly mingle with all our behavior, and continue with us through life.

CHAPTER XI.

Children are capable of being taught many things at the same time.

1. Because the nature of the human mind is such that it can attend to many things together.
2. Because boys can easily bear the labor of study.
3. They have then most time for the purpose.—That indolence is the cause why orators do not learn many things.

It may be asked, admitting that the studies enumerated above are indispensably necessary, can they be all taught and learned at the same time? Some deny

set of old verses sacred to Mars, called the *carmen saliare*; the original form of which was composed by Numa.—See *Livy*, book i. chap. 20.

that they can; because the mind would be confused and fatigued by so many sciences of a different tendency, to acquire which, neither the mind, nor body, nor even the length of the day, divided between such a diversity of study, would be sufficient; and although more mature years might endure the labor, the minds of children could not sustain the same burden.

1. But those who reason in this manner, do not fully understand the nature of the human mind. This principle is so active and quick, and keeps such a multiplicity of points in view, that it cannot restrict itself to the action of one particular thing, but extends its power to many, not only during the same day, but likewise during the same instant. What shall I say of those who play upon the harp? They touch one string, stop another, try this one, tune that; everything is employed at the same time, the memory, the voice, the right hand, the left; even the feet are not idle; they regulate the time, and beat the measure. But suppose we are obliged, by some unforeseen accident, to plead a cause, do we not say one thing, think of another, invent reasons, make choice of words, and adapt pronunciation, countenance, and gesture, to the nature of the cause? If we, therefore, execute these different things, as I may say, by a single exertion, what can retard our application when we have several hours for reflection, especially when variety refreshes and renovates the mind? On the contrary, it is more difficult to persevere in the same study. Composition and reading by turns wear away our aversion; and although we may have done many things, we find ourselves, in some measure, fresh and recruited at entering upon a new

subject. Who can avoid dullness when confined a whole day to the master of one science? But to have changes will be a recreation; as a variety of meats revives the appetite, and preserves it longer from satiety.

I should like to be informed of any other way for learning. Must we devote ourselves to grammar only, and afterwards to nothing but geometry? Must we neglect, in the meantime, what we have learned when we apply ourselves to music, and so forget all that went before? And when we shall study Latin, may we not review Greek? In a word, must nothing be done, unless what presents itself last? Why do we not advise our husbandmen not to cultivate, at the same time, their fields, vineyards, olive-grounds, and shrubs; or dissuade them, at the same time, from taking care of their meadow-grounds, cattle, gardens, and bee-hives? Why do we ourselves allot, every day, something to the bar, something to the gratification of our friends; something to our domestic concerns, something to the care of our health, and something even to our pleasures. Any one of these occupations continued without intermission would prove wearisome: so true is it, that it is much easier to do many things than confine ourselves long to one.

2. We should be under no apprehension that children are incapable of the labor of study: for no age is less fatigued; and this might appear strange, but you may discover it by experience. Children's intellects are more docile before they become blunted by more advanced years. This is exemplified by their speaking nearly all words in less than two years, when their

tongue is once free, without any person's assistance. But as to our newly purchased slaves, how long a time they require to speak Latin! Whoever has instructed adults will know that it is not without reason the Greeks use the term *παιδομαθεις*, to denote those who are as well experienced in their art as if trained to it from their infancy. Children can naturally bear labor more patiently than grown up persons. We see infants fall frequently without much injury; their creeping upon hands and feet is scarcely any trouble to them; when they can walk they run about and play whole days together without being weary; because there is a want of weight in their bodies, and therefore little force can accompany their efforts. In like manner their minds, I believe, are less fatigued than ours; for their application, slight and superficial, does not proceed from an inclination of their own, but only to prepare themselves for receiving their master's instruction. They can also, according to another capability incident to their years, learn more easily from those whose method of teaching is plain and simple: nor do they place any value on what they have already done, being as yet incapable of forming to themselves a judgment of labor. And hence, as we have frequently found, labor is less fatiguing than thought and reflection.

3. But they will never have more time than when young for learning those branches, the progress in which depends entirely on hearing. When they apply themselves to study the elegance of style, and to invent and compose anything, they will not find time, or perhaps will be unwilling to begin these studies. And, therefore, as a grammar-master cannot spend the whole

day with them, for fear of giving them a distaste for learning, in what other studies can these leisure hours be better employed? I would not, however, require the student to be versed in these arts to perfection: he may understand music without being skilled in the art of musical composition; and of geometry there is no necessity to be experienced in its most minute operations. To form an orator's pronunciation, I do not make a comedian of him, nor a dancing master, to grace his motions; and if I did require all these things, there would be time enough. And, indeed, there is time enough for those who improve it. For, as to the stupid, I say nothing of them. How did Plato excel in whatever, I think, the future orator ought to learn. Not content with the sciences which flourished at Athens, nor with those of the Pythagorean sect, for which he sailed to Italy, he also passed over to the priests of Egypt, in order to learn the mysteries couched under their hieroglyphic symbols.

We palliate our sloth under the excuse of difficulty. We do not engage in study through a love of choice and inclination. If we seek eloquence, it is not because it is the most noble accomplishment in nature, and most deserving our care; but rather for a base end, and the desire of sordid gain. Without these requisites, let several plead at the bar, and endeavor to enrich themselves: what will be the consequence? Notwithstanding all their toil and care, a broker may acquire more from the sale of his sordid ware, and a public crier from the hire of his voice. I should dislike even a reader who could think of computing the income of his labor. But I prefer the man of a sublime

genius, who can form to himself an idea of the grandeur of eloquence, which a celebrated tragic poet calls “the queen of all things.”* He keeps his eyes constantly fixed upon her. He seeks after no emolument from his pleading.† The fruits of his labors are his knowledge, contemplation and noble thoughts; fruits perpetually remaining with him, and in no way subject to the caprices of fortune. He will easily persuade himself to apply to music and geometry, the time which others waste away at shows, in the Campus Martius, at gaming, in idle talk, not to speak of sleep and midnight reveling. How exquisite will his pleasures be when compared with those which are destitute of all delicacy and refinement! For Providence has granted this reward to mankind, that the taste of pleasure is always more satisfactory in virtuous amusements. But this satisfaction has led us too far. Let, therefore, what I have said be sufficient for the studies in which youth are to be instructed, until they are capable of greater matters.

* Euripides in Hecuba, verse 816: Πειθῶ δὲ τὴν τύραννον ἀνθρώποις μόνῃν : “Eloquence the only queen among men.”

† *Fructum ex stipe advocatorum*: the fee paid by clients to their lawyers for pleading their cause.



RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE FIRST EDITION.

From James Carnahan, D.D., President of the College of New Jersey.

TO MR. E. LITTELL:

Sir—The “Elements of Rhetoric, by John A. Getty, A.M.,” is the work of a profound classical scholar, manifests extensive reading on the subject discussed, and, in my opinion, will be found very convenient and useful to those who wish to have, in a compendious form, the substance of what distinguished Grecian and Roman masters have taught on the subject of eloquence.

Nassau Hall, June 27, 1831.

JAMES CARNAHAN.

From the Rev. Samuel Eccleston, A.M., President of St. Mary's College, Baltimore.

St. Mary's College, Baltimore, June 26, 1831.

Dear Sir—In reply to your letter of the 20th inst., requesting my opinion of Mr. John A. Getty's Rhetoric, I take pleasure in stating, that I find the definitions to be accurate, and the exemplifications apt and copious. The work may be recommended as a convenient and agreeable manual of the ancient nomenclature of grammatical and rhetorical figures.

I am, with great respect, your ob't serv't,

MR. E. LITTELL.

SAML. ECCLESTON.

From Samuel B. How, D.D., President of Dickinson College.

Carlisle, June 21, 1831.

Dear Sir—I have examined, with as much attention as my engagements would permit, “Getty's Elements of Rhetoric,” and am pleased with it. It compresses into a small space much valuable matter. Its author exhibits an extensive acquaintance with the ancient writers on Rhetoric, and has enriched his work by copious extracts from them. I think it well adapted as a Class Book to prepare youth for studying the more extensive treatises on this subject.

Very respectfully yours,

SAMUEL B. HOW.

From William Neill, D.D., late President of Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

“The Elements of Rhetoric,” by John A. Getty, A.M., comprises, within a small compass, the substance of volumes; and is calculated to facilitate the progress of youth in the study of the Latin and Greek classics.

Philadelphia, June 26, 1831.

WILLIAM NEILL.

From the Rev. Edward Rutledge, A.M., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Pennsylvania.

Philadelphia, June 23, 1831.

Dear Sir—I am very much pleased with Mr. Getty's work, and think it admirably adapted to the conveyance of most useful instruction in a pleasing and striking manner. I hope its respected author may meet the encouragement he merits, and that his beautiful little manual may extensively aid our youth in acquiring the art of which it treats.

With great respect I remain yours, &c.,

E. LITTELL, Esq.

EDWARD RUTLEDGE.

From Robert Adrain, LL.D., &c., Professor of Mathematics in the University of Pennsylvania.

Philadelphia, June 21, 1831.

Dear Sir—Agreeably to your request I have examined Mr. Getty's "Elements of Rhetoric."

It appears to me that the work is elementary, methodical, and perspicuous, abounding in observations and examples which illustrate the subject, and interest the reader; and that it will be highly useful in the education of youth.

Yours, with respect, &c.,
MR. E. LITTELL.

ROBERT ADRAIN.

From S. B. Wylie, D.D., Professor of Languages in the University of Pennsylvania.

Philadelphia, July 23, 1831.

Sir—Having perused the little book you had the goodness to send me, entitled "Elements of Rhetoric," by John A. Getty, A.M., I am prepared to give you my opinion concerning its merits. I consider it as a manual which ought to be in the hands of every youth engaged in the acquisition of classical literature. It is rare to find such a mass of useful elementary matter condensed into such a narrow compass. The definitions of the *figures* will be easily committed, and *not* easily forgotten. The illustrations are lucid, the examples pertinent and numerous, and the work eminently calculated to be a valuable acquisition to our classical institutions. I cordially wish it an extensive circulation.

Very respectfully yours, &c.,
MR. E. LITTELL.

S. B. WYLIE.

From the Rev. W. T. Brantly, Pastor of the First Baptist Church, Philadelphia.

MR. E. LITTELL.

Sir—"The Elements of Rhetoric," by John A. Getty, A.M., is a work of real merit and of unbounded utility. I have read it with attention, and I may also add, with advantage. Those who have spent much time in the instruction of youth, will best appreciate such a book as that which Mr. Getty has made; for they must have sensibly felt the want of such a compend of rhetorical definitions and examples. Indeed, every person who designs to read with propriety, or to understand with clearness, the best productions of ancient and modern times, should be fully acquainted with the whole scope of figurative language. I therefore cordially recommend the "Elements of Rhetoric" as a most valuable acquisition to the existing supply of standard school books.

Very respectfully,

W. T. BRANTLY.

From the Rev. Dr. Samuel K. Jennings, President of Asbury College, Baltimore.

Baltimore, June 29, 1831.

Dear Sir—Agreeably to your request, I have devoted a little time to the "Elements of Rhetoric, by John A. Getty, A.M."

The work begins with very clear and satisfactory definitions of the Elements of Rhetoric, intended to educate the youthful mind for a ready invention and proper disposition; the whole made familiar by appropriate examples, extracted from the English, Latin, and Greek classics. These are followed by excellent definitions and examples, preparatory to an accomplished elocution. In this part of the work, I am particularly pleased to find an old acquaintance, the tropes and figures of speech in rhyme, which I have often felt a wish to see introduced in this way into general use.

In the conclusion we have an epitome of all that is important in pro-

nunciation, elucidated by examples, suited to that part of the general subject. This summary, together with an annunciation that it is given in view of the reports of the merit of the work made by Dr. Waters and Mr. Power, and in which I heartily concur, will sufficiently evince my approbation of Mr. Getty's book.

I am, respectfully, yours,

SAML. K. JENNINGS, M.D.

From the Rev. Francis Waters, D.D., Baltimore.

REV. DR. JENNINGS.

Baltimore, June 28, 1831.

Dear Sir—I thank you for a perusal of the “Elements of Rhetoric, by John A. Getty, A.M.” It is, in my opinion, a very respectable book. The rules and principles of the science are well arranged and illustrated by the author, at the same time that he has defined them with becoming precision and clearness. The additional figures which he has introduced, and the simplicity of their classification, will, no doubt, be estimated as a great advantage. To all learners the treatise will be useful, but to classical students in particular, it will serve as an excellent manual in cultivating this beautiful part of polite and finished education.

Very truly and respectfully,

F. WATERS.

From Michael Power, A.M., Professor of Languages, Asbury College, Baltimore.

REV. DR. JENNINGS.

Baltimore, June 29, 1831.

Dear Sir—Having examined the “Elements of Rhetoric, by John A. Getty, A.M.,” as carefully as the limited time allowed me would permit, I cheerfully concur in opinion with the Rev. F. Waters, and will, in a short time, introduce the work into my school.

Respectfully, your ob't serv't,

M. POWER.

From the New York American.

“Elements of Rhetoric, for the use of Colleges, Academies, and Schools, by John A. Getty.” The sole aim of this little volume appears to be, to exhibit, in a concise and methodical form, the chief elements of rhetoric, as expounded by the most authoritative ancient and modern writers, accompanied with illustrations and examples. By means of questions and answers the principles of the art are developed and explained; and the authority on which the answer is made, is, in all cases, quoted at the bottom of the page. It is, therefore, in the nature of a digest of the whole code of rhetoric, which, scattered through many volumes, is here reduced to its essence in about 120 pages. The explanations of the different tropes and figures of speech are given (for the sake, we presume, of aiding the memory) in a sort of doggerel—both in English and Latin—upon the same principle, and of about the same merit, as the “Propria quæ maribus” of the old Latin grammars. We are well pleased with this little book, which displays more than ordinary research and learning.

From the Baltimore Chronicle.

“Elements of Rhetoric: exhibiting a methodical arrangement of all the important ideas of the ancient and modern writers. Designed for the use of Colleges, Academies, and Schools, by John A. Getty, A.M. Philadelphia.” This small volume appears to us well designed and well executed, and will be found highly useful to students and others disposed to improve in the attractive and noble science of rhetoric. The author has given a condensed view of what has been written on the subject by the most celebrated men of ancient and modern times, accompanied by satisfactory directions and explanations. This book could be read with advantage not only by young gentlemen preparing for professional life, but by their elders, and we hope that it will receive the patronage to which it is entitled from the talents and industry of its author.

From J. R. Chandler, United States Gazette.

We have received from the author a copy of a neat work, entitled "Elements of Rhetoric: exhibiting a methodical arrangement of all the important ideas of ancient and modern rhetorical writers. By John A. Getty, A.M." The work is published by Mr. Littell, of this city, in a style creditable to his taste and liberality. It is rare, that with such a title, a book "destined for schools and academies," assumes such a radical form; the ideas, indeed, rather than the words of writers, are arranged, and the principles of composition and criticism carefully laid down. The work is the result of careful research, and will be found useful to those who seek a thorough acquaintance with rhetoric in its primary sense.

From the Baltimore Patriot.

Elements of Rhetoric.—"Song charms the sense, but eloquence the soul." Mr. Littell, of Philadelphia, has recently published a small treatise, intended to facilitate the progress of the student in this high reaching art. It is entitled the "Elements of Rhetoric: exhibiting a methodical arrangement of all the important ideas of the ancient and modern Rhetorical writers," and is designed for the use of Colleges, Academies, and Schools. The author is J. A. Getty, A.M., who states, in his preface to the work, that his chief design in its composition has been to facilitate the acquisition of those "high and sublime ideas of oratory which are interspersed throughout the ancient classics." The volume is of small size, but rich in examples tending to illustrate its object, drawn from the most approved sources. From a slight examination of the work, we are induced to think it will be favorably received by those every way competent to pass upon its merits.

From the Pennsylvania Inquirer.


Getty's Rhetoric.—This is the title of a very neat volume, which has just issued from the press of E. Littell, of this city. It is designed to exhibit a methodical arrangement of all the important ideas of the ancient and modern rhetorical writers, and is intended for the use of Colleges, Academies, and Schools. The subject, we think, is very happily and judiciously treated by the author, as the book is calculated fully to answer the purpose for which it is written. It gives a full, and what strikes us as a correct, analysis of the art of public speaking, and may be studied with advantage by all who design to practise such art.

From the New York Evening Post.

Getty's Elements of Rhetoric. E. Littell, of Philadelphia, has published a work with this title, compiled by John A. Getty, for the use of Schools. It consists of explanations of the various terms and definitions of the various figures of rhetoric, with examples of their use, from ancient and modern authors. If the object of the art of rhetoric be, as some author has said, to enable the rhetorician to name his tools, the present work, we believe, contains ample means of enabling him to do this to his satisfaction.

From the Saturday Bulletin.

Elements of Rhetoric: exhibiting a methodical arrangement of all the important ideas of the ancient and modern rhetorical writers: designed for the use of Colleges, Academies, and Schools. By John A. Getty, A.M. Philadelphia. The object of this work is very fully explained in the title. Mr. Getty has evidently bestowed much labor in getting up these Elements, and abundant evidence appears of his having consulted all the old writers, with many of the moderns. The study of elocution is one which the youth of this country have too much neglected, when it is known to open to the aspiring a sure road to fame and fortune. Mr. Getty's work appears well fitted to aid the student in attaining a knowledge of this most popular art.






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